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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The origin of this dissertation stems from a class research project that I completed in 2010
for Distinguished Professor Philip Abbott regarding the question: Is republicanism a viable
political ideology for Americans during the early 21 st century? I had chosen Wayne State
University specifically in order to study the differences of power that occur between the people
and the federal government. I was interested in the ballot initiatives that the people utilized in my
neighborhood of Detroit to solve problems, yet I could not understand the feeling of anxiety and
powerlessness, on my part, in regards for a preemptive war policy that was initiated by President
Bush and extended by President Obama. Hamilton, after all, was explicit in Federalist 69 that the
President would have no such power whatsoever. Dr. Abbott's work was relatively straightforward
for me to understand because of my training at James Madison College's Political Theory and
Constitutional Democracy program, where I enthusiastically read and analyzed the writings of the
Founders, Alexis de Tocqueville, Montesquieu, Adam Smith, Louis Hartz, and many others.
Admittedly, they said more than I ever imagined.
I entered the Ph.D. program ten years after receiving my Bachelor of Arts. I had read most
of Dr. Abbott's work before I entered his course on American political thought, and I was eager to
learn more about republicanism. During class, I purposefully sat next to him and was extremely
excited when he explained that we would need to begin a term paper and that he was passing
around a handout with relevant research questions. We needed to place our name next to one
specific question. I extended my hand at this, and with my thanks, he handed the paper to me for
first pick. My jaw dropped when I read the question on republicanism, and I smiled, feeling that I
found my place in it all.
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In my research paper for Dr. Abbott, I focused on restating how a few major republican
works describe core republican values and their possible relevance for understanding American
politics today (Pocock, 1975/2003; Geise, 1984; Pangle, 1990; Fowler, 1991; Smith, 1993; Bock,
Skinner & Viroli, 1993; Pettit, 1997, 1999; Viroli, 2002; Maynor, 2003; Kane, 2008). My research
paper provided a list of quotes by Pettit and Maynor mostly, and the theme of non-domination that
would force me to read up on the differences between authoritarianism and republicanism. As a
student of Dr. Abbott's, acknowledging that Liberalism exists in America as a system of values
which voters possess and use to elect progressive and traditional "liberals" during the 20 th century
was easy. However, I argued that Americans also share three core republican values that people
use to foster participation in self-government. They are:
•

Freedom: Freedom from domination, value-based non-domination policy

•

Virtue: Enjoin in a Common Good, value-based anti-corruption policy

•

Equality: Everyone else is your equal, value-based grassroots policy

The first republican core value that is prevalent in the literature is freedom. Regarding the past,
republicanism is the political language of freedom for all, and people apply republican values of
freedom by actively considering policies of non-domination. Since America's inception,
Machiavellian republicanism meant that "to be free means not to depend on the will of another"
(Maynor, 2003, p. 24). According to Machiavelli, freedom may be threatened in two ways. First,
freedom may be threatened by an external force, such as invasion. Second, internal self-interest
could allow people to dominate one another, which would eviscerate the expression of republican
virtue that is necessary to proliferate a Republic (Maynor, 2003, p. 24-25; Pocock, 1975/2003).
Americans were well-versed in Machiavellian republicanism (Maloy, 2011) and it contained ideas
of political liberty (Skinner, 1993, 1998, 2002; McCormick, 2001; Viroli, 2002).

3
In order to overcome threats to republican freedom in the public sphere, Americans directly
participate in politics through various legitimate movements to replace experiences of domination
with policies that create an experience of non-domination (Pettit, 1997). The abolition and
progressive movements from the former centuries as well as same-sex marriage and the Black
Lives Matter movements of this century may be deeply tied to freedom as non-domination. These
movements happen because "republican liberty" is a practice of "self-government, on the one hand,
and personal security, on the other" (Pangle, 1990, p. 47). Republican freedom happens because
legislating the value of non-domination secures you (1) from anxiety of interference, (2) reduces
the need to anticipate arbitrary interference, and (3) increases trust and stability (Maynor 2003, pp.
44-45). Freedom means to be free from domination in private and public life and to be able to
enjoy non-domination in the Public Space.
The second value is virtue. Republicanism is a political language that requires citizens to
embrace virtue in order to belong to the "vivere civile and civilità" that is protected by a
government that is run by the people (Bock, Skinner, & Viroli, 1993, p. 31). Within a society,
"Fortuna," an external force designed to tempt one away from virtue, puts every person "into a life
of corruption" (Maynor 2003, p. 27). Essentially, the people are able to create a Common Good
while they vigilantly root out corruption (Maynor, 2003, pp. 27-30). During America's beginnings,
Americans valued republicanism to enable them to "escape from a conflict between virtue and
corruption" (Pocock, 1975/2003, p. 538).
People call on civic virtue as a duty to engage in political action in order to encourage the
representatives in government to administer laws in a way that is impartial, transparent, and
contestable (Pettit, 2012). For example, "contemporary democracies naturally give life to
watchdog, activist bodies – nongovernmental organizations – that operate locally, nationally, and
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internationally across various domains of political life" (Pettit, 2012, p. 226). While liberalism
certainly allows all people to have an equal opportunity to be involved in the electoral process or
to abstain from it, scholars of republicanism find that exclusion from political processes alienates
people, and collective liberty vanishes (Maynor 2003, p. 28).
The third value is equality. The republican structure encourages individuals to form
grassroots movements in order to constantly question how the state may interfere to promote ideals
and values of non-domination through a spirit of equality. When individuals through movements
and associations practice republican doctrine to support equality, the government may abandon
liberal neutrality "without restricting the freedom enjoyed by its citizens" and enhance the people's
ability to position their own choices to maximize non-domination (Maynor, 2003, p. 82). This
happens because people equally control their government since each person has "equal access to a
popular system of unconditioned or independent influence that pushes government in an equally
acceptable direction," with special consideration for activity that is efficacious (Pettit, 2012, p.
179). For example, the eyeball test (we are equals as individuals when eye to eye) is an index
regarding private domination, and the tough-luck test (you lost through tough luck, not corruption)
is an index "of whether the guards against public domination are efficacious" (Pettit, 2012, p. 176).
The former tests are possible because of a value for equality that is shared by individuals who
support the republican element of the culture.
In my research paper, I pointed to the political rhetoric during the American Founding as
evidence for the historical significance of republican values in the United States. For instance,
James Madison explained in Federalist 37 that a major requisite design for the American
government was "the inviolable attention due to liberty and to the republican form" (emphasis
added, Rossiter, 1992, p. 226). Hamilton wrote in Federalist 84, "The establishment of the
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writ…prohibition of ex post facto… are perhaps greater security to liberty and republicanism than
any it [constitution] contains" (Rossiter 1992, p. 511). Indeed, Alexander Hamilton opened in
Federalist 1 with a pronouncement for, "…conformity of the proposed Constitution to the true
principles of republican government…" (Rossiter 1992, p. 36). Hamilton, in Federalist 85,
revealed, "The additional securities to republican government, to liberty, and to property… consist
chiefly in the restraints which the preservation of the Union will impose on local factions and
insurrections, and on the ambition of powerful individuals within single States… despots of the
people…" (Rossiter 1992, p. 521). As a lengthy example, James Madison wrote in Federalist 39:
The first question that offers itself is whether the general form and aspect of the government
be strictly republican. It is evident that no other form would be reconcilable with the genius
of the people of America; with the fundamental principles of the Revolution; or with that
honorable determination which animates every votary of freedom to rest all our political
experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government. If the plan of the convention,
therefore, be found to depart from the republican character, its advocates must abandon it
as no longer defensible (emphasis added, Rossiter 1992, p. 240).
Indeed, the Constitution explicitly says in Article IV, Section 4, that, "The United States shall
guarantee to every State in this union a Republican Form of Government…" (Rossiter 1992, p.
539).
After making my case for the historical significance of republicanism during the Founding,
I made my argument for its relevance after Ratification, focusing on Joyce Appleby's summary of
republican developments according to historians during the antebellum era (1985). In her words,
"While most scholars would agree that the possibility of institutionalizing the civic values extolled
in classical republicanism ended with the ratification of the Constitution, these articles give vivid
proof of the fact that the vitality of republican ideals not only persisted but continued to embarrass
the progress of liberal values in America" (p. 472). "Republicanism slipped into the scholarly
lexicon in the late 1960s and has since become the most protean concept for those working on the
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culture of antebellum America" (p. 461). I find that there is a large gap in the literature regarding
republicanism after ratification (political scientists) as well as the antebellum era (historians).
I met with Professor Abbott to consider extending the research paper into a dissertation
project in order to document whether or not republicanism is relevant to Americans during the
early 21st century. He explained that he thought my claim for the on-going relevance of
republicanism was a heavy lift. The prevailing view among students of political culture, derived
from the work of Louis Hartz (1955), is that liberalism (in the Adam Smith sense of the term) is
the dominant value system in the United States. Even among historians like Pocock (1975/2003)
and others (Wood, 1969; Bailyn, 1967, 1970), who argue for the relevance of republican core
values during the American Founding and Antebellum era, he observed, it is generally accepted
that republicanism did not hold much sway on the American people for very long after the
ratification of the Constitution. In light of that observation, the heavy lift began to appear to be
extremely improbable for me.
While resting at Santa Monica Beach, California, since I arrived early to visit family before
the APSA Teaching and Learning Conference in Long Beach, I listened to the pacific waves and
watched surfers try to ride them. I started to read a book that I had recently purchased, Kalyvas
and Katznelson's (2008), Liberal Beginnings: Making a Republic for the Moderns. They set down
at the beginning that there were major shifts by Americans to liberalism after Ratification, and to
my chagrin, republican values have been essentially dead in the United States for more than 200
years as a major cause of political change at the national level. In their words, after Ratification,
"As a freestanding model, republicanism disappeared" (p. 5). I recalled that Dr. Abbott thought
that most political scientists would find the kinds of evidence for the on-going relevance of
republican values that I presented in my research project underwhelming.
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Still, I was captivated, indubitably intoxicated really, as to whether or not republicanism
was an alternative for Americans to the liberal tradition. I watched a surfer last for five seconds
and then remembered that I had gingerly responded to Dr. Abbott that scholars are beginning to
notice that liberalism is incapable of resolving serious problems, like inequality (Przeworski,
2010). Like the surfer under water, I subjected that such a call for republicanism by the Federalists
and others could not have dissipated so quickly after 1787 if Ratification was the defining moment
of their legacy, because they would likely protect the Constitution during the following decades of
political activity by renewing the spirit of republicanism.
As a starting point for such a project, Dr. Abbott suggested that I connect American
republican values expressed in debates by the Founders, when republican political values were
thought to be prevalent, with the corresponding political practices that happened after Ratification
at the national level. If republican values were ubiquitous in America during the antebellum era,
as Bailyn (1992) and others (Appleby, 1985; Pocock, 1975/2003) argue, then researching archival
data during that time period should provide me with ample evidence of republican practices at
work upon the completion of my dissertation, thereby providing further support for their argument,
and if I was lucky, a salient contribution to culture, thought, or policy studies. More importantly,
it would provide me with a baseline by which to potentially demonstrate the on-going relevance
of republicanism to American political thought after Ratification in the event those practices
continued to be employed.
A possible answer as to whether republican practices continued after Ratification emerged
from conversations with Jeff Grynaviski, an Associate Professor of Political Science at Wayne
State who later became my chair. He was working on a critique of William Riker’s, "The Senate
and American Federalism" (1955), which argues that the United States Senate failed to accomplish
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its intended "peripheralizing" function because the right of states to instruct their Senators as to
how they should act together with the authority to recall and replace those who failed to adhere to
their instructions, which was a prominent feature of government under the Articles of
Confederation, was not provided for under the Constitution of 1787. In that work, Riker (1955)
identifies only a handful of instances when state legislatures attempted to instruct their Senators,
mostly during the 1830s, when President Jackson tried to subvert the practice to advance his
political agenda by calling on the people and Governors to induce the State Legislatures to pass a
resolution of instruction with the intent of forcing their U.S. Senator to abide or resign.
Whereas Riker (1955) mentioned only a smattering of instructions in his seminal work,
Professor Grynaviski reported in a 2010 lecture that there are thousands of examples of such
resolves in the records of Congress. He suggested that this may badly understate the actual number
issued by the states. He argued, persuasively, that state legislatures would not have spent unknown
but probably exhaustive amounts of time on debates over issues, both contentious and banal, if
they were perceived to be irrelevant by state legislatures (Grynaviski, 2008). However, Dr.
Grynaviski found little evidence to suggest that they regulated the principal-agent relationship
between Senators and the state they represented in the same way under the Constitution of 1787
as they did between Delegates to the Confederation Congress and the states under the Articles of
Confederation. He was stumped on the question as to the purpose of these instructions.
When he posed this puzzle to students, I dug in my feet and suggested that these were
examples of republican values influencing American politics on a large scale. I had been studying
republicanism for the past two years under the direction of Professor Abbott and I took this to be
exactly the kind of republican practice that he suggested I seek. That is because the Founders
understood republicanism to be a shared commitment to individual liberty, just procedures, broad-
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based political participation, and direct popular control of the government. To people of that
generation, the republican practice of petitioning epitomized republican freedom, virtue, and
equality. Further, it was thought to carry with it particular moral weight when drafted and signed
by committees or conventions of the people (Greenberg, 1977; Bailyn, 1992; Wood 2011, 2011b).
The amateur politicians of the early-19th century who occupied American state legislatures surely
thought of themselves as committees of the people and, by extension, resolutions passed by state
legislatures and sent to their representatives in Congress was an example of a republican practice—
of direct popular control. I argued that his collection of instructions is, at least partially, quantitative
proof that republicanism existed as a republican practice for many decades after Ratification. It
was exactly the kind of evidence that I was looking for.
In this dissertation, the assertion that Resolutions of Instruction happened because
Americans practiced their core republican values to directly control the General Government by
means of self-government (for the ends of fortifying and enjoying life in an Extended Republic) is
the central thesis. In my three empirical chapters, the examples of republicanism should exhibit
that (1) the people did petition the General Government, such as through petitions and resolutions
of instruction and (2) the national representatives did acknowledge and respectively act on the
people's political documents, with attention paid to the defense of republican self-government. If
each chapter confirms this (thesis), then republicanism likely continued as an influential political
value system after Ratification, challenging the claims of historians like Louis Hartz (1955) who
argued that republicanism declined precipitously immediately after ratification as well as to
provide political scientists with a better understanding regarding the influence of republicanism in
the U.S. well into the 19th century.
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Organization of Dissertation
In Chapter Two, I revisit Tocqueville and discuss how he denoted four mores, or elements
of the culture, to illustrate the major sources of influence regarding American politics. After
providing a glimpse of Tocqueville’s (1835 | 1988) observations of authoritarianism based on
paternalism, liberalism based on free markets, republicanism based on enlightened self-interest,
and Biblical Thought from religious participants, I support Tocqueville's observations by
accounting for recent literature pertaining to authoritarianism, liberalism, and republicanism, with
a special focus on American republicanism during the Founders' generation. The review of the
literature reveals that the latter three value systems are unique. There is a gap in the literature
regarding the importance of republicanism after Ratification from a political science perspective.
In Chapter Three, historians widely support the claim that the spirit of republicanism and
its practices were prominent across America during the antebellum era (Appleby, 1985), however,
political scientists quickly dispensed with the theory of republican self-government during the
modern era because the peripheralizing function apparently died with the ratification of the
Constitution (Riker, 1955). To fill this gap in the literature, I propose that some institutions are
adopted because they are seen to be a desirable means, possibly without regard to the ends.
Americans practiced republicanism as a means to assert their political values, but there is little
evidence of this happening within the federal government as a response to self-governing practices.
Riker's conclusion of a centrally-directed Republic during the antebellum era was probably
the result of the biased sample of ROI since the practice of Instruction happened over 2,000 times
in the Senate during the antebellum era (Grynaviski, 2010). This evidence suggests that the people
and their state legislatures probably did peripheralize the U.S. Senate because they were
"republicans." Dr. Grynaviski’s collection provides a more accurate picture of the actual amount
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than Riker, for example, Table 3.1 shows that there was an enthusiastic increase after Jackson's
presidency in all parts of the country (Girdwood & Grynaviski, 2014). Because the amount of ROI
and their upward growth by decade is evidence to suggest that the people exhibited republican core
values through ROI during the antebellum era across the nation, the historians' finding of a
prevalent republicanism were probably correct in that the state legislatures were functioning as a
clearinghouse for ROI to be sent to the United States Senate for due consideration.
The literature shows that many Americans shared a sense of anti-instruction sentiment
and these citizens, particularly from the South and of the Whig Party, supported an independent
national body that was free from the people and their local and state representatives. Meanwhile,
a vastly greater percentage of Americans "believed in" the doctrine of Instruction as a "republican"
practice that was emblematic of their identity as an American—he who did not trust the people to
govern themselves was Anti-American. Nevertheless, William Riker (1955) was cogent in that the
people and state legislatures during the 20th century were not utilizing the practice of passing
a ROI at the state level in order to direct the Senator’s vote or to a recall recalcitrant Senator. If
conventions, petitions, and resolutions of instruction defines the preeminent republican
peripheralizing roles, perhaps because of an accompanying republican moment, then who would
say that Americans practice republicanism after the 1950s?
In Chapter Four, I find that there is little difference regarding the role of Instruction before
and after the Battle of Yorktown during the Founding period. The republican practice of
Instruction was openly practiced by the Founders during the times of a secret government during
the Revolutionary War as well as after the British surrender. Throughout the period, I find that the
"republican" practice of Instruction was evident as a show of self-government. The data clearly
demonstrates that Instruction once played an integral role as a practice of republicanism by the
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American representatives of the people at the national level from 1775 through 1789. James
Madison and others did actively express a belief in republican values, which caused Instruction to
become the central process for implementing political change at the national level. Examples of
Instruction operating in the same manner before and after the Revolutionary War include land
disputes, calls for convention, and calls for the national body to wait on local entities to explain
themselves.
For example, first and foremost, conventions were called in Philadelphia in order to declare
Independence (before) in the same fashion that a convention was called for in order to pass the
Constitution in the backwoods of Danville, Kentucky (after). Second, Instruction was used to
inhibit action in the Continental Congress in similar manners before and after Yorktown. During
the war, Instruction inhibited New York Delegates during 1776 from voting for Independence and
to preserve and re-establish harmony between Great Britain and the Colonies. After the war,
Mr. Fitzsimmons urged a postponement until the sentiments of New Jersey were expressed and
until the Delaware delegates received their instructions from their state before choosing how to
vote in the Confederate Congress during 1783. Before and after Yorktown, the inhabitants
guaranteed unto themselves a self-government and the national representatives of the people
repeatedly engaged Instruction in order to ascertain the sentiments of the people, including
Delegate James Madison's request of Thomas Jefferson to explicitly provide Madison with
instructions

regarding

the

Virginians'

approach

to

dealing

with

Spain.

Finally,

Instruction settled land disputes based on the sentiments of the inhabitants. The call for selfgovernment on the people’s terms by Whipple regarding Rhode Island (1778) as well as
the contestatory nature between the people from different states along the Delaware River
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(1783) allowed for peaceful political change in order to overcome a potentially explosive
stalemate between states.
Therefore, the evidence highly suggests that there was little to no difference in the role
Instruction played before and after the Battle of Yorktown in America, even though the ROI after
the battle were much more clear and concise as political documents. The evidence suggests that
Instruction stemmed from the republican element of the culture because the practice ultimately
rested on the sentiments of the people and self-government throughout the revolutionary period.
The use of Instruction was significant in causing fundamental changes to the governing of
Americans by the federal government because of exhibitions of direct popular control that were
initiated and supported by all the Delegates. This suggests that the element of republicanism was
durable from 1775 through 1789 as a peripheralizing political value system that spanned the
national landscape because the federal representatives shared "republican" values. The American
Founders practiced republicanism as a means to assert their political values.
In Chapter Five, petitions provided lawmakers an opportunity to allow Americans "equal
access to influence" the federal government regarding republican norms (Pettit, 2012), but this
access to government was stifled by the majority party on authoritarian grounds. Even though
aliens and Sabbath breakers were thought to be less of than an equal citizen by some House
members (as indicative of authoritarianism), the people were provided a voting record on the yeas
and nays in response to their petitions during the debate process. There were repeated calls by
some members of the House to call for the yeas and nays regarding confirmation of support for
and opposition to the Alien and Sedition laws as a public answer to the petitioners regarding this
access point to the federal government. This is an example of petitions that were peripheralizing
the House of Representatives.
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Meanwhile, House members in the majority party loyal to President Adams treated the
petitioners and their petitions with scorn. The final committee report is questionably a note of
authoritarianism because it appears to have been based on misinformation and disinformation,
especially once we recall that James Madison argued vehemently that there was no French
connection with American republicanism. The majority party clearly found in the select committee
report a need for the laws to continue because of a belief in paternalism. Therefore, I did not find
that the peripheralizing function caused meaningful changes to transpire against the Alien and
Sedition laws because the House majority supported authoritarianism and their authoritarianism
prevailed over the House minority who openly supported republicanism. In this way, I offer an
original study of multiple traditions.
Considering republicanism, the results confirm that the American people practiced
republican values openly, and their representatives also openly supported republican values in the
House of Representatives as a core value. Two supporting measures are the gross number of pages
in the Journal dedicated to the debate as well as the contextual evidence by Gallatin and others to
vehemently defend republican values on the House floor. This supports the idea that broad-based
participation was tied to meaningful practices to peripheralize the federal government regarding
the Alien and Sedition laws under standard House procedure.
The majority party’s deliberate move to send the petitions regarding the repeal of the Alien
and Sedition laws to a select committee (to ‘go-bye’) was a point of departure from the republican
tradition. This point of departure helps to explain why so many Americans would defend the
principles of the Revolution by choosing “Republicans” in what became known as the Revolution
of 1800. Republican norms of transparency, contestability, and impartiality (Pettit, 2012) were
evident through the record of debate in the House regarding the Alien and Sedition laws to a limited
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degree. Americans as nonelected individual participants did enjoin and sign petitions for the
federal representatives to respond to what they perceived to be impolitic and unconstitutional laws,
and the petitioners' Representatives did empower their constituents by openly defending the
petitions in the House of Representatives.
The evidence supports the hypotheses of republicanism and authoritarianism. House
members presented and defended copious amounts of petitions from their constituents on the
House floor to repeal the Alien and Sedition laws because of a shared belief in republicanism.
However, after extended debate, the minority party who supported the petitioners lost the ability
to peripheralize the House once the petitions were sent to a select committee, since the committee
reported on the petitions to the Chamber for a vote regarding two new resolutions that explicitly
supported the laws. This action invalidated the petitioners' petitions calling for the repeal of the
two laws. The select committee report was, considering James Madison’s views, largely based on
authoritarianism considering misinformation, disinformation, and paternalism.
In Chapter Six, I continue to document whether Americans relied on republicanism as a
means to express their republican values after Ratification. I provide the context and treatment of
a sample of one hundred and sixteen Resolutions of Instruction that were recorded in the Senate
Journal from 1789 through 1819. Of these, only a singular ROI was discharged as a nuisance from
an independent Senate, which points to the fact that senators increasingly utilized the practice of
Instruction after Ratification. The evidence suggests that state legislatures increasingly played an
important role as a broker of power between the people and the federal representatives in regards
for the maintenance of a Republic. From light-houses to westward expansion and constitutional
change, ROI were, to some degree, organized by the state legislatures to peripheralize the U.S.
Senate. The republican practice of Instruction through state legislatures mattered during the
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Founders' generation as a means for being a republican, but republican values were at times
sequestrated by the people and their representatives because some representatives supported other
elements of the American culture, such as authoritarianism, considering the practice of westward
expansion.
The evidence in this chapter supports four key claims. First, ROI increased quantitatively
over the years (Table 6.1 & Table 6.2). Second, ROI were increasingly sent to committee and
passed while they were decreasingly open for debate (Pie Chart 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, Table 6.3, & Table
6.4). Third, the presenter of the ROI changed over time from the president to senators on average
as senators found messages from state legislatures to be more important over time (Line Graph
6.1). Finally, the nature of the communication by resolutions changed over time from a description
of local matters, such as the location of a lighthouse, to national and constitutional issues (Line
Graph 6.2). This happened because Americans were directing self-government through their state
legislatures and ROI provided an established and routine practice to coordinate inter-governmental
relationships at a time when the Senate infrequently met. These results suggest that the
peripheralizing function continued long after Ratification in support of the historians' and not the
political scientists' perspective regarding American republicanism at the federal level after
Ratification.
This incorporation of ROI by the Senate was a processing of the peripheralizing function.
ROI were increasingly introduced and delegated to a number of senators who would serve on the
special committee to determine how to incorporate ROI. Republicanism grew during the decades
after Ratification regarding the federal government, contrary to contemporary assertions from
political scientists that republicanism was basically dead after Ratification. I find support for the
historians' long-held conclusion that republicanism dominated the founding and antebellum eras.
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However, the evidence also illustrates many exhibitions of authoritarianism that were present and
powerful. There were clearly torrents of authoritarianism (race supremacy) embedded into the
decision-making process of ROI in regards for westward expansion. Thus, I find support for
republicanism as a legitimate and stand-alone system after Ratification in light of ROI practices
and I contribute an original study of Multiple Traditions because of exhibitions of authoritarianism.
Future work should consider applying a Multiple Traditions approach to political inquiry with
special consideration for republicanism, liberalism, and authoritarianism.
Summary
The focus of this dissertation is to reveal how Americans supportive of republican values
applied them in practice before and after Ratification. The evidence in the literature widely
supports the idea that republicanism strengthened after Ratification until its practices suddenly
died off [when Abraham Lincoln took on the Republican Party brand and the bloody Civil War
began in earnest] through the practice of Instruction (Chapter Three). A closer look at documents
regarding the development of Instruction from 1775 to 1789 (Chapter Four), petitions to oppose
prominent national laws and a responsive House during 1798 and 1799 (Chapter Five), and the
Senate's treatment of Resolutions of Instruction from 1789 to 1819 (Chapter Six), will begin to
provide social scientists with systematic documentation that republicanism was an influential
political value system because the people and their representatives exhibited republicanism as a
means for engaging in politics from 1775 through 1819. In Chapter Seven, I review the evidence
of this dissertation in order to ascertain whether the element of republicanism was influential at
the national level as a cause of action regarding American politics with respect for the Founders'
generation.
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Whether republicanism is a freestanding political value system during the early 21 st century
is beyond the scope of this dissertation. My contribution is to document examples regarding
republicanism as a political value system at least through the early-19th century so that social
scientists may attempt to develop a more vigorous research agenda in regards for a systematic
consideration of the elements of the American culture, specifically republicanism, amongst other
political traditions, such as authoritarianism and liberalism. I hope to provide a sturdy bridge across
the breach between historians and political scientists regarding the significance of the element of
republicanism that Americans used as a means to engage in politics to cause action at the national
level during the Founders' generation. My answers will hopefully encourage additional research to
be accomplished by social scientists in regards for Multiple Traditions (Smith, 1993; Hero, 2003).
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CHAPTER 2: FIRST LITERATURE REVIEW, MORES
Introduction: The Multiple Elements of the American Culture
This dissertation aims to fill two very different gaps in the literature. The first gap
concerns republicanism. The second concerns the role of resolutions of instruction in American
history. For organizational clarity, I have decided to review the literatures on these two related
but distinct sets of ideas in two different chapters. In this chapter, I review the core values of
republicanism to show that this element is, or at least may have been, a unique political tradition
amongst multiple traditions within the national political landscape. Political scientists generally
agree on what constitutes as core republican values, such as freedom as non-domination, virtue
as civic duty without corruption, and equality as equal access to influence (Chapter One);
however, no one has explicitly clarified how American republicanism is distinct from the other
political elements of the American political culture. It is difficult to ascertain where an element
stops, like liberalism, and another, like republicanism, begins (Stears, 2007). By reviewing how
the elements of the culture are unique / distinct within the American culture in this chapter, I will
be able in the following chapter to review whether the literature in regards for Resolutions of
Instruction during the antebellum era exemplified aspects of the republican, and not the liberal,
element of the American culture.
The American political traditions of republicanism, liberalism, and authoritarianism are
available to Americans online as elements of a complex culture. These political languages have
endured over many generations, from region to region, in the United States. Yet, no one has
established a cogent approach regarding how to establish whether or not multiple elements are
powerfully influencing American politics. The field of political science does not yet offer an
empirically-grounded approach to study the American culture as an inquiry of multiple traditions.
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In practical terms, it is clear that liberalism dominates the American political landscape. An
entrenched stalemate has arisen because researchers of multiple traditions, such as liberalism and
republicanism, find that liberalism is dominant compared to other available political languages
(Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swindler, & Tipton, 1985; Smith, 1993, 1997). Today, most scholars
focus on aspects within the liberal tradition without considering authoritarianism or republicanism.
One needs to ask whether or not an empirically-grounded approach to America’s political culture
in regards to multiple traditions is possible, and if republicanism is relevant to Americans during
the early 21st century.
To discover the roots of the American culture, I revisit Tocqueville (1988/1835) to analyze
his four value systems, or mores, that he found were constantly affecting American politics.
Tocqueville argued that these mores were the basis for American politics because the exhibited
values from these mores on behalf of Americans constituted the parts of a whole national political
dialogue. This dissertation will attempt to prove that mores are instructive and are historically
grounded as independent elements of America’s complex culture. Specifically, I seek to determine
whether the republican element of the culture remained influential, at least partially, after
Ratification. The remainder of this chapter completes an inquiry with respect for the core values
of liberalism, republicanism, and authoritarianism and borrows heavily from a paper that I
published in a peer-reviewed journal, Journal of Behavioral and Social Sciences, Volume 3, Issue
3, "America's Multiple Political Elements of a United Culture" (Girdwood, 2016).
Revisiting Tocqueville’s Mores as Elements of the Political Culture
Tocqueville (1988/1835) attempted to capture the political values expressed by Americans
throughout the United States during the early-1830s in his seminal work, Democracy in America.
This book is almost entirely a reflection of multiple political belief systems that, according to
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Tocqueville, governed American life, which together created the fabric of the national existence—
a united culture. The book is not about legislative activity or elections; for example, the book does
not explain how representatives vote on issues based on partisanship or ideology. To Tocqueville,
the core values in the hearts of all Americans formed the substance of a complex political dialogue,
which is the basis for American politics writ large.
Tocqueville observed four major value systems or mores. First, there was a new type of
authoritarianism which was like a soft despotism. This was a form of paternalism in that the
government was viewed as the shepherd of the people and the sheep do not have a voice. Second,
there was widespread liberalism, which means that an individual was able to advance in a free
market with equal opportunity across the nation. This market was protected by elected
representatives in government. Third, he identified republicanism as enlightened self-interest and
local political participation to advance equality, resources, efficacy, and actions in support of
a common good (i.e., a Good Republic). The people generated the direction of public policy by
directly participating in government, and power resides with the people. Finally, Tocqueville
explored how Biblical Thought transcended American politics and kept the other political
elements of the culture in check. God was the messenger in the open system of politics that
everyone respected.
Tocqueville (1988/1835) evaluated the American political culture in terms of value
systems, or mores (Latin, moeurs). These mores were, "one of the great general causes responsible
for the maintenance of a democratic republic in the United States" (p. 287). Mores were the "habits
of the heart" that framed the "different notions possessed by men, the various opinions current
among them, and the sum of ideas that shape mental habits" (ibid). American mores during the
early-1830s were the main elements to support its political institutions (ibid). This distinction
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presupposes that multiple core values affected American politics because multiple elements of the
culture weaved the core values into the fabric of American life.
Tocqueville (1988/1835) noted liberalism’s strengths during the antebellum era through
debates about capitalism and the ways by which people experienced a marketplace as
entrepreneurs in a free market economy. The democratic people as individuals work for a living
and working for money is necessary, natural, and honest (1988, p. 550). Tocqueville suggested
that making money is honorable and, "the desire for prosperity is universal, fortunes are middling
and ephemeral, and everyone needs to increase his resources or create fresh ones for his children,
all see quite clearly that it is profit which, if not wholly then at least partially, prompts them to
work" (pp. 550-551). He further suggested that everyone respects the dollar because there "is
nothing humiliating about the idea of receiving a salary, for the President of the United States
works for a salary" (p. 551). Americans share a sense that individuals who work hard will earn a
place in the middle class and expect the representatives in government to protect a free
marketplace. Liberalism was part of the American political experience.
Tocqueville (1988/1835) noticed an abundance of tightly knit republican political
communities in early America, especially near Boston. These American towns and cities
demonstrated that people were more committed to ideas of enlightened individualism, whereby
materialism was secondary to the wiser idea of a common good, which all Americans should help
facilitate through politics once in convention. The people did convene often. The common good
might, at times, exclude liberal values because republican values are strongly opposed to rapacious
capitalism, and debates are not premised on materialism or individual prosperity, specifically,
capitalism.
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As Tocqueville (1988/1835) observed, there is not more "egoism among us [French people]
than in America; the only difference is that there it is enlightened, while here it is not. Every
American has the sense to sacrifice some of his private interests to save the rest" (p. 527).
Republicanism often appeared to penetrate civil society because, "the age of blind sacrifice and
instinctive virtues is already long past," but this new age of enlightened self-interest may not last
without public education (p. 528). Republicanism was the major political force in many northern
communities, such as political power being organized and distributed through town hall meetings
for the benefit of the community. Republicanism was part of the American political experience.
Tocqueville (1988/1835) commented at length on American authoritarianism. He was
especially concerned that a soft despotism might eviscerate the notions of equality shared by
Americans to the point that America would become an authoritarian state. This could happen when
the people demanded paternalism, or to be under the control of the state, whereas the state provided
the resources for the benefit of people so long as the people obeyed the rules determined by the
state (pp. 691-3). Authoritarianism in America would not engender a military dictatorship; rather,
the people would observe a government that guided all social and economic decisions through the
application of paternalistic principles to the marketplaces and public spaces.
This would be possible because authoritarian regimes expand as an equality of servitude
so that the people’s political options are suppressed by the public authority. The government stifles
the expressions of liberalism and republicanism in exchange for resources that the people are not
allowed to facilitate themselves. Authoritarianism would be evident when, "in the end each nation
is no more than a flock of timid and hardworking animals with the government as its shepherd"
(Tocqueville, p. 692). For instance, the antebellum South exhibited an almost ubiquitous
governmental structure and citizenry operating under authoritarian patterns of social, economic,
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and political behavior during the antebellum era (Kohn, 2002). Authoritarianism was part of the
American experience.
Finally, Tocqueville (1988/1835) observed Biblical Thought as an element in the American
political culture. Biblical Thought affected the American political culture across the nation because
its mores guard the "soul" from material pleasures and "imposes on each man some obligations
toward mankind, to be performed in common with the rest of mankind, and so draws him away,
from time to time, from thinking about himself" (pp. 444-445). American priests, "take an interest
in the progress of industry… do not forbid the honest pursuit of prosperity… seek to discover the
points of connection and alliance" in society for the Father’s flock (p. 449). In America, "Religion
is considered as the guardian of mores, and mores are regarded as the guarantee of the laws and
pledge for the maintenance of freedom itself" (p. 47). A belief in God mattered as part of the
American political experience.
Of particular salience, Tocqueville (1988/1835) found that each political element of the
culture enforced its own "majority opinion" against serious deviants from within the dominant
element governing the region (Hortwitz, 1966; Maletz, 2002). Deviance from acceptable mores in
one’s community often meant an informal, and sometimes formal, denial of citizenship for the
deviant. The result was that individualistic deviance from the majority opinion resulted in the
deviant being outcast by a tyranny of the majority. In America, according to Tocqueville, "the germ
of tyranny" is widespread because what is "…most repulsive in America is not the extreme
freedom reigning there but the shortage of guarantees against tyranny" (p. 252). As a result, when
the majority opinion is against you in a land with limited laws and a limited government, "you
must submit" (ibid). An American from the North in the 1830s would not espouse southern
authoritarian values in the North, and vice versa, because he would be outcast. Thus, each region
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expressed distinctly republican, liberal, or authoritarian values to affect the governing practices
between the people and their government. An individual during the 1830s was consigned,
depending on location, to the authoritarian, liberal, or republican tradition in the town center and
their collective belief in God allowed them to stave off the other elements of the culture in order
to maintain a peaceful status quo, since each element is fundamentally antithetical to every other
element besides Providence.
Tocqueville clearly observed that there are multiple political elements within the American
culture and that these elements exclude one another whenever possible. This means that each
political element, whether it is republicanism, liberalism or authoritarianism, would not benefit
from the manifestation of the others. Therefore, individuals would be drawn to one political
language which imbued their community because of their social environment. Each individual
would likely recognize the dominant political element that governed their community, such as a
neighbor who organized a meeting in Boston, or Iowa, to engage in a town hall meeting—perhaps
to pass a resolution—as an act of participating in self-government on republican grounds. This
illustrates how mores are freestanding political value systems, regionally, because the people
belong to one of these systems of government locally in America. However, the culture as a whole
was complex with at least four major political traditions being practiced at the national level by
politicians. The traditions, or elements, together created the chorus of the national public discourse
that was the embodiment of Culture as various political expressions. (Figure 2.1)
In sum, Tocqueville witnessed in America:
•

A widespread Liberalism in regards to the right of each individual to have had an equal

opportunity to be able to advance within a free marketplace as an entrepreneur. The market was
protected by elected representatives in the government and could be taxed and regulated for the
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benefit of the people, according to their will as exhibited through the results of democratic
elections.
•

A new type of Authoritarianism in that there were people who consider themselves to

belong to a "superior class" and who control a "second class" of citizens on paternalistic
grounds. The “second class” did not have a legitimate voice with which they could oppose their
rulers.
•

A form of Republicanism where the people engaged in political activity to defend and

expand opportunities for equality, resources, efficacy, and action in order to facilitate a common
good. This happened because individuals practiced an enlightened self-interest through direct
participation and focused on the growth of the community.
•

An omnipresent Belief in God, but a belief that was interpreted differently according to the

mores that were strongest in each region of the country. God was seen to be the messenger in the
open system of politics. A belief in God was a check on all other languages from over-expansion.
Considering Tocqueville’s observations in regards to the American political culture, Figure
2.1 illustrates the four mores which he thought contributed to the political discourse in American
political life. The culture consists of political discourse that is informed by the values stemming
from these four elements over generations.
Literature on Liberalism, Authoritarianism, and Republicanism
Figure 2.1 outlines the broad strokes of the elements of the culture. This section restates
important canons from the literature to detail the core values of the liberal, authoritarian, and
republican elements of the American culture. The purpose is to set down the foundations for a
future study in regards for Multiple Traditions (Smith 1993, 1997; Hero, 2003) and to distinguish
the uniqueness of the elements in order for the reader to be able to consider how multiple elements
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of the culture affect politics uniquely. I pay special attention to the republican literature because I
am attempting to demonstrate how republicanism was a core political value during the
Founders' generation and whether those values translated into meaningful political practices. Also,
providing the definitions for the boundaries and core values of each element should exenterate
much of the ambiguity and misunderstandings that have too often prevented scientists from
providing a Multiple Traditions perspective, which is desperately needed (Katznelson and Milner,
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2002). I now provide the general boundaries and core values of liberalism, authoritarianism, and
republicanism in order to be able to verify that specific data in the later empirical chapters indeed
stems from one of these elements of the American culture, especially republicanism.
Liberalism
In The Liberal Tradition in America, Louis Hartz argued that American citizens are almost
uniformly dedicated to atomistic social freedom (Stears, 2007, p. 2; Hartz, 1955/1991, p. 62). The
central idea is that Americans practice their freedom as individuals by working hard and leaving
behind them a trail of success in the marketplace. Nevertheless, President Franklin Roosevelt
divided the liberal spectrum in two when he guided the national government away from the longstanding laissez faire approach to capitalism by restructuring the government to enable forms of
economic redistribution, such as social security. This divided American liberals into the
conservative (laissez faire) and progressive (expand redistribution) factions, and has nothing to do
with other political traditions. The recurring theme in the literature is that most Americans can
identify with, and often defend or oppose, liberal values from one side of the liberal spectrum by
the late 20th century.
The great strength of liberalism since the New Deal is that Americans never abandon the
element of liberalism to engage in politics. People shift their stance through elections towards
conservative (to the right side of the spectrum) or progressive trends (to the left) regarding
governmental responsibility towards markets, with special attention paid to capitalism. The enemy
of an American is "the richer liberal" (Hartz, 1955/1991, p.75). In this way, the liberal tradition
explains political and social outcomes over time, including the failure of socialism, the failure of
the European-style welfare state, the rise and fall of McCarthyism, family dynamics, vote
decisions, and more (Stears, 2007; Abbott, 1999, 2001, 2005, 2010). Hartz (1955/1991) strongly
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advised that liberalism is culpable as the explanation regarding a tyranny of the majority with
respect for a demanding of free markets and limited government under democratic rule. Liberalism
remains relevant as a cultural explanation for American politics (Abbott, 2005).
America’s liberal tradition is not unimportant. Perhaps the most influential update to
Hartz’s liberal tradition is by McClosky and Zaller in The American Ethos (1984). The authors use
the Opinions and Values of Americans (OVS) and Civil Liberties Studies surveys to claim that
opinion leaders:
tend to disseminate political norms as parts of ideologically integrated ‘packages’…
Americans end up forming attitudes that conform to one of three well-recognized
ideological patterns—the welfare state liberal pattern [progressive liberalism], the
nineteenth-century liberal pattern [traditional liberalism], or the strong conservative
pattern. Only among the least sophisticated… have failed to learn one of the conventionally
recognized belief patterns. (p. 263)
The liberal tradition is fundamental to American history and political experiences because
"…virtually everyone… has the mentality of an independent entrepreneur, two national impulses
are bound to make themselves felt: the impulse toward democracy and the impulse toward
capitalism" (McClosky & Zaller, 1984, p. 3). Public opinion shows that "values of capitalism and
democracy are the principle components of the American political culture" (McClosky & Zaller,
p. 12). Public opinion and election movements are interpreted by elites and they reinterpret liberal
values in order to resolve political conflicts, simultaneously, the people experience the cultural
injunctions and liberal impulses which have become legitimized as new public policy
(McClosky & Zaller).
In support of Hartz’s (1955/1991) perspective that the liberal tradition governs American
culture, the political science literature has long suggested that both major American political
parties since World War II are liberal parties. This is because both the Republican and Democratic
parties form platforms to fortify capitalism through representative democracy. As a famous
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political scientist put it, "the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States… are
examples of Liberal parties; both practice bourgeois, business-orientated politics typical of
European Liberalism…" (Ware, 1996, p. 25).
American political culture shifts to and from progressive and traditional liberal
experimentation over time. From the progressive point of view, Ware (1996) explains,
"…President Franklin Roosevelt's ‘hijacking’ of the term ‘liberal’ to describe his New
Deal programmes [sic]" of governmental intervention was not much different than the English
liberalism at the time; however, "the move towards state interventionism marked a break
with traditional Liberal values of strict laissez faire" capitalism (Ware, p. 26; Nozick, 1974).
Indeed, progressive reforms, including Medicare and Medicaid, expanded under both Republican
and Democratic administrations until the mid-1970s because progressive liberalism remained the
main current of American politics after WWII. Since the mid-1970s, Americans have experienced
a traditional liberal (i.e., conservative) backswing (Hacker & Pierson, 2011). Hence, the American
political culture does shift from left to right and back again along the liberal spectrum—but not
away from the liberal spectrum because both political parties and voters act to protect and engage
in their preferences regarding the treatment of capitalism through representative democracy.
Liberalism is, like the other elements, a stand-alone value system. The literature (e.g.,
(Lijphart, 1999; Dahl, 1956; Brettschneider, 2012) expounds how partisan liberal values work in
concert to create a stable liberal regime. A stable liberal democracy will always demonstrate a
belief in core values that claim a (1) right to vote, (2) right to be elected, (3) right of political parties
to compete, (4) free and fair elections, (5) freedom of association, (6) freedom of expression
infused into the public by representatives in government (liberal neutrality), (7) information from
all sources are tolerated, (8) institutions depend on votes (majority rule), (9) limited government
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in markets, and (10) intolerance for a hateful society and an invasive state. Democratic values are
tied to the equal opportunity developed through socio-political markets and the democracy must
protect the equal opportunity for all people to have a chance to become an entrepreneur. Indeed,
Americans often take economic stances in the voting booth in regards to how elected officials
should solve public topics and issues post-election (Chong, McClosky & Zaller, 1983).
Of particular salience, there is very little need for a participatory democracy in a
functioning liberal democracy (Schumpeter, 1947/2010). This happens because the two dominant
liberal ideologies will eventually resolve the public policy problems and issues through the will of
the voters that is expressed during elections over generations—not day-to-day. The liberal’s
agency is in voting and his power is to shift democratic changes in the party platforms and
economic agendas over time according to the left or the right of the liberal spectrum—not the other
elements / mores.
Thus, elections and campaigns are the mechanisms for participation, and tuning-in is a
form of participation. Citizens are important to politics as voters and not as direct participants in
American politics. The American liberal contributes to a complex relationship between
representative democracy and capitalism within American politics. Americans make public policy
decisions based on expected electoral shifts on the liberal spectrum, and they change their mind
regarding the shifts according to economic times. There is no confusion that this liberalism is
bound to representative democracy, and not to participatory democracy, as "the ruled, in short,
must consent to their rulers, who are in turn accountable to the governed" (McClosky & Zaller,
1984, p. 2). The left (progressive liberals) did successfully foster a welfare state to decrease
problems of poverty and unemployment that traditional capitalism, historically, was unable to
alleviate with success in regards to the entire population (Przeworski, 2010). At the center of the
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liberal society thesis, citizens believe that individuals who work hard will join the middle class
and an entrepreneur may swiftly come into riches, or else work harder (Hartz, 1955/1991). The
right (traditional liberal) remains faithful to capitalism and these voters are "Capitalists" who are
"primarily concerned with making private profit" (McClosky & Zaller, 1984, p. 7). All liberals
should remember to vote in elections because of the fundamental differences between the
progressive and traditional liberal policy recommendations. Liberalism is part of the culture and
an influence on American politics.
Authoritarianism
Authoritarianism is as an applied value system by the hands of the people in government.
The values are very similar to a panopticon in that there are people with power who are part of a
special class, while the people, or a large proportion of them, are a citizenry without political
power. Jeremy Bentham, an English philosopher and social theorist in the late 18th century,
imagined a panopticon design for a prison that would allow an observer (opticon) to monitor all
(pan) people inside an enclosed structure (Bentham & Božovič, 1995). The idea was that prisoners
would not know when they were being watched, so would remain controlled, without physical
monitors. The prisoners would assume that they were being monitored at any given time. The
people had no power or authority to change the rules, and they were provided shelter, food, and a
community of inmates. Americans living in a community that is protecting authoritarian norms
(e.g., the antebellum South) are not able to utilize republican or liberal norms because one language
prevails.
Historically, widespread authoritarianism based on paternalism is no stranger to the
American culture and politics. After the Civil War, segregation policy proliferated via eugenics,
social Darwinism, and cultural segregation. Racism, discrimination, and prejudice are forms of
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authoritarianism and still remain in American politics. Authoritarianism is often enforced in
America by the ideal of paternalism – that one group of citizens are allowed to dominate other
people totally as second-class citizens, like parents who control a child, because of a belief in
ascriptive hierarchy by the people who consider themselves to be part of the first-class citizenry.
However ugly, authoritarianism is often used and defended by Americans in politics (Smith,
1993).
There are many examples of authoritarianism in America. As a long-term governmental
regime, the American military is organized by rules of authoritarianism. At the local level, most
Americans would probably agree that it is legitimate to institutionalize a suicidal person for his or
her own safety. To give an everyday example, New York City's abolition of the Big Gulp was an
authoritarian act justified with paternalistic motivations because the government was looking out
for the health of the individual. Moreover, many Americans hold authoritarian values in the early
21st century on various political topics, for instance, authoritarianism and ethnocentrism spiked
after the terrorist attacks on 9/11 (Kam & Kinder, 2007).
Some Americans express authoritarian values during the early 21 st century as a preference
for policy in American politics. In Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics,
Hetherington & Weiler (2009) confirm that expressions of authoritarianism in public opinion polls
come from people who generally support paternalism as a value preference for the government to
adopt regarding specific topics. Authoritarianism is a strong belief in the rule of law set by the
government. It is practically unalterable by the people. The data reveals:
Those who score lowest in authoritarianism are, by far, the least supportive of limitations to
civil liberties while those who score highest are the most willing to support them. We find
the largest differences on media censorship in fighting the war on terrorism. Only 27 percent
of those who score at the minimum of the authoritarianism scale think the media should not
report on secret methods in fighting the war on terrorism. Nearly 80 percent of those who
score at the maximum of the scale do. (pp. 98-99)
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Further, Americans expressing a minimum number of authoritarian values versus those expressing
large number of authoritarian values showed wide differences with respect to immigration. As
Hetherington & Weiler (2009) demonstrate, there is a gap of 39, 33, 44, and 40 percentage points
between the two groups on their views concerning the following respectively: immigration is a
threat to American economy, immigrants should adopt American culture, illegal immigrants are
lawbreakers plain and simple, and, against a path of citizenship for illegal immigrants. In short,
some Americans hold steadfast to authoritarian values and these values impact the directional
choices for major public policy issues, which may help to explain the reason immigration and other
public policy reform does not get passed (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009).
Quite recently, in "Political Spotlight" from the journal PS: Political Science & Politics
(2018), Dana Moss contends that authoritarianism exists in America, pointing to common
examples of authoritarianism that President Trump has utilized to support this claim, such
as strategies to reinforce elite loyalty, which includes spoils for loyalists to become part of the
inner circle, co-opting oppositionists, and making examples of defectors (Crabtree, Davenport,
Chenoweth, Moss, Earl, Ritter, & Sullivan, p. 20). Additionally, President Trump appears to be
enforcing strategies to suppress and undermine grassroots movements, which includes direct
violence against dissidents, counter-mobilization by supporters, infiltration of movements,
surveillance, applying administrative and financial burdens, and passing pseudo-legitimate laws
to criminalize legal behaviors (p. 20). And there seems to be evidence of authoritarian strategies
utilized to garner support among the public, including the blaming of foreigners, mischaracterizing
domestic opponents as criminals, terrorists, traitors, or plotters, concealing information through
censorship and propaganda, and removing or harassing independent journalists (p. 20). Readily,
President Trump has definitively deployed authoritarian measures, such as negative othering,
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dishonoring, and loyalist counter-mobilization (p. 21). Thus, authoritarianism is present in the
current American presidency! Authoritarianism is part of the culture and an influence on American
politics.
Republicanism
Since the 1970s, studies of republicanism have begun to call into question the dominance
of the liberal tradition during the 20th century. This is because republicanism is beginning to be
thought of as a long-standing element within American culture since some Americans quite
consistently exhibit republican values via revival movements over the course of American history
(Pocock, 1975; Bellah et al., 1985; Sunstein, 1988; Ericson, 1993; Kahn, 2007). Scholars widely
agree that the most intense political values exhibited during the Founding era and before was
republicanism—not liberalism (Wood, 2011; Maloy, 2011). The idea of republicanism is selfgovernment, whereby the people foster a common good for themselves, even though many
Americans expressed serious doubts about the ability of communities to cause a common good
during these times (Shalhope, 2004). Indubitably, the Founders' great fear was that representatives
in the extended republic might abandon republican principles in favor of a debate about
unrestrained capitalism; ergo, liberalism (Rossiter, 1992, Federalist Papers, #10).
Phillip Pettit provides the long-needed roadmap for what a researcher should expect to find
in a Republic as described in, On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model for
Government (2012). First, republicanism is "a system of individualized contestation that parallels
the collective challenge that elections make possible," because new laws and petitions by the
people provide, "openings for particular individuals and subgroups to test the laws or proposals…
respects the value of equal access to influence and, more generally, the value of equal status" (p.
213). Relying on individuals to be active in politics keeps the future development of the republic
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open for all people and is also incumbent in order to not allow a "majority rule" at the national
level to close out the voice of the people, those whom should be relying on the active voice of the
people anyway (p. 215).
For people to be confident in an individualized contestability, Pettit (2012) says that the
people must enjoy the requirements of transparency, contestability, and impartiality (p. 215).
Transparency is the capacity of members of the society to know what proposals are under
consideration and what measures have been passed. Contestability is the opportunity for members
to challenge overtures both in advance of legislation and after they have passed into
law. Impartiality is the availability of forums in which challengers can expect an impartial
assessment and, ideally, resolution. Contestation is widely seen when the people are the cause of
self-government and the citizens require the former values to be implemented by their government
in order to craft a policy response to "what’s happening."
At heart, Pettit (2012) argues, "How could a state that inevitably interferes in the choices
of people manage to be supported in such a way that its interference does not take away from their
freedom?" (p. 152). The answer is: In a republic, the people enjoy "an equal share in a public
system of individualized, unconditioned and efficacious control" (p. 185). Republicans
vehemently promote individual activity that is efficacious and worthwhile at the local level with
consideration for the world and republicans accomplish this because of transparency,
contestability, and impartiality via self-government.
Republicanism is distinct from liberalism in that, "From a republican point of view, then,
the free contract cannot serve the role of automatic legitimator—even prima facie legitimator—of
what happens under the terms of the contract" (Pettit, 1997, p. 164). A shared system of popular
control through movements and legal actions to enforce non-domination is not Rawlsian in that
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social justice and freedom depends on the, "goodwill of the government," such as a progressive
liberal might believe is necessary in order to enlarge the welfare state for the benefit of the least
advantaged (Pettit, 2012, p. 186). For example, a progressive liberal regime could explain
legitimacy by holding an electoral majority, yet this allows for the complete exclusion of
republican values and the popular control of the government. And, Pettit (2012) is clear that
laissez-faire individualism does not address republican principles (p. 271). Truly, "Schumpeterian
democracy [politicians protect capitalism] is a second-grade ideal from our [republican] point of
view…" (p. 242). Finally, republicans actively fight against rapacious capitalism (Pettit, 2012;
Ericson, 1993). Fair Trade and Equal Trade are likely republican movements. Hence,
republicanism is outside the progressive or traditional liberal element of the culture and
republicanism relies on its own structure for organizing and administering politics through selfgovernment with specific requirements. Paramount is the value of equality because it is often
expressed in terms of non-domination, unlike liberal equality that seeks to protect private property,
free markets, and capitalism through a laissez faire regime (Traditional Liberal) or a welfare
regime (Progressive Liberal).
To the core, Pettit (2012) states, "Republicanism differs from liberalism in espousing a
more radical ideal of freedom, in arguing for a distinctive connection between freedom…[and] a
contestatory citizenry" (p. 11). For the contestatory citizenry to proceed on republican grounds
in the public space, there must be a norm for an "equality of influence… equal access to influence"
(p. 262). By extension, employees of the government base their decisions on equality as nondomination, including the ways people consider the separation of powers, the independence of the
judiciary, and the transparency of government (p. 263). Accordingly, a republican democracy will
rely on the spirit of republicanism located in the current grassroots movements and actions of the
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people engaging in self-government because they foster politics that: Defend the country, identify
basic liberties, enforce law and order, regulate industry, commerce, and employment, and very
likely extends to "the provision of education for the young, the regulation of various markets, the
insurance of communities against catastrophe, and the insurance of individuals against urgent or
pressing need, medical, legal, or economic" (pp. 263-264). In short, a republican government will
demonstrate that the people have individualized, unconditioned, and efficacious control over their
government in order to foster a common good (p. 242).
A core republican value dating back to the Greeks is equality. The republican revolution is
continual so long as someone is unfree, and "Being unfree consists rather in being subject to
arbitrary sway: being subject to the potentially capricious will or the potential idiosyncratic
judgment of another. Freedom involves emancipation from any such subordination" (Pettit, 1997,
p. 5). Today, the common expressions of republican equality consist of non-domination, efficacy,
transparency, contestability, and impartiality.
Republicanism allows the people to act directly in politics when they rely on the core values
of equality, freedom, and virtue. These values produce practices to facilitate public policy that will
increase and protect institutions in support of non-domination at all levels of government,
including a response for "how the republic can best improve the prospects for non-domination on
the international front" (Pettit, 1997, p. 151). Non-domination means "non-mastery," or said
plainly, no one is master over me (Pettit, 1997, p. 22) and all individuals can pass the eyeball
test. Equality under non-domination means that any given individual can look any other individual
in the eye and not feel threatened due to social or political hierarchies. In order for government to
enforce non-domination, representatives track the citizens’ interests and issues (Maynor, 2002)
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and base their decisions on republican grounds because they expect their decision to cause the
people to become active in politics in order to have the last word.
Republican equality requires that citizens protect the weaker party while requesting all
people to participate in self-government, and as a result, republicans welcome and try to increase
contestation in politics in order to deliberate and enact a wiser common good (Pettit, 2012). More
so, "…the channels of contestation will be more effective to the extent that there are social
movements, such as the green movement, or the woman’s movement, or the consumer movement...
serve as an initial clearinghouse" (Pettit, 1997, p. 193). Self-government begins and ends with a
decision by the people whereby the representatives in government moderate the will of the people
on republican grounds (Pettit, 2012). Republican values are based on a spirit of good governance
to establish a fair playing field for all citizens. This happens regardless of wealth, or capitalism,
because efficacious activity is the primary point of dialogue (Pettit, 2012).
Review of Evidence regarding American Republicanism
During the Founding, "the state governments worked vigorously to deal with the problems
facing their citizens… the republican governments in the states became the whole object of the
Revolution itself" (Shalhope, 2004, p. 87). Towns were nested, "essentially republican; in order
permanently to destroy the laws which form the basis of the republic, one would have to almost
abolish all the laws at once" (Tocqueville, 1988, p. 397). Everywhere, "Republicanism’s emphasis
upon equality encouraged ordinary, obscure men to challenge all manifestations of authority and
eminence within society" (Shalhope, 2004, p. xii). But republicanism wasn’t alone, as James
Madison put it, the greed for paper money by representatives in state legislatures was abusive and
"so frequent and so flagrant as to alarm the most steadfast friends of Republicanism…" (Wood,
2011, p. 131). In this way, the "Public Space" that all Americans share should be governed by a
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common good according to republican values (Abbott, 2010). The common good is attainable
because self-government is the basis for resolving issues or topics in American politics and the
people's actions are a chain reaction (Smith, 1997; Abbott, 2010).
Historians since the 1960s have continued to see republicanism in American politics during
the antebellum era. For example, Joyce Appleby (1985) in "Republicanism and Ideology"
summarizes advances made by historians in regards to the pervasiveness of republicanism during
this time period. "While most scholars would agree that the possibility of institutionalizing the
civic values extolled in classical republicanism ended with the ratification of the Constitution,
these articles give vivid proof of the fact that the vitality of republican ideals not only persisted but
continued to embarrass the progress of liberal values in America" (p. 472). "Republicanism slipped
into the scholarly lexicon in the late 1960s and has since become the most protean concept for
those working on the culture of antebellum America" (p. 461). Then came Bernard Bailyn, who
"turned around the entire field working on eighteenth-century America... he replaced the tired old
notion of intellectual influence with the exciting concept of ideology" in The Ideological Origins
of the American Revolution (p. 464).
Appleby (1985) continues, Gordon Wood, Bailyn's student, connected American
revolutionary concepts with the republican tradition in England and Pocock's The Machiavellian
Moment connected the ideology with "the spiritual crisis that accompanied the birth of the modern
world" (p. 465). The American Revolution was not about economic progress or liberalism
whatsoever; rather, it was the final act of the Renaissance (p. 466). Indeed, historian Paul Rahe
(1992) argued that the American Founders created, "a republican experiment that reached the
limits of Lockean first principles and then silently passed beyond their narrow confines" (p.
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572). There was an enduring tradition of Americans practicing distinctly republican politics during
the Founding and antebellum eras.
Unambiguously, Rogers Smith (1993) summarizes that there is a "republican synthesis"
through the works of Bernard Bailyn (1967), Gordon Wood (1969), and J. G. A. Pocock (1975) to
illustrate that Americans have participated in politics throughout American history because of a
belief in core republican values (p. 555). Referencing Gleason (1980, p. 62), Smith (1993) notes,
"All he [an American] had to do was commit himself to the political ideology centered on the
abstract ideals of liberty, equality, and republicanism" (p. 557). The idea is clear: There is a spirit
of republicanism in America for Americans to rely on in order to influence American politics. Any
American would recognize that the nation's civic culture is based on:
…three beliefs derived from the Founders' understanding of republicanism: that “ordinary
men and women” are entitled to representative self-governance, that “all who live in
the political community” should be able to “participate in public life as equals,” and that
citizens should have freedom for different religious outlooks and other sorts of pursuits in
their private lives. (Smith 1993, p. 557; citing Fuchs 1990, pp. 4-6)
In the footnotes, Smith (1993) elucidates, "The republican tradition is grounded on popular
sovereignty exercised via institutions of mass self-governance. It includes an ethos of civic virtue
and economic regulation for the public good" (p. 563).
The cultural element of republicanism is observable when we focus on how the people are
engaged in self-government, as an act of virtue, to root out corruption and to reinforce "republican"
values (Pocock, 1975). The most common example from the antebellum era is grounded in the
people’s ability to instruct national representatives whereby the people and state legislatures pass
a resolution of instruction for the national representative to introduce in their Chamber. Indeed, the
formal institution of Instruction was alive and growing during the antebellum era and was not
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displaced or diminished by the absence of the Right to Instruct in the Constitution (Girdwood &
Grynaviski, 2014).
The people may practice their "republican values" because a Right of Instruction is inherent
within the republican system. There is, for example, research showing that republicanism erupted
during the presidency of Andrew Jackson. Most notably, President Jackson used the republican
commitment to Instruction shared by Americans as a core value in order to achieve public policy
goals (Eaton, 1952; Hoffmann, 1956; Dupre, 1994; Jaenicke, 1986; Brown, 1980; Meek,
1967; Esarey, 1917). In this way, Jackson called on the people to participate and influence the state
legislatures in order to influence national representatives. The people and state legislatures sent
resolutions to be brought before the national congress, whereby, under Jackson, "The doctrine of
legislative instruction developed virtually into a form of recall of senators, anticipating the
Progressive Movement for the recall in the early twentieth century" (Eaton, 1952, p. 317).
Eaton (1952) defined the practice of Instruction by referencing how William Maclay of
Pennsylvania denoted the Right of Instruction, arguing it was "the Republican doctrine that
senators, being servants of the people, were responsible to the will of their states and therefore in
voting should follow the instructions of their legislatures…" (p. 304). Further, to thwart the
attempts of senators to vote against legislation to abolish the national bank, Jackson did induce
governors and the people to ask their state legislature to pass a ROI for Senators in the U.S.
Congress to abide by or resign. This political maneuver was intended to influence the senators’
vote and was possible exactly because the people openly shared a belief in the doctrine
of Instruction (Eaton, 1952). In one instance, Jackson’s opponent, Leigh, "realized that it would
be expedient for him to resign since most Virginians believed in the right of instruction" (Eaton,
1952, pp. 314-315, emphasis added). President Jackson therefore utilized the doctrine of
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Instruction as a powerful practice in order to allow citizens to enjoin with him in politics as an
extended arm of his presidency. This was possible because most Americans valued the practice as
a way to exhibit their republican, not liberal, values. As a republican, everyone expected the people
to govern themselves in the first place.
Today, the doctrine of Instruction continues on a large scale, though research on this
subject is quite limited. A modern example regarding this type of republicanism is described in,
"Telegrams to Washington, Using Memorials to Congress as a Measure of State Attention to the
Federal Policy Agenda" (Leckrone & Gollob, 2010). In this study, there were 4,119 memorials
submitted to Congress from 1987 to 2006 by the states. However, few scholars would suggest that
"Telegrams to Washington" are vital to the next presidential election in American politics or
responsible for major changes to the national agenda, or that this form of republicanism matters
significantly as an affront to the liberal tradition during the 21st century. Thus, what is desperately
needed today is research to demonstrate how republicanism was a core political value in the hearts
of Americans as well as how they meaningfully practiced these values at the national
level, regardless of the liberal tradition.
Conclusion
Republicanism was, as one of many political traditions, or mores, a major element of
the American political culture because it was an independent political value system that Americans
did use as a means to engage in politics long before and after the ratification of the Constitution,
considering Tocqueville and the surrounding literature. Historians have come to repeatedly
find that the spirit of republicanism and its practices were prominent during the antebellum era
(Appleby, 1985), however, political scientists have dispensed with the theory of republican self-
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government during the modern era because the peripheralizing function apparently died with the
ratification of the Constitution (Riker, 1955). I explore these arguments in the next chapter.
Today, political scientists, such as Katznelson and Milner (2002), recommend a study of
republicanism, authoritarianism, and liberalism through a Multiple Traditions framework, as
opposed to a sole study of liberalism, because a systematic study of American's persistent elements
of the culture should provide much more explanatory power with respect for the exhibitions of
major changes in federal political formations than a simple study of liberalism. Thus, even though
most political scientists have been focusing on the liberal tradition, there is a call for a more
inclusive research agenda.
To fill the gap in the political science literature regarding the "republican" element of the
culture post Ratification, I now turn to review the literature in regards for Resolutions of
Instruction during the antebellum era, since Dr. Grynaviski's collection of more than 2,000 ROI
during the antebellum era as recorded in the Senate Journal provides, on its face, evidence that
"republican" values were persistently exhibited by Americans as a means to participate in the
republican tradition. Doing so will allow me to ascertain the depth of the gap in the literature
between the political scientists and the historians / legal scholars regarding republicanism as a
shared core value to influence politics at the national level post Ratification. By accounting for the
literature in regards for ROI using the context of republicanism, I should be able to generate
original scientific claims and hypotheses in order to corroborate that the practices of Instruction
from 1775 through 1819 did stem from citizens engaging in their "republican" values for the
empirical chapters of this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 3: SECOND LITERATURE REVIEW, INSTRUCTION
Introduction: Resolutions of Instruction
There is a gap in the literature concerning the role of Resolutions of Instruction (ROI) as a
political value and practice that Americans once utilized in order to influence representatives at
the national level after Ratification. The evidence of such practices mostly reflects work by
historians who find that the passage of ROI after Ratification did stem from the "republican"
element of the culture and that these examples were important to the functioning of American
politics during the antebellum era. However, political scientists generally agree with Hartz (1955)
in that liberalism burst forth after Ratification and republicanism as self-government quickly
dissipated from American politics at the national level. This happened because the Constitution
enabled a centrally-directed federal government to function free of local / state control, since the
Right of Instruction was deliberately withheld from the Constitution by James Madison and
others (Riker, 1955). This meant that the "peripheralizing" function of the Senate whose members
were elected by state governments and which could have been buttressed by the republican
practice of U.S. Senators being bound to ROI from state legislatures as performed under the
Articles of Confederation was never fully realized (Riker, 1955). Therefore, the central
government became disconnected from local / state control after Ratification (Riker, 1955).
Even though the Constitution created a centrally-directed government that enabled
liberalism to flourish while discarding the peripheralizing function (Riker, 1955), historians
have long noted that the American people and their representatives deeply struggled with the idea
of self-government well after Ratification. This happened because many Americans apparently
shared a belief in a fundamental right of the people to instruct their government on policy
matters, and this belief was shared by their representatives. Culturally, there was an expectation
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that the national representatives, especially senators, would introduce local political documents
into their Chamber and defend them, whether they be from an individual, association, county, or
state legislature, because of a shared belief in self-government.
On its face, the findings by historians support the idea that the "peripheralizing" function
continued after Ratification in a way that was originally intended by the American Founders.
Republicanism was an independent and significant element of the American political culture at the
time because of observable exhibits of republican values and practices at the state and national
levels. Thus, the gap in the literature is between historians who find that republicanism continued
to influence politics after Ratification while political scientists do not.
While exploring the doctrine and practice of passing ROI for federal representatives to
adhere to after Ratification, historians have pointed to specific meaningful exhibitions of political
action at the local, state, and national levels to suggest that the "republican" and not the "liberal"
element of the culture was a prime influencer of political change, with the exception of Riker
(Esarey, 1917; Viles, 1934; Eaton, 1952; Riker, 1955; Hoffmann, 1956; Meek, 1967; Greenberg,
1977; Brown, 1980; Gunn, 1980; Jaenicke, 1986; Amar, 1988; VanBurkleo, 1989; Pope, 1990;
Dupre, 1994; Shade, 1998; Volk, 2009). Considering these examples with respect for ROI,
my chair and I have attempted to ascertain whether republicanism should be given another
chance by political scientists.
The purpose of this chapter is to account for the ROI examples in the literature with
respect for the "republican" tradition post Ratification in order to form a rebuttal to Riker (1955)
in that the "peripheralizing" function may have continued after Ratification by means of the
republican element of the culture. I seek to explain the gap, which is a breach, between historians
and political scientists in order to understand whether the peripheralizing function (Riker, 1955)
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substantively continued after Ratification as explicated by historians and

legal scholars with

respect for ROI. An exploration of the ROI literature should also help to firmly establish a baseline
of "republican" expressions post Ratification.
After considering the literature, I should be able to make a couple of new claims which
political scientists have heretofore abstained from. First, Americans openly practiced their
"republican" values well after Ratification in meaningful ways. Second, the exemplification of
these values in practice through thousands of ROI exhibitions, for instance, suggests that
American republicanism was a core political value for most Americans and most of their
representatives long after Ratification. In short, a belief in republicanism was a cause for
meaningful political action to occur at the national level long after Ratification, which contradicts
what Riker (1955) argued as well as what many political scientists during the early 21 st century
surmise.
This chapter is organized as follows. Next, I restate the research question by each scholarly
article considering ROI and I note the central finding. Afterwards, I summarize the findings in
order to form a baseline of "republican" practices during the antebellum era. This baseline supports
the idea that "republican" values were operational at the national level after Ratification through
the practice of Instruction. Once I have this baseline of republicanism according to the ROI
literature, I argue that I will be able to investigate archival data (Library of Congress) in the
following three chapters with respect for practices that are distinctly "republican" and not
"liberal." Finally, I conclude the chapter.
Review of Literature regarding Resolutions of Instruction
The first article, by Indiana History Professor Logan Esarey (1917), published in

the

Indiana Magazine of History, addresses the pioneer politics of Indiana and Resolutions of
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Instruction are an important aspect of the story before the Civil War. The people had a "rising
discontent against the office-holders" and they wanted a greater voice in choosing presidential
electors after the election of 1824 (p. 110). The answer lay in "the relation of a representative to
his constituents... usually called the 'right of instruction.' This question is still alive; one might say
'perniciously' alive in 1912" (p. 110). Accordingly, there is a complex relationship between the
political party and the people who support ROI according to a right of Instruction. During 1824,
"Democrats insisted that their representatives should vote according to his [party] platform or
resign. A number of Democratic members actually resigned their positions rather than vote
contrary to the known wishes of their constituents" (p. 110). Meanwhile, Whigs "as a rule went on
the theory that in the election a superior man was chosen but left free to vote as he thought best
under the conditions as they arose. A testy Whig in a Whitewater convention said they might as
well send an ass to the legislature with instructions tied to his pack saddle..." (p. 110).
Esarey (1917) finds that strong proponents of Instruction supported Andrew Jackson. In
general, he quotes and comments on political documents from newspapers, conventions, caucuses,
delegate meetings, and the Indiana General Assembly in order to show how passing ROI was a
widely established practice. Central to the debate was the "republican constitution" (p. 112) and
the "character of republicans" (p. 113). And as an exhibit, from 1840 to 1860, Hoosiers
would attend a "monster barbecue" put on by their district (of nineteen districts), where two to ten
oxen would be roasted for the people to consume "beef and bread and washing it down with good
cider or corn whisky" (pp. 127-128). The people "came as much to hear the great speakers
[organized stump speeches] as to munch on the roasted beef" (p. 128). The evidence supports the
idea that the people of Indiana did engage in politics on republican grounds through ROI during the
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antebellum era because the politicians sought to tie themselves to the people at the local
barbeques.
Published during 1934 in the Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Jonas Viles, the Chair
of the History Department at the University of Missouri, considers how the geographic
environment, such as sectionalism, is a scientific research problem. He begins that:
The statistical data, economic and political, are embedded in the arbitrary frame of the
autonomous political divisions, the state, which strengthens the emphasis of the area. But the
so-called border states, where northern, southern, and western interest clearly overlap and
clash, any fiction of a homogeneous or united... breaks down. (p. 3)
Accounting for the economic and social groups should better explain which dominant
interests significantly influence politics on a large scale (p. 4). The practice of passing ROI was
admonished in 1858 and "caused such an uproar [to the delegates to Charleston] that it was
abandoned" in 1860 (p. 19). However, adherence to the practice of passing ROI was a top issue and
priority for many before and during the 1852 Democratic convention in Missouri (pp. 16-17).
Many Americans felt deeply bound to Instruction as a practice for governing based on the
experiences of the previous decades. Therefore, the evidence suggests that practice of passing
ROI was a significant political influence regarding changes in national politics from Ratification
until 1860.
During the 1950s, Clement Eaton, a historian, provides an excellent review of the role of
ROI after Ratification until the mid-twentieth century. Published in the Journal of Southern
History during 1952, Eaton addresses the ways problems have been solved through the
development of U.S. representative government. He questions whether federal senators were
"bound to obey instructions of state legislatures" after Ratification (p. 303). After John Bell damns
the right of instruction in a speech in the Senate, February 23, 1858, Eaton finds that the doctrine
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of Instruction that had dominated many regions before the speech became "obsolete after 1860" (p.
319) and:
The adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913 gave a final blow to the venerable
doctrine of instructions which had been transplanted from England. Nevertheless, long before
that date the development of the Solid South rendered the practice of instructions below the
Potomac an act of supererogation. Like the duel and virtually at the same time, the practice
of legislative instruction disappeared from the mores of the American people. (p. 319)
That being said, Eaton documents widespread support for the practice from America's inception
until John Bell's historic speech.
Eaton (1952) asserts that after Ratification, Instruction was a well-known political practice.
States controlled by the Democratic-Republican Party from 1789 to 1795 frequently utilized
Instruction to control party members (p. 304). The practice was widely utilized during the 1810s,
since the Legislature of Virginia in 1812 instructed senators, and when one ROI was ignored, they
adopted resolutions from Benjamin Watkins Leigh to censure the conduct of the senators,
considering Leigh's historical review of support for the practice of Instruction. In another
example, John Taylor of Caroline defended Instruction in An Inquiry into the Principles and Policy
of the Government of the United States (1814), and add Thomas Jefferson to the list of Founders
who whole-heartedly supported the Right of Instruction, because he wrote to Taylor to exclaim that
his work, "'settles unanswerably the right of instructing representatives, and their duty to
obey'" (p. 305). Following, during the 1830s, President Jackson worked with legislatures to
instruct senators with the view "that the senator 'has no right to exercise his own judgment at all,
or consult his own conscience; he is not in this case a moral agent'" (p. 314).
Republicanism is beginning to appear like a widespread system that is republican because
there were various resignations by senators who would not follow a ROI as well as senators who
purposefully disobeyed instructions without stepping down in order to call for the voters to remove
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them, with respect for the fact that power remains with the people. Americans practiced selfgovernment during the antebellum era. For instance, on December 27, 1834, the House of
Commons in North Carolina voted to adhere to the practice of Instruction with 99 supporting the
measure and 28 opposing it (Eaton 1952, p. 308).
Eaton (1952) finds that ROI to senators from state legislatures were widespread and
controversial throughout the antebellum era and that ROI did often cause senators to become an
agent of their state legislature in the U.S. Senate. As the constituents retained political power, for
instance, Virginians and Carolinians strongly supported the practice of Instruction. Therefore,
Eaton finds that Instruction, "proved to be a double-edged sword... developed virtually into a form
of recall of senators, anticipating the Progressive Movement for the recall in the early
twentieth century" (p. 317). Unfortunately, Eaton does not offer a comparison of legislation
resulting from Instruction compared to the total amount of bills passed. However, the evidence
does suggest that antebellum politicians adhered to and defended the practice of passing ROI as a
sincere exhibition of self-government which allows for the people and their local representatives
to cause action and thereby influence the federal politicians, their duties of federal output, by
causing it after Ratification until 1860.
William Riker, a political scientist, in the much-admired Journal of the American Political
Science Review, supports Eaton insofar as Instruction was moot after 1860 (1955). At the time of
the Founding, the Constitution established two types of federalism. In the former, national
supremacy is a closed question, and this is called "centrally-directed or centralized" (p. 453). The
latter path of constitutional effectuality showcases that "decisions are made, partially at least,
through the machinery of local governments (this type we can describe as peripherally-directed or
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peripheralized)" (p. 453). Under the Articles, the people did enjoy a Republic that was
peripherally-directed in that:
Local governments by constitutional right take part in central decisions, direct their voting of
their delegates to the center, form suballiances to control its policy, confirm federal decisions,
and influence federal policy as much as does the federal government itself, there these local
governments usually retain the primary loyalty of the citizen. (p. 453)
However, the Constitution was explicitly centrally-directed because the national government ruled
supremely over the states and the people without them having an ability to apply meaningful
pressure through local and state governments at the national level. The right of Instruction was not
in the Constitution. Hence, after Ratification, "the states did not control the relation of citizens to
the nation" (p. 453). Still, the Constitution remained unable to control the disparate regional
ideologies that bound together sectional interests at the expense of a national interest, considering
the numerous factions on the floor of the Senate, or "sectionalism" (p. 454). This is, I believe, an
implicit call for a study of Multiple Traditions because a study of the elements of authoritarianism,
liberalism, and republicanism should explain, at least partially, which aspects of the regional
ideologies were responsible for the patterns of behavior seeking to influence national politics.
Furthermore, the mechanisms and transactions of those elements, when exhibited, may be
measured. I question: Is the practice of Instruction as operational through the process of ROI an
example of republican values being expressed as an exhibition a means for Americans to be a
republican citizen?
Riker (1955) argues that the Senate, with respect to its role as a "peripheralizing institution"
was a "failure" after Ratification (p. 455). State governments did purport to be sovereign and
influential players at the national level after the signing of the Constitution, but "state
governments, as state governments, could not hope to control national policy" (p. 454). Of
particular interest, "the authors of the Constitution themselves were not aware that they had shut
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off all circuits for states to direct the nation" (p. 454). Yet, the divergence from the peripheralizing
institutions created by the Articles and established through the constitutional abidance to the new
centralized form, especially from a Senate who historically did rely on local resolutions according
to the doctrine of Instruction, has not been systematically examined (p. 455). On the other hand,
the Electoral College "should probably be interpreted as another peripheralizing institution"
(Footnote 1, p. 454). Thus, the peripheralizing function might be constitutionally embedded,
implicitly, but the states had been failing to enforce their ROI on senators and the lead up to
the Seventieth Amendment proved that the peripheralizing function was "divorced wholly"
between the Senate and the state governments (p. 455).
Riker (1955) states that the idea that senators should "obey their immediate constituents is
now almost forgotten" (p. 455). One of the problems is that "we have no clear indication as to the
attitudes of the delegates at the Constitutional Convention toward the practice of instructing..." (p.
456). To help solve this problem, I intend to systematically document how the Founders relied on
the value of Instruction from 1775 through 1789 (Chapter Four), because the "doctrine of
instructions followed naturally from political institutions prior to the Constitution" (p. 456). If so,
I should be able to see if Dr. Grynaviski's ROI collection from the Senate Journal is convincingly
a continuation of "republican" values (in Chapter Six).
Riker (1955) finds that Instruction was supported by leaders at the national level during the
antebellum era. State legislatures and Jeffersonian Republicans "tenaciously" supported
Instruction, with an important example being the Kentucky Resolves of 1798 as those ROI
purposefully attempted to influence politics at the national level. But instructions were "frequently
violated" and Instruction was not a substitute for recall (p. 457). For instance, many senators
"violated instructions in voting 'not guilty' on the impeachment of Justice Chase" (at President
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Thomas Jefferson's request) and this caused a constitutional amendment to be submitted in
Congress to recall a recalcitrant Senator, however, nothing happened after the motion was tabled
(p. 457).
In the following years, Riker (1955) finds that important forced resignations due to the
belief in Instruction happened, mostly against men of honor or as "mitigating circumstances of
party advantage" (p. 458). Nevertheless, a prominent instance to suggest that "republican" values
altered a national public policy happened when Jackson used Instruction to coerce three senators
to resign rather than to follow a ROI. Their resignations, as well as their replacement with Jackson
supporters, allowed for Benton's resolution to pass precisely because of the resignations and
replacements, which is known as the "tinsel victory" (p. 460). Riker (1955) finds that, in
general, the Senate remained centralized since Ratification, probably because Instruction was
"excised" from the Constitution (p. 469). By 1911, "state legislatures had lost all touch with
national policy" (p. 469).
In 1956, William Hoffmann published in the Journal of Southern History a tremendous
story regarding the practice of Instruction surrounding the life of Willie P. Mangum and the Whig
revival of the doctrine. Whig resolutions often attempted to embarrass and "Mangum would
respectfully introduce anti-removal petitions and call them instructions from the people of North
Carolina. On February 11, 1834, he introduced one such petition from Burke County, declared
his willingness to obey, and called on Brown to do likewise or resign" (p. 344). In response,
Georgia Senator John Forsyth "expressed disgust at the 'miserable petition.' Brown declared that it
had been the work of 'a partisan collection of bank men in a pot house... led by a disappointed
politician" (p. 344). Whig editors at newspapers swiftly and repeatedly appealed to Burke County
Whigs who protested the statement, "Brown had called his fellow citizens 'pot house politicians'
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and the voice of his constituents 'miserable petitions.' They denounced him for not resigning or
obeying instructions" (p. 344).
Hoffmann (1956) argues that "pot house politicians" was just the beginning of a slew
of degradations against and calls for a defense of Instruction. Representatives constantly dealt
with Instruction as they introduced local petitions and resolutions as important political documents
to cause action for and against an issue or event. Other insults concerning Instruction during
1834 include a response to Pott's resolution from the newspaper The Western Carolinian in that
Pott's ROI was "disgusting to all but those... blinded by manworship" [sic], "wasting public
money," and "dereliction of duty... to remain silent while a fiend... is endeavoring to apply a torch
to the citadel of American liberty" (p. 346).
Hoffmann (1956) finds that Instruction was the decisive campaign issue during the election
of 1834 when the voters went to the polls to elect legislators and Whigs and Democrats utilized
the practice of passing resolutions considering "their stand on national issues" (p. 345). Parties
utilized Instruction explicitly for partisan purposes and both parties defended the practice in North
Carolina on an issue basis (pp. 346-354). Of special interest, William Graham argued that,
nationally, "Jackson's usurpations threatened the independence of the Senate and that it was
unconstitutional to mutilate the Senate Journal" (pp. 346-347). In this way, Hoffman provides
support for the idea that Americans widely adhered to republican values, which created an
opportunity for the peripheralizing function to continue on long after Ratification.
Melinda Meek's "The Life of Archibald Yell" in the Arkansas Historical Quarterly (1967)
chronicles the pernicious politics surrounding Yell's political career. Regarding Instruction, "the
Oregon boundary was one of President Polk's chief objectives, and he requested a resolution
authorizing him to give the necessary twelve month notice to the British to end joint occupation.
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[Arkansas Representative] Yell voiced his support of the resolution in a speech before the House
on February 7, 1846" (p. 364). While this shows that presidents continued to use Instruction after
Andrew Jackson as a practice in support of the peripheralizing function regarding the governing
from the national stage by calling on state and local governments to pass an ROI, it is likewise
noted that resolutions were also passed at the local level to simply pay tribute to Yell after he died
at a public meeting. In Fayetteville, Arkansas, held on April 5, 1847, the people wrote an ROI
"expressing the loss of their fellow townsman" (p. 377). Thus, ROI during the 1840s in Arkansas
was a major practice to cause national action regarding issues that the President of the United
States deemed to be important as a formal practice to initiate policy in the Congress. At the other
end of political significance, passing an ROI is a simple way for people in a town to record and
pay tribute to an individual for the record. ROI were complex and customary in Arkansas during
the 1840s.
Kenneth Greenberg (1977) published an article in the Journal of American History which
compliments fellow historians in that the American Revolution was about direct representation and
the ability to govern oneself independently. South Carolinians, like other Americans,
repeatedly argued that England could not tax them, however, why was South Carolina alienated
after Ratification and isolated by the time of the Civil War? Greenberg finds that after 1776:
…the mechanisms of actual representation flourished: constituents bound representatives by
instructions, election laws tied officials to local districts by residence and property
qualifications for office holding, the suffrage broadened, and legislatures reapportioned
themselves to reflect more accurately the actual distribution of the population. (p. 727)
But in South Carolina, politicians supported virtual and not actual representation, unlike the rest
of the country. South Carolinians, like Christopher Gadsden, thought ROI would "prove a
dangerous Jesuitical imperium in imperio and serve to put the legislature into leading strings,
and make them as a body contemptible..." (p. 729, italics in original). It might be interesting to
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note how many ROI originated from South Carolina as recorded in Dr. Grynaviski’s ROI
collection, regardless, Greenberg's point regarding this dissertation is to relate that Instruction did
manifestly proliferate everywhere in the United States except South Carolina until the Civil War.
Greenberg (1977) finds that South Carolinians welcomed local resolutions without
political ramifications (like Yell's tribute resolution), but the representatives there did not think
resolutions should be binding "from local constituents" (p. 729). Therefore, Greenberg finds
that South Carolina's increasing alienation from 1776 through 1860 in the union is explainable by
"their devotion to an archaic conception of the representative... they dried out and eventually
burned up the machine which was dependent on the constant lubrication of compromise" (p. 743).
Thus, South Carolina was alienated because they acted outside the republican norms of selfgoverning, considering actual representation based on the sentiments of the people, in favor of a
system of virtual representation which did not consider the voice of the people to be important to
the political process. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but might South Carolina’s
mechanism for government and political transactions have more closely mimicked authoritarian,
not liberal, institutions?
Five articles address Instruction during the 1980s. First, published in the Journal of
Southern History, Thomas Brown (1980) agrees that the Old South fought sectionalism, yet "the
Antebellum southern Democrats and Whigs, it seems, disagreed about the same national issues as
their colleagues in other parts of the country" (p. 361). With respect for how Whigs were able to
function as a national party, the question is, "what did the diverse elements of southern Whiggery
have in common with each other and the motley northern elements of their party?" (pp. 362-363).
Certainly, Whigs distrusted Andrew Jackson and they wholly supported characters like John Tyler
for Vice-President who, "Like other members of his species... resigned from the Senate rather than
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submit to instructions by a democratically controlled legislature" (p. 375) when Jacksonians were
"inducing state legislatures to wield the club of instruction over the heads of the United
States senators" (p. 365). He finds that Whigs held together because representatives were
"democratic soldiers" who supported economic nationalism, party politics, and a statesmanship of
being disinterested in order to guard against "executive usurpation" (pp. 379-380). And being
disinterested meant being unsupportive of ROI being taken in by U.S. Senators.
Second, Ray Gunn (1980) wrote "The New York State Legislature: A Developmental
Perspective: 1777-1846," published in Social Science History, because he was stumped that
"Given the centrality of legislatures in our representative system government, it is a remarkable
fact that there is today no general, systematic history of state legislative development in America"
(p. 267). By the time of the Constitution, republicanism had matriculated in America over two
centuries of colonial development because the colonists held distrust of the English aristocracy and
a need to govern themselves, and these values towards politics fueled a revolutionary spirit of
republicanism. Early Americans embraced republicanism based on the principles of popular
sovereignty and direct representation, and "most revolutionary state constitutions severely limited
the executive and judicial power and delegated the authority to govern to a bicameral
legislature" (Gunn, p. 269; citing Wood, 1969; 125-389; Bailyn, 1967, 1970; Douglass, 1955).
Gunn (1980) argues that political power substantially resided in provincial legislatures,
however, "Historians have also assumed, without investigating the proposition, that policy making
was the primary function of legislatures and that citizens were linked to that policy-making process
through representatives" (p. 267). Interest groups and political parties explain the "conversion of
constituent demands into public policy," but is there a third way to describe successful legislative
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structures and processes? Specifically, how does a political value system practice "its role in the
authoritative allocation of the tangible and symbolic rewards of society?" (p. 269).
Gunn (1980) finds that state legislatures brokered major legislation to greatly impact
national politics well after Ratification. After the Founding, state legislatures played a prodigious
role in the political system that "is ‘generally almost terra incognita’ to historians," according to
Ronald Formisano (p. 267; citing Zemsky, 1973; Bogue, 1974; Campbell, 1976). For example,
the New York’s legislature supported "the revolutionary pattern" of self-government through the
antebellum era, yet the New York Governor was more powerful compared to other states because
the office was a three-year post by elections to directly appoint by the people (p. 269). Considering
the prominent role of the state legislatures around the country, "Most of the work of the
legislature originated externally. Legislative structures and the norm of direct participation
facilitated maxium [sic] input from nonmembers through direct petitions" (p. 284). The petitions
and memorials addressed private, local, and sectional interests regarding disparate topics (p. 284).
The evidence suggests that local petitions turn into an ROI, and they appear to have a great deal
of influence over federal officials from time to time.
Given the possibility that state legislatures served as an intermediary between the national
representatives and the regional / local concerns, social scientists, "must pursue the systematic
analysis of legislative development in the past free of eighteenth-century conceptions of what
the legislature was supposed to do and [be] sensitive to its larger role in the political system"
(Gunn, 1980, p. 289, italics in original). Gunn extends his findings from 1977 in that many
legislative tasks were taken over by the delegation of eminent domain powers to private business
corporations, by finding in this article that, "Constitutional changes broadening the opportunities
for popular participation in the legislative process accompanied this erosion of legislative
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authority" during the antebellum era (p. 288). This supports the idea that New Yorkers did act on
their republican values during the antebellum era, given petitions and memorials, that was a
practice of self-government to be able to openly influence their federal officials.
Third, the article, "The Jacksonian Integration of Parties into the Constitutional System,"
written by Douglas Jaenicke (1986) and published in Political Science Quarterly as part of a
broader study of American ideas about political parties, Jaenicke questions why parties bound
together amidst the culture's antiparty tradition after Ratification. Specifically, "The Jacksonian
Democrats developed both the idea and reality of an institutionalized mass political party as a
coalition of heterogeneous groups bound together by procedural norms" (p. 86). The procedural
norms they embraced was the practice of Instruction. The Democratic-Republicans supported
strict construction of the Constitution and, "True Republicanism not only guarantees to each State
the full enjoyment of its reserved rights but it guarantees to each State protection from the
molestation of other States... people of the large and small States of this vast empire [are] all
dwelling under the Republican system..." (p. 87). I believe the gap between historians and William
Riker to this point is possibly a difference between the assumption that the federal actions were
peripheralizing forms or centrally-directed forms, respectively. The historians support the idea that
the peripheralizing form was prevalent during the antebellum era, a great cause of movements and
political activity at all levels of government, but we don’t know, for example, whether ROI were
increasingly introduced in the Senate by the Senator from that representative’s state legislature.
This might help to verify that the peripheralizing form was important as a process utilized by the
federal government.
Considering republicanism, the Democratic Party made a statement

in 1836

supporting their pick for president, "If Van Buren be the rallying point of antibankism, anti-
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nullification, and the right of instruction, what [Democrat] will fail to rally around him? Is his
mere name to frighten men from their principles. . . ? The [Democratic] party will adhere
to principle, regardless of names" (Jaenicke, 1986, p. 102, italics added). On the other hand, there
is a spirit of anti-republicanism, "To justify their temporary rejection of the Democratic yoke in
1848, the New York Barnburners led by Martin Van Buren cited procedural irregularities at the
party's state and national conventions, which had supposedly denied them equal opportunity within
the party" (Jaenicke, p. 106). In short, parties bound together because they "are a kind of political
community... confront the problem of political obligation especially when practical politicians
attempt to maintain partisan unity in the face of substantive disagreement," and of particular
importance, Andrew Jackson, "accepted procedures as the primary source of unity available to a
heterogeneous people..." (p. 107). The evidence supports the idea that the republican practice of
Instruction wholly dominated Jacksonian national politics during the 1830s, which was decades
after Ratification. President Jackson was able to unite the party because Americans across the
nation believed in the right and practice of Instruction. This is a bridge across the breach between
political scientists and historians regarding the role of Instruction as an influence regarding federal
policy.
Fourth, Akhil Amar (1988) wrote, "Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution
outside Article V," published in the University of Chicago Law Review. The central question is
whether "unenumerated rights retained by the People are primarily or exclusively individualistic,
rather than majoritarian; second, that those rights are primarily or exclusively enforceable through
judicial, rather than political, processes" (p. 1044). Amar conjectures that, "if unenumerated, right
of the People is the right of a majority of voters to amend the Constitution—even in ways not
expressly provided for by Article V" (p. 1044). The rights of assembly and instruction "were paired
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and guaranteed by similar language in the North Carolina Constitution of 1776,
the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776..." and others (pp. 1058-1059).
However, according to Amar (1988), "Instruction tends to displace everyday deliberation
in ordinary government entities; it threatens to swallow up Madison's scheme of representative
government even during moments of 'normal politics.' …Madison's key arguments in Federalist
10 are premised on a rejection of instruction" (p. 1059). The Framers rejected the right of
instruction from being added to the First Amendment of the Constitution, still, the Constitution
doesn't regulate popular sovereignty (p. 1060).
Amar (1988) concludes that, "Individual rights, federalism, separation of powers, and
ordinary representation all exist under our Constitution, but they all derive from a higher source,
unbound by these principles" (p. 1103). And the true source of power of the Constitution is, "We
the People of the United States" (p. 1104). Besides resolutions from state legislatures to agree
to amend the Constitution as well as the long-term impacts of judicial review, another major way
for "updating our fundamental law... [is] constitutional amendment by direct appeal to, and
ratification by, We the People of the United States" (p. 1044). Legally, the people of the Republic
of the United States may cause action to generate changes in their government on their call.
Fifth, from the article, "The Paws of Banks: The Origins and Significance of Kentucky's
Decision to Tax Federal Bankers, 1818 – 1820," published in the Journal of the Early Republic,
Wayne State University History Professor Sandra VanBurkleo (1989) admits that the Second
Bank War is "a kind of 'set piece' in the history of the early republic" and she questions why
"Kentuckians rejected the possibility that magistrates were capable of destroying, creating,

or

dispensing rights" (p. 461). Was it because, "'republicanizers' often fail to connect displays of
libertarianism within smale-scale neighborhoods to an extensive, boundary-setting polity, and de-
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emphasize the citizenry's frequent resort to government in defense of liberty" (p. 460)? Could it be
that liberalism dominated the American mind a great deal (Hartz, 1955)?
Central to the Second Bank War, some argued that "republicans before the advent of
banking corporations had been free to form 'unchartered associations or banks—the only kind that
ought to exist?" (VanBurkleo, 1989, p. 468). To these followers of republicanism, revocation was
important so that bankers would not exhibit a "false sovereignty" as well as so the people would
not be tempted into a spirit of "luxury" (VanBurkleo, p. 468). "To drive the point home, Bledsoe,
a staunch promoter of republicanism, offered five bank-smashing resolutions incendiary enough
to merit space in the National Intelligencer... any 'monied monopoly' was 'hostile to republican
liberty'" (p. 468). Perhaps liberalism should be more closely examined, but the spirit of
republicanism at times was loudly exhibited.
According to VanBurkleo (1989), the main problem was that "without specific voter
instruction, past legislatures had no authority to alter the nature of the political order..." (pp. 467468). The resolutions submitted by Bledsoe were not passed, but, "Most obviously, aspects of 'the
Spirit of '76' survived well beyond the War of 1812..." (p. 487). Dramatic rampant incorporation
and the creation of property rights by government, their staunchly resisting of ideological
innovation, and their "choosing instead to defend and deploy inherited 'systems' against outbreaks
of anti-republicanism until accumulated evidence forced them to reconsider and regroup," supports
the idea that republicanism remained a stand-alone political value system after Ratification in
Kentucky (p. 487). The finding that Americans used a "system" to expel anti-republicanism is
particularly interesting because it supports the idea that Americans relied on their republican
values to effectually govern themselves decades after Ratification.
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There are three articles from the 1990s. First, published in the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review, "Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American
Constitutional Order," James Pope (1990) seeks to understand the republican alternative to
pluralism and collective action. The "proponents of the 'republican revival,' for example, are not
especially concerned about the purported irrationality of collective action; according to republican
theory, political activism can be a source of happiness in itself" (p. 291). This assertion supports
the idea that Americans would exhibit republican practices as a means to gain happiness.
The problem is that the "republican ideal of deliberative democracy was designed for
societies the size of city-states. The notion that ordinary citizens can engage in deliberative selfgovernment seems utopian in a polity as large as the United States" (Pope, 1990, p. 291). However,
Pope argues that this is simply a pessimism of systems-thinking (p. 291). Indeed, Pope finds
evidence to support the claim that "republican moments" did cause action at the national level
through direct popular control, which "may be far more important than its attitude toward interest
group politics" (p. 291). Pope's thesis is:
The most important transformations in our political order-independence, abolition, the rise
of economic regulation, the integration of the industrial working class into capitalist
democracy, and the extension women and minorities-were brought on by republican
moments. Not only do republican moments upset systems-thinking, they also violate the
axiom that ours is a system of representative government... During republican moments,
social movements exert direct popular power on government and private institutions. (pp.
292-293, italics in original)
Americans did share direct popular control, or power, over their government. Americans did use
republican values to enforce direct popular power by their political participation in social / political
movements in order to facilitate an apparent form of self-government that is by all accounts an
extended Republic. Direct "means outside the formal structure of representative democracy"
(p. 293). Popular means "the opposite of aristocratic or elitist" (p. 293). Examples of "direct
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popular power" include assemblies of the whole people, mass demonstrations, boycotts, or other
nonelectoral means (p. 293).
Pope (1990) states examples for how the people expressed direct popular control during the
Founding. After the Declaration of Independence, provincial assemblies, such as North Carolina,
insisted that the people had a right to assemble and petition for action. "Even after state power had
shifted to Congress and the Revolutionary state legislatures, informal popular assemblies
continued to be justified" by the legislators themselves (p. 337). In practice, there were so many
conventions and assemblies that some observers said, "the country would ‘shortly be overrun by
committees’" (p. 338). For instance, yeoman farmers from remote towns could not afford to send
a national delegate, so they organized a county convention. There were conventions everywhere
in New England and they, "passed resolutions, petitioned the legislature, and sometimes claimed
sovereign powers" (p. 338). In these cases, the people were the principal originators of public
policy and their state legislature was supposed to relay the message to the national delegate, who
was customarily bound to the instruction from the people. One possible theory to take from this is
that the state legislature acted as a broker for the people who were petitioning them, with power
firmly established by the people, through the passage of a ROI. It is beyond the scope of this
dissertation, but it might be helpful to ascertain how many petitions or ROI from the people locally
assembled or together in a county convention were duly passed on to the Senator or not. How
many originated from a state legislature? In any event, all of these answers would likely add to our
understanding of the multiple facets of the peripheralizing function of self-government.
In, "Barbecues and Pledges: Electioneering and the Rise of Democratic Politics in
Antebellum Alabama," published in the Journal of Southern History, Daniel Dupre (1994) notes
that barbeque parties were an accepted tradition of southern politics for ordinary people to secure
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a relationship with political candidates seeking their vote at campgrounds, muster fields, and
taverns. So, "why then did the citizens of Madison County attack the campaign events in the late
1820s?" (p. 483). As a matter of fact, there was a petition drive in Madison Country
that garnered over one thousand signatures to denounce "the drinking, rowdiness, and corruption
associated with electioneering" during 1829 (p. 480). Dupre follows that:
The following year a new controversy over electioneering stirred the political waters of the
community. Were voters' demands that candidates pledge their support for specific policies
an extension of the constituents' right of instruction or were they a dangerous infringement
upon the independence of representatives? Madison County's two newspapers, united in their
opposition to the political barbecues, found themselves in opposite corners over the question
of pledges. The discomfort and debate over those two forms of electioneering revolved
around the issue of trust. Could voters be trusted to behave properly during the campaigns
and to vote responsibly at the polls? Could candidates be trusted to give honest portrayals of
their policies and their sentiments and to avoid misrepresentation and demagoguery? (p.
480)
Dupre (1994) finds evidence of people participating in and enjoying the campaign events, even
though no one defended the campaign events in print. On the one hand, "Who would go on record
in support of whiskey treating and gander pulling?" (p. 498). On the other hand, these activities
damned by critics could be "sources of great pleasure to the common folk. Pork and whiskey,
crowds of neighbors and strangers, dancing and gambling, blood sports and stump speeches—
those were entertaining diversions from the monotony and isolation of rural life" (p. 498). More
importantly, at these barbeques, pledges were a central opportunity to speak about republican
values and witness candidates tie their policy plans to those values.
Dupre (1994) argues that the "Barbacuensis" exemplified the pervasiveness of the
republican ideology as a longing for the virtues of the past without licentiousness while others
demanded free political experiences of voluntary reform organizations with respect for present day
politics (pp. 511-512). The people with the traditional ideas of virtue tempered the reform
movements, and "they remained ever vigilant for signs of elite dominance or governmental
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coercion. That vigilance extended to barbecues, where a hypocritical candidate might masquerade
as one of the people in order to seduce the common folk" (pp. 511-512).
Considering the diversity of sober and allegedly licentious individuals at these barbecues
who attended with the chief purpose of being able to hear the candidates' stump speech, Dupre
(1994) puts forth that "The Democrat promoted pledges as a tool to expose devious candidates...
Candidates' pledges served to mobilize voters around specific policy platforms and thus became
an early innovation of an emerging partisan political culture" (p. 512, italics in original). This
supports the idea that, during the 1820s, republican values were the bedrock for crafting public
policy on the campaign trail because pledges of policy were announced to the people at a place
where they could respond openly and inform the candidate of their own opinion among witnesses.
De facto, the candidates bound themselves to the people at these events which seems to be a
catalyst for the people to be able to legitimately use Instruction to influence their federal
representatives.
During 1998, William Shade, Professor of History and Director of American Studies at
Lehigh University, wrote "'The Most Delicate and Exciting Topics': Martin Van Buren, Slavery,
and the Election of 1836." Published in the Journal of the Early Republic, the article focuses on
the "converting" that occurred during the 1836 election because the Democratic Party retained
its electoral winning position, "but there is considerable change in its voter base" (p. 459). Initially,
the issue of slavery played a chief role in the internal Democratic debates about the tariff,
internal improvements at the federal government's expense, the Second Bank of the United States,
public lands, and Indian policy (p. 461). Still, how did the Democratic Party maintain a solid
electoral victory as its base shifted?

68
Shade (1998) finds that most states favored one candidate heavily, and during 1832,
Jackson won nearly eighty-five percent of the vote in the planter dominated tobacco counties,
being supported by "virtually everyone of the black belt counties," and his policy of Indian
removal "generally suited slaveholding interests" (p. 464). By 1836, Van Buren adopted Jackson's
winning platform, but his opponents cast him as a racist on multiple fronts, considering the
suppression of "incendiary" literature debacle (p. 475). At the time, there were slaves in the North,
for example, one quarter of blacks in New Jersey and New York were enslaved as late as 1820
(p. 462), yet there was an open debate about slavery in the North, unlike the South. More
poignantly, southerners favored states' rights as a guard against federal encroachments, such
as calls for the abolition of slavery by northerners, and, interestingly enough, southerners found
themselves advancing their agenda in the federal government by joining in the passage of ROI.
Shade (1998) explains that the South had passed resolutions, such as that by Henry
Pinckney of South Carolina, to include a "gag" rule against the making use of antislavery
arguments in the South at the national level (p. 476). Of special concern, petitions to Congress
from abolitionist groups in the North to abolish slavery at the national level were, "handled by
simply referring them to the proper committee, which proceeded to ignore them. Realizing that the
recent rapid growth of the antislavery societies in the North might make this procedure
problematic," southerners needed a strategy to thwart the incoming petitions to Congress (p. 476).
This supports the earlier literature in that a "republican movement" would rock the Congress. On
the other hand, it seems anti-republican that ROI were sent to a committee in order to be ignored
and put to rest.
To these northern petitions calling for the abolition of slavery in the Union, a southerner,
Hammond, responded that he "could not sit there and see the rights of the southern people
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assaulted day after day, by ignorant fanatics from whom these memorials proceed..." (Shade, 1998,
p. 476). But, to the chagrin of Calhoun, southern Democrats rallied to support Pinckney's
resolutions to include the "gag" rule instead of showing support for the northern resolutions to
abolish slavery (Shade, pp. 476-477). When Pinckney's committee reported to Congress in May, it
simply repeated the earlier resolutions regarding the "disposition of slavery in the states and in the
District... the committee added a third resolution, the 'gag rule' for handling antislavery petitions"
in Congress, so that additional resolutions would not be seriously considered by congressmen. The
rule passed easily with bipartisan support (p. 478). When the vote on Pinckney's resolutions were
at a tie in the Senate, Van Buren "calmly cast his vote in favor of such censorship of the mails" and
abolitionist materials were banned in the South (p. 475).
Conversely, Shade (1998) states that Van Buren was known to have supported the right to
vote for African Americans who were "free" in New York as well as the favoring of the lowering
of property requirements for eligibility to vote at the constitutional convention of 1821 (p. 468).
Thus, Van Buren could play to the abolitionists and slaveholders, and, following Jackson, even
though everything was tied to the slavery issue, he could ignore the issue of slavery and support
the use of Instruction to pass ROI. The platform wholly supported the policy of Instruction as an
institution of procedural republicanism, and senators could send ROI to the appropriate committee
for a political decision or willful indecision.
According to the evidence, Van Buren did not receive as much of the vote in slave states
as Jackson, but he did retain them. For example, "Even in Virginia where efforts of Ritchie and
Richmond Junto enabled him to win handily, Van Buren's percentage of the vote was nearly 20
points below that garnered by Jackson in 1832 although it correlated with that cast for Jacksonian
congressional candidates the previous year" (Shade, 1998, p. 480). In other slave states, Van Buren

70
was hurt by turnout because it fell in the North and rose in the South (p. 480). By the election of
1840, Van Buren ran as a "northern man with southern principles" (p. 482).
Shade (1988) concludes that there was an "acceptance of racism and slavery [that]
constituted the moral cost of political development in antebellum America... Van Buren's strategy
for building a modern political party, was rooted, ironically, in his and his party's acceptance of
the most traditional norms of a racist society" (p. 484). This may suggest that relying on procedural
republicanism as a party identification tool wasn't enough in the lead up to the Civil War, with
consideration for the common republican values of freedom, equality, and virtue, to guide
Americans in their creation of a common good. This is because the former values are antithetical to
the Master-Slave relationship in every regard, with respect for the republican underpinnings of
the American Revolution. To what degree the state's rights advocates preferred Instruction because
it secured direct popular control or because the practice allowed racists to engage in
authoritarianism and abstain from forms of republican popular control is unanswered. The reader
is left to ponder the degree by which national representatives / Unionists supported Instruction
because it enabled republican values to be applied by all the representatives to fortify an extended
Republic to exhibit the republican values of the people, or because ROI allowed authoritarian
nationalists to unite their elite party members in order to suppress the political opposition
through the coercive powers of the state legislature.
During 2009, in the Journal of the Early Republic, "The Perils of 'Pure Democracy':
Minority Rights, Liquor Politics, and Popular Sovereignty in Antebellum America," Kyle
Volk, Assistant Professor of History at the University of Montana, examines why representatives
were reluctant to end liquor licensing once "reformers lobbied for laws that allowed the people to
decide the license question" (p. 643). The legislatures supported the Jacksonian ethos of
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majoritarian democracy and public policy in America was guaranteed to be "rooted in 'public
sentiment,' authorized 'the will of the majority' to control the sale... 'the people...are the legitimate
source of power—the sovereigns of the land.' Local option was American popular sovereignty
incarnate" (p. 643). But when the voters returned No-License decisions, a debate about popular
sovereignty arose as the protests became louder from the liquor consortium of dealers and their
allies (p. 643). According to James Madison and others, some argued, the "local option established
a 'pure democracy' that made for unstable policymaking and facilitated the oppression of local
minorities by local majorities" (p. 643). Again and again, the evidence surrounding the practices
of Instruction highly suggests that the peripheralizing function mattered as an influence at the
national level after Ratification due to every American’s engagement with republicanism.
Volk (2009) argues that the practice of people deciding the outcomes of issues became
known as "Ballot-box legislation," which is a form of direct democracy supported by people who
rule themselves (p. 644). Both sides of the temperance movement, independent of the
party system, helped to shape public policy, and "Temperance reformers' embrace of ballot-box
legislation illustrates an important technology of policy creation available both to groups wishing
to circumvent partisan legislators and to legislators seeking to evade vexed questions like
liquor licensing" (p. 646). Indeed, "the local option" allowed radical New York Democrats in the
1840s to propose resolutions to amend the state constitution so that voters would be required to
approve of any new law that would create state debt. And, the people in the temperance movement
openly supported the resolutions and rallied to the local option because if the people could control
tax law, then what would be beyond their control (p. 653)?
Volk (2009) states that the local option became more popular as a political form for the
people to craft public policy because the "People's Resolutions" became part of the state
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constitution in 1846, after New York implemented a local option law in 1845 to allow the for the
ability of the people to vote on laws affecting taxation at the ballot box (p. 653). After all,
"'Republican Governments' [are] champions of the local option" and therefore "'the majority ought
to decide all questions of taxation.' Local option made sure of it" (p. 653). The local option was a
technology of popular sovereignty and presented policy makers with an alternate position for
"public opinion" (p. 654). This time of temperance and ballot-box legislation during the
1840s allowed supporters of the local option to replace the image of a whiskey drunken voter as
described earlier into someone who was sober and thoughtful, and they argued that the "electorate
was moral enough to decide directly public policy and implied that bare majorities were morally
superior to government officials" (p. 656). This suggests that the spirit of republicanism was
significant long after Ratification among New Yorkers.
Volk (2009) states that the idea of self-government was appealing to minority groups
too. As the ballot became "a tool to enact social and moral change directly," women became
increasingly aware of their movement to gain the franchise (p. 657). Meanwhile, the backlash
against the local option persisted and enlivened, for instance, "some overtly appealed to immigrant
voters, jibing that reformers next would 'make possession of a temperance certificate... an
indispensable qualification for citizenship" (p. 659). On the whole, the evidence suggests that
there was an independent citizenry who directly participated in exercising their republican values
to participate in self-government because even the objectors of ballot-box legislation "did not
seek to oppose democracy or return to the elitist Federalist-style deferential politics of an earlier
era" since the local option "ensured freedom within governments of popular sovereignty by
helping avert 'the tyranny of the changeable majority'" (p. 679). Republican democracy was the
solution, or as the Select Committee of the Maryland General Assembly reported in 1847, "He who
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fears or objects to trust the people in any matters pertaining to general or national questions should
have written on his forehead anti-American" (p. 641, italics in original). Republican selfgovernment was an option for bypassing the political party and interest groups.
Political Scientist Jeff Grynaviski, and my Chair, provides an update to Riker (1955) in
that he directly reevaluates a possible role that ROI may have played in signaling a commitment by
state legislatures to national political affairs. The idea is that Instruction was a practice that
Jackson engaged in order to unify the party so as to pursue all its programs, at times pitting what
a Senator would do directly in opposition to what he will do according to a ROI from the peoples’
representatives of his State Legislature (2008). Regarding ROI, Grynaviski (2008) demonstrates
that senators often disobeyed, obeyed, and on four occasions, resigned due to an ROI. One
resignation came from the Whigs and three from the Democrats (pp. 32-34).
The evidence suggests that ROI were "largely symbolic actions by which state parties
signal their commitment to a national party program" (Grynaviski, 2008, p. 34). Evidently through
the yeas and nays, party leaders during the Jacksonian period could call for an ROI to "commit
their back-benchers to party logrolls by forcing them to make public announcements of their
support for the national party's program" (p. 48). Therefore, state legislatures utilized ROI as a tool
to cause back-benchers to toe the party line and President Jackson utilized ROI as a tool to push
his policy commitments through the Congress. Taken together, this suggests that ROI may have
played a peripheralizing role, but the evidence remains quite limited to offer such a claim because
the "original" Constitution of 1787 created a bicameral legislature so that the Senate would be
comprised of two representatives sent from the state legislature and a proportional House of
Representatives who were elected directly by the people.
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Following Riker (1955), ROI were ineffective compared to the recall provision of the
Articles of Confederation, and the circumstances surrounding ROI did not affect the partisan
legislature after Ratification. At this, Grynaviski finds that a state's decision to pass a ROI with
respect for President Jackson's Bank War, "was closely related to whether it issued bonds to serve
as bank capital in state chartered banks" (2008, p. 29). As President Jackson initiated the ROI
process, one might argue that Instruction morphed into a centrally-directed tool, not a
peripheralizing one.
From an unpublished paper that Dr. Grynaviski shared with me (2010) as well as our
collaboration on a paper that I presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Conference,
2014, republicanism might have been a viable political value system for Americans during the
antebellum era, however, ROI failed to perform the same principal-agent function after
Ratification as they had during the time of the Articles of Confederation because legislators were
not bound to Instruction by the Constitution as they were bound by the Articles. A major turning
point for political scientists to consider republicanism as a viable political value system came
through Riker’s (1955) argument that the Senate failed to perform these functions because the
Founders did not empower state legislatures with the constitutional power to instruct senators and
to recall those who failed to abide by them. Riker (1955) places particular importance on the role
of ROI during Jackson’s presidency.
In assessing the veracity of this claim, there is, on the one hand, absolutely no question that
Jackson and his allies used Instruction to embarrass his Senate opponents during Jackson’s Bank
War. Furthermore, there was a marked upswing in the number of instructions recorded in the
Senate Journal beginning in the 19th Congress. That was the first Congress after Jackson was
denied the Presidency by Adams and Clay in the "Corrupt Bargain" and therefore corresponds with
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the moment when Jackson was beginning to forge an intersectional political alliance with Martin
that formed the basis of the Democratic Party (Aldrich, 1995). It is plausible that this represents
evidence of coordinated national action by Jackson supporters to bolster the appeal of his states’
rights program office (Grynaviski, 2010; Girdwood & Grynaviski, 2014).
On the other hand, Jackson’s Bank War did not begin in earnest until the 22nd Congress—
six years after instructions had become common. There is little evidence from the 19 th Congress of
partisan coordination across states, because almost every recorded ROI concerns a different issue.
There is also little evidence to support the claim that there was a marked increase in the number of
instructions during Jackson’s presidency that extended only until the 24 th Congress—after the
19th Congress the number of ROI did not leap again until the 25th Congress once Jackson had left
office and the number of instruction remained high for more than a decade after Jackson left
office (Grynaviski, 2010; Girdwood & Grynaviski, 2014).
The more damaging evidence for Riker’s characterization of Instruction is probably not
their timing, but the prevalence of ROI pertaining to local matters. It is hard to imagine state
legislatures passing ROI on to Senators calling on them to pursue land grants for schools or to
move a federal land office from one town to another in order to embarrass. These resolutions are
better understood as pertaining to things that state legislatures wanted from the General
Government and their Senators were agents on their behalf seeking to satisfy those wishes. In this
way, the republican practice of Instruction was convenient, but there remains little qualitative
proof that the Founders and Americans utilized Instruction because of a reliance on republican
values (Girdwood & Grynaviski, 2014).
The key point is that viewed through the prism of the principal-agent framework presented
by Riker (1955), the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions were irrelevant. They did not carry the
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force of law and were really just expressions of the sentiments of those state legislatures. There is
no evidence that they changed the support of Senators or Representatives from Virginia and
Kentucky for the Alien and Sedition Acts. Nevertheless, much like the Declaration of
Independence, by petitioning the government, Virginia and Kentucky were able to highlight its
abuses and formally express a political remedy. The practice of republicanism based on republican
values did matter to James Madison and Thomas Jefferson and their state resolutions were
probably at the root of the Revolution of 1800 (Girdwood & Grynaviski, 2014).
In their account of how standing committees came to replace select committees in the
House and Senate during the early-19th century, Gamm and Shepsle (1989) identify two
theoretical approaches to the study of institutions' emergence and development (see also Aldrich
1995; Aldrich & Shepsle 2000; Jenkins 1998). The first of these, drawn from the rational choice
study of institutions, emphasizes the role that human agency, especially thoughtful, purposeful
action, plays in institutional development. This perspective views institutions through the prism of
the goals that foresighted actors seek to realize and it argues that institutions develop based on
their success and failure in accomplishing their intended ends or because of changing preferences
among those who seek to benefit from them (Shepsle, 1989). The second approach places much
greater weight on the environment in which institutions develop, especially macro-historical
forces, than human agency (see also Cooper, 1970; Cooper & Young, 1989; Sait, 1938).
Quoting Sait, they describe this approach as adopting an evolutionary perspective in which, "When
we examine political institutions, one after the other, they seem to have been erected, almost like
coral reefs, without conscious design" (Gamm & Shepsle, p. 41) (Girdwood & Grynaviski,
2014).
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Both the rational choice-new institutionalism and the macro-historical approaches share
the view that institutions evolve as a means to realize some end. That is most clearly seen in the
former approach that sees institutions as being explicitly adopted to pursue some end. To that way
of thinking, institutions are chosen given the preferences of the relevant actors in order to
determine the outcome. The macro-historical approach also tends to see institutional change
through the theoretical lens of means changing to obtain some ends. That point is perhaps most
vividly illustrated by Polsby's account of the institutionalization of the House of Representatives
in response to the greater demands placed on it by the Industrial Revolution (Girdwood &
Grynaviski, 2014).
Where my Chair and I depart from these two approaches is the belief that some institutions
are adopted because they are seen to be a desirable means, possibly without regard to the ends. A
useful comparison might be to imagine different theological doctrines. For example, some people
might see religious practice as a means to some end. At one extreme, someone making Pascal's
Wager may become a practicing Christian, not really believing in the afterlife, just in case their
behavior on Earth yields rewards in heaven. At the other extreme, a Calvinist who believes in predestination might see religious practice as irrelevant to their experiences in the afterlife.
Nevertheless, she remains a practicing Christian because of her adherence to a particular religious
doctrine. Thus, in our paper, we argued that the perpetuation of ROI as a practice continued on
after the Constitutional Convention and early-Congress' because to many Americans during the
late-18th and early-19th centuries, the doctrine of Instruction was a core "republican" value
engaged as a means for exhibiting their political values (Girdwood & Grynaviski, 2014).
Essentially, we found that Riker's conclusion of a centrally-directed Republic during the
antebellum era was probably the result of the biased sample of ROI. He said that ROI weren't
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used to cause the national representatives to heed Instructions sent from their constituents and that
there were roughly 20 ROI. However, there are more than 2,000 ROI passed by state legislatures
during the antebellum period dedicated to causing at least a "recognition" in Congress since they
were recorded in the Senate Journal, and many ROI, such as the Virginia and Kentucky
resolutions, were not recorded in the Senate Journal. Hence, the practice of passing ROI in such
numbers was likely a valid example of the peripheralizing function as a widespread and accepted
political practice to influence the federal government. Thus, Riker's (1955) assessment for how the
government was centralized and could ignore ROI was true according to the Constitution, but the
evidence of the practice of Instruction clearly suggests that the people and their state legislatures
probably peripheralized the federal government because they were "republicans."
The ROI recorded in the Senate Journal regarding state and national concerns are various.
From the information graciously shared with me by Dr. Grynaviski, there were a number of ROI
passed and recorded in the Senate Journal regarding state and national concerns directly after
Ratification (Girdwood & Grynaviski, 2014). For example, Graph 3.1 is a record of the entries in
the Senate Journal, located by Dr. Grynaviski’s Research Assistants, Kateri Somrak, Brett Carter,
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Tom Wood, and Dmitri Leybman, with support provided by the David Greenstone Fund and the
Howard Foundation (Grynaviski, 2008). Given that there were over a hundred ROI in the three
decades after Ratification, well before the Jacksonian period, we know that Riker (1955) greatly
understates the amount of ROI received and recorded by the Senate.

Dr. Grynaviski’s collection provides a more accurate picture of the actual amount than
Riker, offering an opportunity to determine whether the evidence suggests that the federal
government remained "peripheralizing" during the decades after Ratification (Girdwood
and Grynaviski, 2014). To be sure, with respect for ROI, Table 3.1 shows that there was an
enthusiastic increase after the Jackson's presidency in all parts of the country (Girdwood
& Grynaviski, 2014).
The amount of ROI and their upward growth by decade is evidence to suggest that the
people exhibited republican core values through ROI during the antebellum era across the nation.
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Hence, a scientific inquiry into "republicanism" should be meaningful as a contribution for how
republicanism served up the peripheralizing function through ROI from 1789 until 1860 because
ROI begins at the local / state level and requires that the local / state level be involved in the
process to pass the ROI for interaction to occur at the national level. The state legislatures were,
apparently, functioning as a clearinghouse for ROI to be sent to the United States Senate for due
consideration.
In summary, the literature shows that many Americans shared a sense of anti-instruction
sentiment and these citizens, particularly from the South and of the Whig Party, supported an
independent national body that was free from the people and their local and state representatives.
Meanwhile, a vastly greater percentage of Americans "believed in" the doctrine of Instruction as
a "republican" practice that was emblematic of their identity as an American—he who did not trust
the people to govern themselves was Anti-American. During the antebellum era, nearly everyone
carried with them the republican belief of Instruction and, consequently, the practice of passing
ROI was a means for the people to express their republican values. The oft cited case of President
Jackson using ROI to win over voters across the nation was an example, par excellence, of the
utter dominance of the republican values that were held by Americans across the nation during the
antebellum era.
Nevertheless, William Riker (1955) was cogent in that the people and state legislatures
during the 20th century were not utilizing the practice of passing a ROI at the state level in order
to direct the Senator’s vote or to recall a recalcitrant Senator. If conventions, petitions, and
resolutions of instruction defines the prominent republican peripheralizing function, perhaps
because of an accompanying republic moment, then who would say that Americans practice
republicanism after the 1950s?
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Discussion: My Dissertation Problem and Solution
One goal of this dissertation is to subject the claim that republican values contributed to
the practice of Instruction so that, if proven, a Multiple Traditions study in regards for the elements
of republicanism, liberalism, and authoritarianism of the culture will become more feasible
(Chapter Two). Hence, in this chapter, it is important to note that the literature with respect
for ROI has shown that Instruction was a common practice for causing changes to occur in politics
at all levels of government and across the nation during the antebellum era, with South Carolina
being an outlier. Bridging the gap in the literature between political scientists and historians is
important work because political scientists are unsure whether national representatives on the
whole took ROI from their state legislatures as well as their constituents very seriously. Political
scientists

don’t

yet

assert

that

the

peripheralizing

function was

substantive

after

Ratification. Plainly, no one has established that federal representatives took the peripheralizing
function

seriously

after Ratification (I

will

attempt

to

prove in

Chapter

Five that

representatives did peripheralize petitions from the people in the U.S. House, and in Chapter Six I
attempt to prove the U.S. Senate did peripheralize ROI from state legislatures).
The literature suggests that national representatives did take republicanism via the
peripheralizing function seriously insofar as passing and sending ROI to the Senate was
increasingly a common occurrence in the Journal during the antebellum era (Grynaviski, 2010;
Girdwood & Grynaviski, 2014). However, there were plenty of reasons to suggest that ROI were
not viewed as significant by some national representatives, such as national legislators planning
to send petitions / resolutions to a committee in order for them to die, or in that senators voted on
occasion in direct opposition to a ROI that was delivered to them. On the other hand, if ROI
were increasingly incorporated into bills or passed by a committee during the decades after
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Ratification in Congress, wouldn't the peripheralizing function be evident and explanatory as a
consequential form of governing at the federal level?

In consideration for both the historians' and political scientists' perspective, the literature
in regards for ROI by and large illuminates republicanism as a ritualistic ceremony of political
formations via the people through exhibitions of self-government during the antebellum era in all
regions of the United States (Table 3.2 & Table 3.3). The historians by and large provide evidence
for republican values as a cause for Americans to participate in politics, such as through a
barbecue, local option ballot, or ROI. A couple legal scholars also support the idea that Americans
continued to employ the peripheralizing function because the purpose of the Constitution was to
protect the functions of popular sovereignty from a centrally-directed national government!
Simply put, the problem for the political scientist is that no one has verified whether federal
representatives promoted the practice of Instruction because of their own "republican" and
not "liberal" values.
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The degree by which the people maintained direct popular control is an open question
because no one knows how deeply these practices affected politicians in the national government.
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 suggests that there was broad support for Instruction nationwide, both
locally and nationally, but much more evidence would be needed to suggest that the Founders and
subsequent federal representatives after Ratification defended the practice at the federal level on
"republican" and not "liberal" grounds. This begs the question for political scientists: Why did
state legislatures increasingly pass on ROI to the United States Senate throughout the antebellum
era if the peripheralizing function was dead?
From roughly 100 years of literature in review of ROI, almost entirely by historians, there
is support for the claim that Instruction was a "republican" and not a "liberal" value put into
practice. Even though Riker and others are persuasive in that the practice seems to be pretty much
dead during our modern age, the literature is equally persuasive in that the spirit of republicanism
was alive and well in America as an element of the political culture to powerfully influence
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the political habits of Americans long after the Founders' generation. Thus, I intend to
systematically document how ROI as a practice was "republican" in order for political scientists
to begin to recognize the possible significance of republicanism and the "peripheralizing" function
that has been largely ignored since 1955 by political scientists.
Conclusion
To summarize the literature with respect for the exhibitions of Instruction, the results of
the scholarly findings strongly suggests that ROI was a local and national practice because of an
adherence to republican values by the people and their representatives during the antebellum era.
The historians and legal scholars are clear that Americans organize republican movements, such
as Jefferson's and Madison's rebuke of the Alien and Sedition laws through the Kentucky
Resolutions and Virginia Resolves, respectively. I propose that if the members of the House and
Senate did take Instruction seriously, such as local petitions and ROI from state legislatures, then
"republican" values and not "liberal" values should be credited for, at least at times, acting as the
guideposts of the national political agenda. In this way, just as the Kentucky and Virginia
resolutions didn't technically have an impact at the national level, there is evidence to suggest that
they were part of the larger cultural experience of the Revolution of 1800. For instance, as Pope
(1990) finds, "Jackson could not agree to ‘the total exclusion of the people, in their collective
capacity’ from the government. As the reference to the tax resistance makes clear, he saw the right
of assembly as a protection for forceful, collectively organized, and direct popular pressure" (pp.
343-344).
Accordingly, I argue that the literature on institutional choice and development has largely
ignored the possibility that some institutions may be simple manifestations of the values of actors
participating in the political process on republican grounds. Instruction during the first decades of
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rule under the Constitution of 1787 was possibly the result of an ideological commitment on the
part of many Americans to the "republican" practices of Instruction. These republican practices
allowed the people to directly participate in and perform the ritualized custom of self-government,
and those practices lasted for many decades after Ratification because Americans shared
these republican values. Thus, I claim that:
(C1) The American people and their representatives practiced their republican values
openly before and long after Ratification, and
(C2) Their exhibitions of Instruction based on core republican values were widespread
and prevalent across the nation.
If true, I think that it is reasonable to conclude that republicanism was a freestanding political value
system, at the very least, from inception through the antebellum era. These claims are important
because they, if true, should cause political scientists to stop focusing on liberalism as a standalone system and, instead, begin to sincerely incorporate republicanism into a Multiple Traditions
approach.
Most of the research in regards for ROI that I am able to locate has been accomplished by
historians, followed by legal scholars. There are only two journal articles referencing ROI as a
central part of the story from political scientists, William Riker (1955) and Douglas Jaenicke
(1986), excluding me and my Chair. William Riker (1955) did not find that ROI was worth
revisiting because the peripheralizing function, which existed as republicanism under the Articles
of Confederation, was basically dead at the national level as a result of the passage of the
Constitution since the Right of Instruction and Recall of national representatives were excluded
from the Constitution. However, the evidence from the literature as summarized in Tables 3.2
and 3.3 clarify why my two claims regarding republicanism are worthy of research pursuit, since
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social scientists from 1917 to 2014 have been increasingly aware that the doctrine of Instruction
and the accompanying passage of documents to be incorporated into the federal government were
meaningful exhibitions of republicanism during the entire antebellum era.
Hence, in order to bridge the breach between political scientists and historians regarding
republicanism, I will build a bridge as a political scientist for fellow social scientists to traverse
considering the peripheralizing function that is supportive of "republican" governance. The ROI
literature provides an opportunity to understand that there is a breach today between historians
and political scientists in that republicanism was a thriving political element or a dead element of
the culture regarding the federal government during the decades after Ratification. So, was the
practice of Instruction an embodiment of the American political form of republicanism as argued
by historians? Have political scientists misread the significance of ROI in that they did in fact
serve to foster the peripheralizing function that was intended by the Founders? Or, were ROI
perhaps a way for local and state governments to advance state concerns during a time of amateur
political networks and ROI had little to no bearing on the national agenda, as political scientists
might surmise?
To bridge the breach in the literature, I visit online the archives of Congress and gather
data on "Instruct" so that I may discern exactly how the American Founders embraced the role
of Instruction before Ratification. Did Instruction permeate American politics at the national
level from 1775 through 1789 according to the peripheralizing function, as Riker suggested it
once did under the Articles of Confederation? Once I systematically document the role of
Instruction

before

the Constitution (Chapter

Four), I will attempt

to account for

the

peripheralizing function according to the direct petitioning of the House of Representatives
(Chapter Five) as well as the prolonged use of ROI after Ratification by state legislatures in the
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U.S. Senate (Chapter Six). If both of the latter chapters showcase examples of self-government in
the House and Senate as an exhibition of the peripheralizing function, then I will contribute a
study of republicanism to support my two claims by this dissertation.
This research is possible because the literature in regards for ROI in this chapter supports
the idea that ROI political documents were generated by a people who adhered to a spirit of
republicanism from the Founding until 1860. The people as well as their representatives,
apparently, exerted themselves as "republicans" under the Constitution (Chapter Four) and
everyone continued to engage these "republican" values and to participate in politics as a means to
exhibit their adherence to the republican belief system after Ratification (Chapters Five & Six).
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CHAPTER 4: ARCHIVAL RECORDS REGARDING "INSTRUCT" FROM 1775
THROUGH 1789
Introduction
Despite the reservations of James Madison and other nationalists about the practice of
state legislators instructing their representatives how to govern, the states retained the right to
recall their representatives in the national legislature explicitly in the Virginia Plan for the new
Constitution and implicitly in the New Jersey Plan (Girdwood & Grynaviski, 2014). The records
of the debates at the Constitutional Convention contain little if any support for the practice,
however, and it was struck from early drafts of the Constitution, without objection, on the grounds
that delegates would, in the words of Alexander Hamilton, come with the prejudices of their states
rather than the good of the Union (Elliot, 1827). That said, it was widely accepted within Federalist
circles that state legislatures would continue to instruct their senators (Girdwood & Grynaviski,
2014). As John Jay, a contributor to The Federalist Papers, remarked (Elliot, 1827):
The Senate is to be composed of men appointed by the state legislatures: they will certainly
choose those who are most distinguished for their general knowledge. I presume they will
also instruct them, that there will be a constant correspondence supported between the
senators and the state executives, who will be able, from time to time, to afford them all
that particular information which particular circumstances may require.
Even Hamilton, the most nationalistic of the authors of The Federalist Papers, argued during the
New York Convention that, "If the general voice of the people be for an increase, it undoubtedly
must take place. They have it in their power to instruct their representatives; and the state
legislatures, which appoint the senators, may enjoin it also upon them" (Elliot, 1827). Despite these
assurances during the ratification debates, the absence of provisions to recall or even to
instruct senators, with their lengthy six-year terms, contributed to Anti-Federalist charges that the
Constitution created a natural aristocracy in the upper chamber of Congress because it was not
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constitutionally tied to the will of the people (Storing & Dry, 1981). Indeed, at their ratifying
conventions, North Carolina and Virginia called on Congress to include the Right to Instruct in the
Bill of Rights (Farrand, 1911).
In the First Congress, Representative Thomas Tudor Tucker of South Carolina proposed
modifying what was to become the First Amendment to include the phrase, "to instruct their
Representatives." Based on the grammar and context, this must have been directed to members of
the lower chamber of Congress who might subsequently receive "instructions" from their
constituents; however, the debate is ultimately turned on the interpretation of the term "instruct."
Most participants in the debate accepted that if Instruction meant removing agency from
representatives and giving it to their constituents, the new Constitution would inherit many of the
defects of the Articles of Confederation that they sought to remedy, and possibly even magnify
them because of the possibility that senators might receive Resolutions of Instruction (ROI) on the
same issue from different groups of constituents who call for drastically different solutions. For
example, given the regional differences in the United States observed by Tocqueville (Chapter
Two), ROI on the same issue from the North and the South, such as slavery, would directly
controvert one another. The people and state legislatures would thus have an ability to cause
discord in the national chambers, which the authors of the Constitution sought to mitigate, not
exacerbate (Girdwood & Grynaviski, 2014).
An alternative interpretation of "instruct" might have been that it was simply an alternative
form of the term "petition." Madison, the master logician, argued that the First Amendment’s
protections of speech, the press, and assembly guaranteed the people the right to petition.
Consequently, the only possible justification for the Tucker Amendment would be to give greater
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agency to the people. James Madison openly bemoaned this move, quarrelling (Annals of
Congress, August 15, 1789, pp. 761-776):
Suppose they, the people, instruct a representative by his vote to violate the Constitution;
is he at liberty to obey such instructions? If his vote must inevitably have the same effect,
what sort of a right is this, in the Constitution, to instruct a representative who has a right
to disregard the order, if he pleases?
In the end, Madison’s views prevailed, as it would on future occasions. Tucker’s Amendment
failed in the House 10 votes for to 41 votes against. Shortly thereafter, the Senate rejected a similar
measure by a vote of 2 to 14 (Annals of Congress, September 3, 1789, pp. 761-776).
James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay most likely endorsed the practice of
Instruction during the ratification debates in the states because of a shared adherence to a
republican political tradition that was common to the time (Shalhope, 2004; Wood, 2011). The
authors of the Federalist Papers said these things because they thought the same way about,
though they had differing opinions regarding, republicanism. The overwhelming rejection of the
Tucker Amendment as well as Instruction's documented exorcism from the Constitution leads me
to ask: How was Instruction understood from the beginning of the Revolutionary War until after
the passage of the Constitution?
Given the conundrum of explicit support for Instruction by the Federalists in the states'
ratification debates, and the overwhelming vote to withhold Instruction from the Constitution
by nearly everyone voting on the Tucker Amendment, I imagine that Instruction must have been
a political process engrained in the core political values that Americans shared as a political
tradition. If so, it is reasonable to infer that the Founders expected, during times of major political
change, that the practice of Instruction would be used to resolve political issues and problems. This
suggests that a useful next step for this dissertation is to consider the role of Instruction during the
Founding period. However, lessons from such an exploration must be qualified by the fact that
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there was a secret government during the Revolutionary War when the Founders were hiding from
the British versus the transparent self-government that the Americans fought for and won, once
the British surrendered at the Battle of Yorktown.
For this chapter, my research questions are straightforward. Did the Founders utilize
Instruction to transform the political reality of everyday America from that of a colony in 1775
to America’s enduring and beloved constitutional Republic in 1787? Was the practice of
Instruction essentially a form of direct popular control? If so, then the idea of republicanism as
a core political value will be, at least partially, validated from 1775 through 1789. Thus, did the
American Founders establish a "republican" and not a "liberal" democracy because of the political
culture that prevailed from 1775 through 1789?
Answers to these questions should help to address the conundrum as to why the Founders
both endorsed the practice of Instruction and explicitly chose to not incorporate it into the
Constitution. To accomplish this, I systematically document examples of Instruction in order to be
able to show how self-government unfolded during the Founding because of the Founders'
application of republican values, which caused salient political changes to occur at the national
level of the American government. Reviewing the historical record specifically for the concept
of "Instruct" should therefore demonstrate the various boundaries, processes, and expectations of
Instruction that played out during the colonial times of secrecy and also during the world’s first
independent and transparent democracy.
I suspect that documenting the practice of Instruction will show that there was no
difference between the two time periods because everyone shared and openly practiced
"republican" values. Therefore, I hypothesize that,
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(H1) the people and their representatives (Delegates) practiced Instruction as an expression
of their "republican" values to cause significant action in changing national policy, and
(H2) there is no difference between the exertion of political change that Instruction had in
American politics before and after the Battle of Yorktown.
To test the hypotheses, this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I provide evidence
of Instruction from primary source material that I retrieved electronically from the Library of
Congress (n. 16). In the next section, Analysis, I state whether or not the data regarding
Instruction corroborates the hypotheses. Then, I briefly discuss the results and conclude the
chapter.
Sample of Data: Role of Instruction
In this section, I provide the raw data regarding Instruction with limited follow-up
commentary. To gather the data, I visited .gov and .org websites during 2014 and searched for
official political records regarding "Instruct" and "Instruction." Beginning with the Library of
Congress (LOC), my search criteria during the Continental Congress (1774-1789) located
documents about Instruction as well as other topics (https://memory.loc.gov). While browsing the
results, I located a record titled, "Letters of Delegates to Congress" and the content appeared to
match the description of Instruction as described earlier. This meaningful result provided a link
to a document that detailed the process of Instruction, and I was redirected within LOC to
documents in, “A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and
Debates, 1774-1875.”1 This new source provided a simple search engine and a search for
"Instruct" and "Instruction" returned 55 results (in 2014). I read through each result in order to
ascertain the relevance to Instruction. After I excluded results beyond the scope of Instruction
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regarding this dissertation, there were 16 relevant results listed. All of these results originate from
the archival record provided by the Library of Congress.2
In this chapter, I provide sixteen primary source documents regarding the role of
Instruction from the beginning of the Revolutionary War through the passage of the Constitution in
order to illustrate that Instruction was a standard practice during the war and after the Battle of
Yorktown. To be able to ascertain whether Instruction was utilized differently during a time of
secrecy as the Founders hid from the British versus a time of transparency after the Founders won
the war, I divide the data entries regarding Instruction into these two time-periods. Accounting for
Instruction before and after the Battle of Yorktown should illustrate that there was little difference
regarding the role of Instruction between the two periods, which would help to confirm that the
spirit of republicanism was a durable political tradition that Americans shared across the nation.
As some historians argue that the American Revolution was the final act of the Renaissance,
actually a public orchestration of the spirit of republicanism (Appleby, 1985), the fifteen years
under scrutiny should be an important snapshot of this political time regarding Instruction that
demonstrates how Instruction

was

a common practice grounded

in a

shared spirit

of

republicanism.
Before victory at Yorktown, my search identified seven documents consistent with the
criteria noted above. The first document is "Letters of Delegates to Congress: Volume 2,
September 1775 - December 1775, Francis Lewis to John Alsop." The second document is,
"Letters of Delegates to Congress: Volume 4, May 16, 1776 - August 15, 1776, New York
Convention." The third document originating from the Library of Congress is, "The Revolutionary
Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, Volume 2, Congress, Franklin's Commission and
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Instructions." The fourth document is, "Letters of Delegates to Congress: Volume 11, October 1,
1778 - January 31, 1779, William Whipple to Meshech Weare." The fifth document is, "Journals
of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, Friday, May 21, 1779." The sixth document is, "Letters
of Delegates to Congress: Volume: 15, April 1, 1780 - August 31, 1780, to the Pennsylvania
Council." The final primary document to express the cultural narrative on Instruction
originating from the Library of Congress is, "Letters of Delegates to Congress: Volume 16,
September 1, 1780 - February 28, 1781, Virginia Delegates to Thomas Jefferson."
After victory at Yorktown, there are nine primary documents regarding Instruction
identified by my search. These were written at a time when Americans could operate much more
openly since the war was essentially kaput and Americans could organize in public places
without fear of retribution from the British. The first document is, "Letters of Delegates to
Congress: Volume 19, August 1, 1782 - March 11, 1783, Abraham Clark to Joseph Cooper." The
second document is, "Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789 Tuesday, June 10, 1783."
The third document is, "The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution [Elliot's Debates, Volume 5], Tuesday, June 10." The fourth document is,
"Letters of Delegates to Congress: Volume 20, March 12, 1783 - September 30, 1783, James
McHenry to William Paca." The fifth primary document is, "Letters of Delegates to Congress:
Volume 21, October 1, 1783 - October 31, 1784, Pennsylvania Delegates to John Dickinson." The
sixth document is, "Letters of Delegates to Congress: Volume 22, November 1, 1784 - November
6, 1785, Massachusetts Delegates to Caleb Davis." The seventh document is, "Letters of Delegates
to Congress: Volume 25, March 1, 1788-December 31, 1789, John Brown to James Madison." The
eighth primary document collected from the Library of Congress is, "Journal of the Senate of the
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United States of America, 1789-1793 Saturday, July 18, 1789." The last document is, "Journal of
the Senate of the United States of America, 1789-1792, Thursday, September 10, 1789."
Many of the documents use old English, abbreviate, or have spelling errors. The first
document below, for example, has so many errors by modern standards that I would need to write
[sic] multiple times in a sentence or at least after every sentence. Therefore, I will not write [sic]
so that the documents are easier to read due to the copious amounts of grammatical errors by
today's standards which would riddle the cited passages if in place. Therefore, the quoted words
below from the primary documents are the original text in the original form.
Data Sample: 1775 until Yorktown
In the first document, Francis Lewis writes to John Alsop on December 2, after receiving
a letter from Alsop on November 29 (this letter remains lost), and he reports that the "Northern
Troops" have plenty of clothing, and because they overextended the clothing order under a nonrefundable contract, Lewis requests, "pray stop what is at Nw York & Albany (at least) and direct
them to be forwarded to Cambridge" where troops didn’t have enough clothing. In addition, Lewis
exclaimed that he just sent 500 pounds of "Powder" with Mr. Burden from Burden Town and
Amboy Stages to New York per Alsop’s previous request in order to avoid a risk of seizure at the
hands of the British. Lewis ends the letter, "Please advise the Convention hereof." The American
Revolution was underway and conventions appear to be the source for altering American politics
and to approve war supplies.
In the same document, there is another correspondence by Alsop to James Duane thought
to be similar to the one Lewis received, and the Library of Congress has this letter because it was
seized by the British and sent to New York Governor Tryon incommunicado with Lord Dartmouth
on January 5, 1776. Nevertheless, Alsop reveals events of the Revolution and the tenor
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of Instruction. As for the events, there was an expedition led by Messrs, Sears, Sam Brown, and
John Woodward with eighty Connecticut horsemen armed with bayonets to Rivingtons, where
they, "Carried off his Types, and return’d very speed[il]y back to Conn[ecticu]t and on
their returne Seized parson Seabury, the Mayor of West Chester & Judge Fowler and Carried them
along with them." Alsop says this attack and seizure were, "a high insult upon our City and yet I
fear if a Similar attempt shou'd be made, it wou'd not be opposed. Tho all most every body
condemns it, none are to Stand forth." Are these encoded instructions? Indeed, "Matters are kept
very Secret when violence is intended." Alsop beseeches his friend to support settlement, and
oppose gloom, because, "I hope no farther push will be made for any person so violent to Comand
the Fort on Hudsons River; if it Shou'd pray oppose it." Further, Alsop details Instruction as the
central authority for political power and the direction of the Revolution seems entirely uncertain
following the trail of instructions. First,
It gives me satisfaction to hear that No. Carolina delegates have similar instruct[ion]s to
those of Pensylvania. I have spoke to Mr. Woodhull about ours. He tells me that he expects
Tomorrow to make a Convention, and thinks it wou'd be proper for our delegates
at Philada. to write them a letter requesting the same, for he told me if they were asked for,
he Thought they shou'd be given.
Second, Alsop continues that a Convention is good in order for, "The Sentiments of the people" to
address the delegates in Philadelphia, and he thinks that the people are "intirely against
Confederat[ion] or independency but ardently wish a reconcilliation free from Taxation. If you
agree to write such a letter you may send opend." Are we to assume that if he wrote that the people
were for independence the letter must be sent in secret? Third, in a continuous turn of recoiling
after calling for more Conventions, Alsop says that, "you will not want a Copy of the Last
Instructions from McKesson, otherwise Let me know." Apparently, instructions hold a lot of
weight, but may be weightless upon news and a new instruction that supports the most current
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news? Finally, Alsop ends the letter with, "Jones has promised to write you" and, "Perhaps he may
be more intelligent than I am, for I have been so confin'd to business Since I have [been] home that
have not the proper oppty yet [to] know of the politicks of our City." In any event, conventions and
the Instruction were clearly of importance in guiding the Revolutionary War process.
In the second document, a letter dated June 8, 1776, written by Livingston, signed by New
York Delegates Livingston, Floyd, Lewis, and Wisner, and sent to Nathaniel Woodhull, the
President of the Convention of New York, Livingston and company wrote that one should, "expect
that the question of independence will very shortly be agitated in Congress" at the convention in
Philadelphia, and of particular salience, some of the delegates feel "bound" to vote no on
independence because of an instruction sent to them on April 22, 1775. In that instruction, the
delegates were instructed to seek, "the preservation and reestablishment of American rights
and priviledges, and for the restoration of harmony between Great Britain and the Colonies."
However, all the delegates, "wish to have your sentiments thereon" through a new vote by the New
York Convention in order for the New Yorkers in Philadelphia to be able to assuredly vote for or
against independence in the near future.
In the same document, dated June 11, 1776, the provincial congress in New York sent a
letter back to the delegates in Philadelphia with mixed messages. First, the provincial Congress
established that the delegates did not have express authority, "to give the sense of this Colony on
the question of declaring it to be… an independent State." However, the letter continues, "nor does
this Congress incline to instruct you on that point; it being a matter of doubt whether their
constituents intended to vest them with the power to deliberate and determine on that question."
But, the reason the provincial Congress did not authorize a convention vote was because it would
be, "imprudent to require the sentiments of the people relative to the question of Independence,
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least it should create division," and concluded that, "the inhabitants of the colony would be
consulted on this matter at 'the earliest opportunity.'" The New York Congress never asked the
people of New York to vote on the formal request by Lewis and company and the New York
Delegates at the Continental Congress abstained from voting on Richard Henry Lee’s Resolution
for Independence on July 2, 1776.6 Conversely, General Washington was unsure of British
sympathy in hearts of New Yorkers and the city was indeed the first target by the British when
they attacked on September 21, 1776.
The third document, printed in the Secret Journals of Congress, dated October 21, 1778, is
a letter out of a special committee addressed to, "our great, faithful, and beloved friend and ally
Louis the Sixteenth, King of France," with a "draught of instructions" to relate that Benjamin
Franklin has been honored with the responsibility to be the Minister Plenipotentiary from the
United States at his court in France. The document assures the French king, "of the permanency of
our friendship; and we pray God that he will keep your majesty, our great, faithful, and beloved
friend and ally, in his most holy protection" and continues with a description of the political
relationship:
The principles of equality and reciprocity on which you have entered into treaties with us
give you an additional security for that good faith with which we shall observe them from
motives of honor and of affection to your majesty. The distinguished part you have taken
in the support of the liberties and independence of these States cannot but inspire them with
the most ardent wishes for the interest and the glory of France.
The fourth document, dated December 14, 1778, was a letter William Whipple sent to
Meshech Weare in which he mentions a memorial from the people to withdraw from the "Windsor
Assembly" and, "on farther inquiry I find myself mistaken in the form of the paper it being a letter
from a Mr. Marsh who stiles himself Chairman of a Convention their assembly." The problem was
that the "western part of the State will be keept in a perpetual Broil 'till a final settlement of the
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Jurisdiction." Considering this, he requested that the people in a disputed territory instruct the
Congress themselves as an assembly or to send delegates to the Continental Congress with
instructions regarding the territory. Whipple added that New Hampshire’s boundary with New
York was uncertain, and that the people in the disputed territory had, "an unextinguishable
avertion, arising from the injuries they have suffered, by the most cruel acts of Injustice" at the
hands of the New Yorkers. Second, "I am very apprehensive that many Towns on the Eastern side
of the River will be fond of joining" New Hampshire. Whipple continued that if the people join
New Hampshire, then the State, "will be embroiled in a very disagreeable contention or subscribed
to a very small compass, and that limited Territory subject to the discharge of an immense
debt, incured for the defence & protection of the whole." In order to resolve this political conflict,
Whipple wrote:
I therefore wish to know the minds of my constituents as soon as possible. Whether they
will send another Delegate who may be well acquainted with the business, or will Instruct
their Delegates now in Congress, must be left to their decision. I must confess I most
heartily wish that the former method may be adopted. I cannot suppose the expence will
be an objection when the Magnitude of object is considered, which is nothing less than
doubling the Territory of a Sovereign Independent State.
General Whipple was apparently making reference to Rhode Island and the magnitudes of ruin
considering the battles of Quaker Hill and the Siege of Newport, as well as the aftermath of the
British retaining the island. Considering that, the exact form of political power to decide the issue
of territory was for the people settled there to send an instruction or, preferably to Whipple, for a
delegate (perhaps from Hew Hampshire) familiar with the territory and inhabitants to attend to this
business at the Continental Congress.
In the fifth document, from "Journals of the Continental Congress," J. Duckett provides
a "true copy" from the proceedings of December 15, 1778, which were read in Congress on January
6, 1779. The document opens with witness of attendance by Samuel Huntington from Connecticut
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and an appeal on a libel case from Connecticut that was, "referred to the Committee on
Appeals." The remainder of the record is in regards to the process of confederation for the States
in America to begin in earnest. The proceedings in Congress center on the political pathway
that Instruction plays as a source of political power from the people to the Congress, and then back
to the people for validation, much like how Riker (1955) explained the peripheralizing function
would operate (Chapter Three).
The Maryland delegates provide the Congress with instructions from Maryland in regards
for the need to pass articles that will consolidate America as a confederation because they were
directed to, "lay" them before Congress, to have them entered in their journals, to be read to
Congress by the congressional secretary, and "we desire and instruct you to move at a proper
time." The delegates receiving these instructions were George Plater, William Paca, William
Carmichael, John Henry, James Forbes, and Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer, esquires. Further, the
instruction from Maryland began with approbation for the Congress in regards to trust, great
confidence, integrity, a zeal to promote the general welfare, and the instruction is meant, "to add
greater weight to your proceedings in Congress." In a legitimate confederacy, power stemmed
from the people and the states and not the opinions of the members in Congress. The instruction
from Maryland was an extension of direct popular control which did, "take away all suspicion that
the opinions you deliver there, and the votes you give," were entirely due to the "deliberate
judgement of the state you represent…we think it our duty to instruct you as followed on the
subject of confederation…"
After accolades for the Continental Congress and the assertion that the voice of the people
was essential to the political process, the Maryland delegates were instructed to not agree to the
confederation, "unless an article or articles be added thereto in conformity with our declaration:
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should we succeed in obtaining such article or articles, then you are hereby fully empowered to
accede to the confederation." This is because Maryland asserted that, "we must not betray the trust
reposed in us by our constituents." Indeed, Maryland’s reasoning on instruction in this document
read on January 6, 1779, may help to clarify why Maryland was the last state to ratify the Articles,
since most other states had already ratified the Articles, with Virginia being the first state to ratify
the Articles of Confederation on December 16, 1777. Maryland sought to clarify the exact text of
the Articles in order to, "bring about a permanent union," and instruction was the procedure
Maryland required for its vote to join the United States. Indeed, Maryland did provide the
final "yes" vote to formalize the Articles on March 1, 1781, and I find it noteworthy that the first
Confederation Congress met on November 5, 1781, and the congressmen elected John Hanson,
former delegate from Maryland, as its President.
The sixth document, from "Letters of Delegates to Congress," on May 31, 1780, Ellsworth,
Armstrong, and Duane convene a Committee of Congress, "with instructions to confer with the
authorities of Pennsylvania…" in order to answer a letter from General George Washington, dated
May 27, "concerning the threat of mutiny facing the army ‘for want of meat.’" Hence, at the point
of mutiny, General Washington did not commandeer livestock willy-nilly; rather, he wrote to the
Continental Congress to address the issue and the Congress solved it through Instruction.
Unfortunately, Congress was not very successful in light of the well-known Pennsylvania Line
Mutiny on January 1, 1781, as well as the known losses of troops over the year to hunger.
Finally, from "Letters of Delegates to Congress," James Madison penned a letter co-signed
by fellow delegate Theodorick Bland and sent to Thomas Jefferson to explain an outline for how
to politically proceed in collaboration with Spain, considering their constituents in Virginia and
others along the Mississippi River, because intelligence reports suggested that Spain might seek
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to control the navigation rights of the Mississippi River as well as land east of the river in exchange
for a pledge of allegiance to the United States in their war for independence against Great
Britain. Thomas Jefferson was the elected Governor of Virginia, at the time on his second oneyear term, when James Madison wrote to Governor Jefferson as a Virginia Delegate. He asked
Governor Jefferson to, "make it our duty to apply to our constituents for their precise full and
ultimate sense on the point [of Spain]."
Delegate James Madison stated that if Spain requires the United States to relinquish
navigation rights, then the new policy would go against a previous instruction providing Virginians
and other Americans with navigation rights. In order to change the previous instruction, Madison
requests a new instruction to clarify the actions that constituents should take if the United States
does, or does not, cede navigation rights on the Mississippi to Spain, including property east of the
river. Delegate Madison beseeches Governor Jefferson in this pressing matter to know the
sentiments of the people and to express that it is, "expedient for the Legislature to instruct us in the
most explicit terms." The new instruction will state whether or not the Virginians support or oppose
a concession of property rights from the United States to Spain in order to secure allegiance.
Madison requests that the instruction will also state, "what steps it is the pleasure of our
Constituents" to take if Spain is not given territorial rights. Clearly, the Father of the Constitution
was very involved in utilizing Instruction in order to determine public policy at the national level.
Data Sample: After Yorktown through 1789
Spain entered the war in league with the United States and their navy stationed in
Mexico took Fort Bute at Manchas on the Mississippi as well as the Fort at Baton Rouge in 1779.
Spain captured Mobile in west Florida and Pensacola, Florida, from the British in 1781. There
were other successful Spanish attacks on the British, yet from the American perspective, the
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Spanish navy was truly instrumental in the final American victory at Yorktown because their navy
stopped the English in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico from travelling north to support
Cornwallis, and the lack of British naval support helped to facilitate the British surrender. French
and American forces trapped the British army on Virginia's Yorktown Peninsula and the French
fleet helped to repel the British fleet from allowing General Cornwallis a way to evacuate or
receive reinforcements; hence, Yorktown was a full surrender. Although New York City and
Charleston, South Carolina, remained under British control until the Treaty of Paris in 1783, the
war for Independence was all but won.
American colonists worked through committees of correspondence at the national and
state levels to pass ROI regarding boundary disputes between Delaware, New Jersey, and
Philadelphia during 1782 and 1783. In "Letters of Delegates to Congress," written by Abraham
Clark from Philadelphia and sent to Joseph Cooper of Gloucester, Delegate Clark wrote to the
New Jersey assembly and a member of a committee appointed by the New Jersey legislature to
resolve the boundary issue along the Delaware River and islands on the river:
The Legislature of Pennsyla. have Appointed Judge Bryan, Mr. Bingham, & Mr. Gray
Commissrs. for dividing the Islands & settling the Jurisdiction of the River Delaware,
but have not compleated their instructions which are now under Consideration. (2) As our
Legislature will meet this week, they will it is presumed instruct their Commrs., which
appear necessary, as their Appointment does not appear to Convey any power more than
Obtaining information and reporting the same--this may also be necessary to undergo a
revision...
Next, Clark provides a third option for all to consider as a quick possible solution in that
"reciprocal jurisdiction" may be the guideline for jurisdiction rights along the Delaware River so
that jurisdiction is granted to each vessel according to the citizen’s state. Further, the island near
Philadelphia should belong to Pennsylvania and the other islands on the river can be divided as an
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equivalent to the Philadelphia island. After these suggestions, Clark explains past instructions and
the new instructions to come:
I hope you will communicate this to Dr. Henderson and Consult him previous to any
Communication to the Legislature. I must inform you that what I have said respecting
the desires or intentions of Pennsylvania. I have not learned from the Commissioners but
from Other Gentlemen who have Conversed with me upon the Subject, but who I believe
delivered the Sentiments of the Commrs. Delaware had instructed their Delegates
respecting the Island and Jurisdiction of the Delaware, which upon examination does not
appear to Convey powers necessary for effecting any thing. The proceedings of our
Legislature I have Communicated to Governor Dickinson who promised to lay the same
before the Legislature of Delaware at their meeting this fall.
On the face of it, this letter represents a continuation of Whipple’s 1778 letter to show a policy of
instruction when considering boundary disputes, such as between New York, New Hampshire, and
Rhode Island. The political participants in different states are seeking an answer through
the process of instruction and a committee from the territory of the State in question is sought after.
Instruction through direct popular control was the proper way to resolve who will own the land,
not the spoils of war, a single state, or an individual. Once the foreign influence was removed, the
people governed themselves.
In the next three documents, Instruction was utilized to quell political activity. First, in
the Provincial Congress, noncommissioned officers from Baylor’s regiment asked the Virginia
Governor for financial relief given their service in the war, and this was referred to the
Superintendent of Finance and the Secretary of War, in which the committee of Madison,
Rutledge, and Hamilton reported that they pursued and "considered the instructions to Mr. Jay and
are of opinion that it is unnecessary to make any alteration in them or to give Mr. Jay any further
instructions at present."
Then, from, "The Debates on the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution," a report on the cession of Virginia arose and some sought to immediately resolve
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the debate between private claims and the right of the United States. Next, Mr. Fitzsimmons then
urged, "a postponement of the question, observing, that he had sent a copy of the report to the
Maryland delegates." At this, "the president was for a postponement till the sense of New Jersey
be known. The Delaware delegates, expecting instructions, were for postponing till Monday
next." After these additional requests for a postponement in order to receive an instruction, "It was
agreed, at length, that a final vote should not be taken till that day," with, "Mr. Madison yielding
to the sense of the House, but warning that the opportunity might be lost by the rising of the
legislature of Virginia."
Finally, James McHenry, a Delegate from Maryland, sent a letter to Governor William
Paca of Maryland to explain a report from committee regarding, "the act of our State misapplying
the money we had engaged to Congress… It asserts the right of Congress, Censures the act, and
the flagrant infringement of the confederation." To repel this, McHenry moved to postpone the
consideration of the report until, "the delegates from Maryland could receive information from the
legislature of the State respecting the subject matter of the same." This was needed because it was
necessary to present the disposition of the inhabitants, so that the state legislature might be able
to, "satisfy the house of the necessity and perhaps propriety of the infringement." By allowing the
legislatures to instruct their delegates in the Continental Congress, "to declare to Congress the
alarming situation which forced them into the measure, and that they even had and still have, the
strongest inclination to do everything in their power to support and maintain inviolate the
confederation." McHenry utilized the need to wait for instructions from Maryland, dated August
4, 1783, in order to put a report on hold that would collect revenue for the confederate government
on the national stage from the State of Maryland.
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The fifth document is a letter dated December 30, 1783, in regards to Pennsylvania
Delegates Mifflin, Morris, and Hand, and the back and forth instruction played in the ratification
process. In their letter sent to John Dickerson, the elected President of Pennsylvania, it was asked
whether seven States in Congress assembled are "competent" to ratify "the Definitive Treaty" and
to request a "positive instruction from Council." The letter stated that Congress at the time
consisted of Nine States: Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina. Political change seemed imminent.
Specifically,
…on the 29th of October last at Princeton authorize and instruct their Ministers at Paris to
make the Preliminary Articles a Definitive Treaty of Peace. That Nine States having
declared What Articles should constitute the Definitive Treaty; and the Treaty
being framed according to their Declaration & Instructions, It may now be ratified by
Seven States.
The Delegates point out that there is, "no Probability that Nine States will assemble in Time" to
ratify and assert that an, "Excess of bad Policy" will "risqué a Renewal of the War by delaying the
Ratification of it." The letter concludes that time is running out and, "only sixty Days now remain
for the Ratification & Exchange which last must be made in Paris or London." The Delegates close
the letter with a request for instructions of Council and admit that this request for council is causing
them to, "endeavour to delay the Determination of Congress untill we receive an Answer."
Evidently, instruction was instrumental in the process to ratify the Treaty of Paris.
In the sixth document, from "Letters of Delegates to Congress," the Massachusetts
Delegates Gerry and King sent a letter to Caleb Davis in Massachusetts, dated October 27, 1785.
Gerry and King opened that they enclosed to the Governor a resolution from Congress "appointing
a Grand Committee for preventing the Separation of Districts from the parent States, without
Consent thereof," as a confederal law to be addressed. He adds a similar resolution that was an Act
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of Pennsylvania, "by which that State put an effectual Stop to Attempts which had been made
therein, to make Such a Separation," suffices regardless of a confederal law. Gerry and King
continue that the Grand Committee will not likely report out of committee in the Continental
Congress since the session is nearly complete. They seek to know, "whether it may not be best for
the Legislature to instruct their Delegates of the next Congress to attend to this Business." Even
though "there appears not any great Indisposition in the Delegates of the other three N[ew] England
States to dismember Massachusetts," and there is a role for the Congress to prevent such
dismemberment through the "Force of the Union" when "necessary to suppress the Opposition
of any District to the constitutional Authority of a state," the Delegates recommend that
Massachusetts, "pass an Act similar to that of Pennsylvania" to resolve the possibility of
dismemberment and the Delegates promise to follow whatever instructions they receive from
Massachusetts.
In the seventh document, from "Letters of Delegates to Congress," a Virginia Delegate of
the Continental Congress, John Brown, sent a letter on May 12, 1788, outlining the reputation of
instruction to James Madison in regards to whether or not the people in Kentucky would support
the new Constitution. Brown opens with thanks to Madison for, "favors of the 9 th and 21st of
April," and then regrets to inform Madison that he was, "still sorry to find that the number of
friends & foes are so nearly divided as to render the Vote of Kentucky of critical importance for I
fear nothing friendly is to be expected from that quarter." Brown received letters from Muter and
Innes the day before and they expressed that Kentucky has, "few or no Supporters" and Brown
tells Madison that Muter has turned, "from a warm friend" to "a violent enemy to the Plan & that
upon general principles." Brown stated that Muter and Innes enclosed a letter, expressing:
…a list of members chosen to represent that District in Convention & further advise that
on the 1st Monday in April a Convention was to meet at Danville expressly to take into
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consideration the new Constitution & instruct & charge their representatives with the
Sentiments of the District upon that Subject.
Given the unlikelihood of passage for the Constitution, Brown states that he will provide his
sentiments to the Delegates and is, "apprehensive that they will conceive themselves religiously
bound to observe Instructions framed & given with such Solemnity." However, Brown provides
Madison with some hope at the conclusion in that Brown was "personally acquainted with the Men
& fully possess their confidence," and that he "shall at all events hazard the Attempt" of convincing
them to support the Constitution. Instruction was a political practice used in the passage of the
Constitution and representatives felt religiously bound to follow the instructions from local
conventions, including if the people in convention chose to vote against the Constitution, as was
likely at Danville.
In the eighth document, from, "Journal of the Senate of the United States of America," the
Senate continued to use instruction as a mechanism for advancing a political agenda after the
advent of the Constitution. Dated July 18, 1789, the Senate began with a third reading of a bill
entitled, "An act for establishing an Executive Department, to be denominated the Department of
Foreign Affairs." Regarding the bill, the Secretary proposed the vote on a motion, "to strike out of
the bill these words: page 3d, line 15th, ‘by the President of the United States’" and the Vice
President broke a tie of ten votes for and ten votes against to keep the clause. Next, there was a
motion to strike out these words in the bill to define the Executive Department:
such duties as shall, from time to time, be enjoined on, or entrusted to, him by the President
of the United States, agreeable to the constitution, relative to correspondences,
commissions, or instructions, to or with public ministers or consuls from the United States,
or to negotiations with public ministers from foreign states or princes, or to memorials, or
other applications from foreign public ministers, or other foreigners, or to such other
matters respecting foreign affairs as the President of the United States shall assign to the
said department: And furthermore, that the said principal officers shall conduct the business
of said department, in such manner as the President of the United States shall, from time
to time, order or instruct.
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The former paragraph was to be amended to read, "The duties of his office with integrity, ability,
and diligence," however, the vote failed and the original language that mentions the ability for the
President to receive instructions and to instruct remained on the books for the time being (but it is
not in the current Constitution). Other motions to change the language in other sections of this
document also failed and the bill was "concurred with amendments." Thus, Instruction was seen to
be an important political form for the President to use in order to influence the policy process.
The final primary document is from the Senate Journal, dated September 10, 1789, and
outlines the role of instruction and committees. First, Mr. Wingate reported out of committee that
the committee had examined two bills, "An act to provide for the safe keeping of the sets, records,
arid seal of the United States, and for other purposes," and, "An act for establishing the salaries of
the executive officers of government, with their assistants and clerks," and noted that the bills were
correct. Second, Clerk Beckley from the House of Representatives read a message in the Senate to
say that the House of Representatives had agreed to recede from their disagreement to the third
and fifth amendments, proposed by the Senate, to the bill entitled, "An act for establishing the
salaries of the executive officers of government, with their assistants and clerks." And, the House
of Representatives agreed to the proposed conference on the subject matter of the amendment to
the bill entitled, "An act for allowing compensation to the President and Vice President of the
United States." Further, the House agreed to Messrs, Baldwin, Livermore, and Goodhue
as "managers of the conference."
Of special interest, the House Clerk continued to hold the floor in the Senate with a resolve
by the House of Representatives about the General Post Office of the United States. The "rules and
regulations prescribed" regarding, "the ordinances and resolutions of the late Congress, and that
contracts be made for the conveyance of the mail in conformity," and the Clerk requested, "the
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concurrence of the Senate" in the resolve. Then, "the Vice President affixed his signature to the
above mentioned enrolled bills, and they were, by the Committee of Enrollment, laid before the
President of the United States for his approbation." However, the resolve from the House of
Representatives regarding the Post Office was read and, "Ordered, That it be committeed to
Messrs. Butler, Morris, and Ellsworth, with an instruction to report a bill upon the subject…"
Hence, the Vice President appointed a committee with, unambiguously, an instruction to create a
legislative bill.
Results
I find that there is little difference regarding the role of Instruction before and after the
Battle of Yorktown. Instruction was openly practiced by Americans during the times of a secret
government during the Revolutionary War as well as after the British surrender. Throughout the
period, I find that the "republican" practice of Instruction was evident as a show of selfgovernment. The evidence in this chapter supports the key claim that Instruction once played an
integral in national politics from 1775 through 1789. James Madison and others actively expressed
a

belief

in

republican values,

which

caused

Instruction to become a central process for

implementing political change at the national level. Examples of Instruction operating in a similar
manner before and after the Revolutionary War include land disputes, calls for convention, and
calls for the national body to wait on local entities to explain themselves.
Before the Battle of Yorktown was won on October 19, 1781, republican values were
expressed by calls for conventions to occur in multiple states in order for the people to discuss and
vote on independence from England. During 1776, delegates felt "bound" by instructions in New
York to vote for restoration with England because of an instruction in 1775. During 1778,
instructions were sent to the French King to welcome Ben Franklin to his Court in a manner to
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suggest that America was an independent nation. During 1779, the General Assembly of Maryland
instructed its delegates to lay the Articles of Confederation before Congress, and to have them
entered in the journals, printed, delivered to each of the delegates of the other states in Congress,
signed by the Maryland delegates, and to begin in Congress a serious and candid consideration of
them. And, the Maryland delegates were instructed to not agree to confederation until Maryland
received back a copy of the Articles in conformity to their instructions therein or the Articles
passed were Maryland’s Articles. During 1780, Congress referred General Washington’s call for
meat in Pennsylvania for his troops with an instruction to fulfill his order. James Madison, in the
same year, asked for instructions from Governor Thomas Jefferson of Virginia to explicitly
reference the people and the appropriate response for a cession of navigation and land rights to be,
or not to be, awarded to Spain in exchange for an alliance against England. In all these cases, power
stemmed from the people in a bottom-up process of self-government.
After Americans won the Revolutionary War, Instruction remained a powerful practice to
influence the national government. During 1783, many political figures utilized Instruction to
inhibit action at the national level through a call to postpone votes in order to wait for instructions
from their home state. During 1785, Pennsylvania delegates recommended that Pennsylvania pass
a resolution preventing districts to be able to separate from a State and suggested that they receive
instructions from Pennsylvania to not support a national plan on the same issue. During 1788,
people in Kentucky utilized instruction to call for a convention to vote on the Constitution.
During 1789, the Senate maintained a clause to allow the President to receive instructions and to
instruct, and the Vice President in the Senate instructed a committee that he formed on the spot to
report to the Senate a Post Office bill. Thus, ROI was an output of a complex Instruction practice
that existed as a function of republicanism.
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The hypothesis that Instruction was influential during a secret government and a
transparent government before and after the Battle of Yorktown is borne out and the most notable
examples where similar situations produce the same Instruction practices were the call for
conventions to approve of major political changes, to inhibit national actions in order to garner the
sentiments of the people as a policy of self-government, and to settle land disputes based on the
sentiments of the inhabitants from the territory under dispute. For example, first and foremost,
conventions were called in Philadelphia in order to declare Independence (before) in the same
fashion that a convention was called for in order to pass the Constitution in the backwoods of
Danville, Kentucky (after).
Second, Instruction was used to inhibit action in the Continental Congress in similar
manners before and after Yorktown. During the war, Instruction inhibited New York Delegates
during 1776 from voting for Independence and to preserve and re-establish harmony between
Great Britain and the Colonies. After the war, Mr. Fitzsimmons urged a postponement until the
sentiments of New Jersey were expressed and until the Delaware delegates received their
instructions from their state before choosing how to vote in the Confederate Congress during
1783. Also, a Delegate from Maryland, McHenry, postponed debate on a report in Congress
regarding Maryland's owing of money to the Confederate Congress until the delegates from
Maryland could receive information from the legislature of the State, which would include the
present disposition of the inhabitants during 1783. Before and after Yorktown, the inhabitants
guaranteed unto themselves a self-government and the national representatives of the people
repeatedly engaged Instruction in order to ascertain the sentiments of the people, including
Delegate James Madison's request of Thomas Jefferson to explicitly provide Madison with
instructions regarding the Virginians' approach to dealing with Spain.
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Third, before and after the Revolutionary War was won, instructions called for land
disputes to be determined by additional instructions based on the sentiments of the inhabitants.
The call for self-government on the people’s terms by Whipple regarding Rhode Island (1778) as
well as the contestatory nature between the people from different states along the Delaware River
(1783) allowed for peaceful political change in order to overcome a potentially explosive
stalemate.
Therefore, the evidence highly suggests that there was little to no difference in the role
Instruction played before and after the Battle of Yorktown in America, even though the ROI after
the battle were much more clear and concise as political documents. The evidence suggests that
Instruction stemmed from the republican element of the culture because the practice ultimately
rested on the sentiments of the people and self-government throughout the revolutionary period.
The use of Instruction was qualitatively significant in causing fundamental changes to the
governing of Americans at the national level because of exhibitions of direct popular control that
were initiated by the Delegates. This suggests that the element of republicanism was durable from
1775 through 1789 as a peripheralizing political value system that spanned the national landscape
because the federal representatives shared "republican" values.
Conclusion
I find that there is little difference in the effect of Instruction during the revolutionary
era before and after the Battle of Yorktown. Instruction during both periods was a political process
for advancing politics on the people’s terms. The call for conventions was far more secretive
during the Revolutionary War, still, the actions by the people to engage in self-government in
Philadelphia in 1775-1776 along with other state conventions was equally valued by Madison and
others with respect for passing the Constitution by convention, such as in Danville, Kentucky.
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The conventions to fundamentally alter national policy were equal as examples for how
Instruction was a peripheralizing political form of self-government. The conventions happened
because American citizens and their representatives held a steadfastness to republican values that
required broad-based political participation.
This finding leads me to ask: After the ratification of the Constitution, did members of the
House of Representatives or Senate actually take petitions directly from the people (Chapter Five)
and ROI from state legislatures (Chapter Six) very seriously? Did the culture of practicing
republican values among the peoples' representatives continue on after Ratification because the
role of Instruction supported measures of self-government?
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CHAPTER 5: RESPONSE FROM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO
PETITIONERS SEEKING THE REPEAL OF THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS
Introduction
The literature and evidence from previous chapters supports my two claims that the people
and their representatives expressed republicanism openly throughout the Founding period and that
to them the republican practice of Instruction was a reflection of their core values. The purpose of
this chapter is to begin to fill the breach between political scientists and historians regarding the
salience of republicanism after Ratification. To do so, I hypothesize that Americans sent petitions
directly to their Representatives in order to cause action at the federal level regarding the need to
repeal the Alien and Sedition laws of 1798 and 1799 a dozen years after Ratification. And, the
members of the House who received the petitions defended them and performed their role as agent
of the people in a way that exhibited the role of Instruction as a ritualized practice of selfgovernment. Thus, in accordance with America's republican tradition, the people directly acted to
influence their federal government by petitioning it and their Representatives defended the right
of the people to petition and responded to the petitioners' requests.
A vexing aspect of the controversy over the Alien and Sedition laws is noticeable in the
prominent role that James Madison played in drafting the Virginia Resolves. Little more than a
decade before, he had supported giving the national government the power to veto state laws and
to ignore ROI when the Tucker Amendment sought to include the right of Instruction in the
Constitution, yet Madison now appears to be guilty by association of supporting the nullification
by state legislatures of federal laws. Fearing for the health of the Constitution, Madison offered
his interpretation of ROI as an interposition by state governments and to distinguish that act from
nullification (Girdwood & Grynaviski, 2014). Madison did not think state legislatures could
determine a federal law to be null and void (nullification); rather, the state legislature may pass a
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specific type of Resolution that engages a practice of interposition, which recognizes the
supremacy of a specific federal law but also openly shuns it by not allowing for the local
enforcement of it and calls for its repeal.
I surmise that James Madison, the Father of the Constitution, might have favored the ability
of state governments to craft an interposition as a formal request upon the federal government
to cease and desist a specific federal law that appeared to be anti-republican because of a desire to
guard the Constitution and Republic. Therefore, state governments could openly guard
"republican" values by passing ROI as an interposition upon a federal law since it was common
political practice regarding the American republican tradition for the local / state governments to
be a source of political power with the ability to peripheralize the federal government, considering
the years of governing practices before Ratification (Chapter Four).
To better understand Madison's political beliefs, let us take note of his correspondence with
Thomas Jefferson, the author of the Declaration of Independence and Kentucky Resolutions who
specifically called for the nullification of the Alien and Sedition laws. In brief, both gentlemen
agreed that the Alien and Sedition laws were anti-republican. A letter from Jefferson dated April
26, 1798, was prescient, "One of the war party, in a fit of unguarded passion, declared some time
ago they would pass a citizen bill, an alien bill, and a sedition bill; accordingly, some days ago,
Coit laid a motion on the table of the H. of R. for modifying the citizen law." And, Jefferson said
in a letter dated May 3, "The alien bill, proposed by the Senate, has not yet been brought in. That
proposed by the H. of R. has been so moderated, that it will not answer the passionate purposes of
the war gentlemen."
James Madison replied to Thomas Jefferson on May 20, 1798, incorporating his notes from
previous letters regarding their sentiments about the Alien and Sedition laws. Madison had recently
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been given a copy of the Senate bill, and his opening remark to Jefferson is telling, "The Alien bill
proposed in the Senate is a monster that must forever disgrace its parents" (Archives.gov).3 Then,
Madison neutralized his opinion with, "It may however all be for the best. These addresses to the
feelings of the people from their enemies may have more effect in opening their eyes, than all the
arguments addressed to their understandings by their friends." Madison admitted, "The President,
also, seems to be co-operating for the same purpose." In the end, Madison restated Jefferson’s
main gripe, which was that the Alien and Sedition laws are abominable and degrading for a nation
of independent people, "particularly from a Revolutionary patriot." Madison was vehement
in that, "there was not a single principle the same in the American and French Revolutions" (ibid).
On the face of it, the Alien and Sedition laws of 1798 violated core republican values, such
as equality by the eye-ball test, virtue by norms to repel corruption, and freedom as nondomination. Those laws seemed to create a set of losers through the legalization of rules to allow
for corruption and domination by the federal government upon the people. In response, the
Virginia and Kentucky state legislatures both passed resolutions condemning the federal
government’s actions, but they appealed to different methods of redress. The Kentucky Resolves,
drafted by Thomas Jefferson and adopted in November, 1798, repeatedly declared that the Alien
and Sedition Acts were "altogether void, and of no force." Thus, Kentucky claimed for itself the
right to void federal laws it viewed as unconstitutional. In contrast, the Virginia Resolves by James
Madison noted that the Constitution reigns supreme and then simply closed with a statement that
one might interpret to be an instruction to its representatives in Congress. It read (Girdwood
& Grynaviski, 2014, pp. 6-7):
That the Governor be desired to transmit a copy of the foregoing resolutions to the
executive authority of each of the other States, with a request that the same may be
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communicated to the legislature thereof. And that a copy be furnished to each of the
senators and representatives representing this state in the Congress of the United States.
To erase any doubts that it was intended as an instruction, three weeks later, the following
statement was included in the Virginia legislature's annual instructions to its Senators (Girdwood
& Grynaviski, 2014, pp. 6-7):
Deeply impressed with these opinions, the General Assembly of Virginia instructs the
senators and requests the representatives from this state in Congress, to use their best
efforts...
1. To procure a reduction of the army...
2. To prevent any augmentation of the navy, and to promote any proposition for reducing
it… and of consequence a proportionate reduction of the taxes.
3. To oppose the passing of any law founded on, or recognising [sic] the principle lately
advanced, "that the common law of England is in force under the government of the United
States"…
4. To procure a repeal of the acts of Congress commonly called the alien and seditionacts.
Indeed, the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions sparked a political firestorm. Many state
legislatures passed counter-resolutions that 1) signaled support for the policies of the Adams
administration and 2) condemned Virginia and Kentucky for claiming for themselves the power to
determine the constitutionality of federal laws.
Public opinion, however, was on the side of the Democratic-Republicans. Ironically, the
Alien and Sedition Acts were intended by Federalists to crush their domestic political opponents.
Instead, they provided them with a winning campaign issue that resulted in Thomas Jefferson's
election to become President under the first period of unified Democratic-Republican control of
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the federal government in the nation's history. The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions were
instrumental in attaining that outcome (Girdwood & Grynaviski, 2014).
The Virginia and Kentucky resolutions became a cause of action for the people. The
historical record shows that in response the people voted to replace the President at their earliest
opportunity with someone who would support them: Thomas Jefferson. It is beyond the scope of
this dissertation, but the unfolding of these events suggests that when Americans are confronted
with the idea that they have elected someone who enacts policies supportive of authoritarianism,
they may unite in the upcoming election as "republicans" in order to outcast representatives who
are associated with the authoritarian in charge and that party and that leader's cronies. Given the
fact that President Trump is known to engage in authoritarianism (Chapter Two), understanding
how republicanism affected the Founders' generation may help to provide insight into the elections
of 2018 and 2020, and beyond.
Given the deep-rooted opposition to the Alien and Sedition laws by two of the most beloved
Founders, it follows that their guidance in passing ROI to formally oppose the laws at the state
level in Virginia (James Madison) and Kentucky (Thomas Jefferson) were part of a political
culture moment of republicanism. If there was a movement of republicanism "shared" by
Americans across the nation, then I expect to find that copious amounts of petitions were signed
and sent by the people to their Representatives as a means of practicing self-government, which
would in turn influence the national lawmakers regarding the two laws. This would happen because
the political motive to engage in republican self-government in order to maintain inviolate a
common good requires that the people directly participate in the political process, otherwise the
federal government would not function as an extended Republic. The people's involvement allows
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their republican-minded representatives to have a cause for action to repeal or defend a law at the
national level on the people’s terms.
The principal claim of this dissertation is that republicanism continued to influence
American politics at the federal level after Ratification. To test this, House records should
demonstrate that a lot of petitions by ordinary people were signed and delivered which condemned
the Alien and Sedition laws (Hypothesis 1). If affirmed, there would be a defense of the petitioners
and the petitions by the Representatives in order to protect self-government (Hypothesis 2). In this
chapter, I argue that House members presented and defended petitions from their constituents on
the House floor as part of their effort to repeal the Alien and Sedition laws, and these petitions
were sent to a committee, and the committee reported upon the petitions to the Chamber for a vote.
In addition, I will document whether some Representatives in the debate promoted
authoritarian values, such as the ability to deny petitions from people to be read on the floor of the
House because of discriminatory reasons or on paternalistic grounds. Representatives from an
authoritarian-value or liberal-value district would likely abide by the republican political practices
of self-government, but they would stand against policies according to their authoritarian or liberal
beliefs because they seek to represent their base of constituents according to those value-systems.
These values, if present in the House debate, would have been expressed as an argument against
the people’s right to exercise an ability to legitimately oppose and repeal a federal law because the
petitions were argued to be an affront to a body of Representatives who hold an inherent power to
care for the people (e.g., paternalism) (i.e., Authoritarianism) (Hypothesis 3). And, the petitions
were argued to be illegitimate on various grounds, such as being passed by the people based on
misinformation or disinformation (i.e, Authoritarianism) (Hypothesis 4). I do not make a case for
identifying Liberalism in this dissertation regarding my narrowly tailored investigation.

121
In this chapter, I seek to determine whether Americans as nonelected individual
participants enjoined and signed petitions for the federal representatives to respond to
regarding what they perceived to be impolitic and unconstitutional laws, and whether those
representatives empowered the people by openly defending their petitions through a call for a
repeal in Congress of the two laws. To accomplish this, I retell the essential storyline from the
debate on the subject of the Alien and Sedition laws as recorded in the House Journal from eight
different occasions during 1798 and 1799. Next, I pronounce the results for my hypotheses and
comment on the evidence in regards for my principal claim. On republican grounds after
Ratification, 1) the people were openly petitioning to repeal the Alien and Sedition laws and 2) the
Representatives were offering these documents on the House floor while defending the petitioners’
right of self-government. Hence, republicanism continued to influence American politics at the
federal level after Ratification. Then, I discuss how the House record is a good fit for the
description of a republican model of democracy as stated in previous chapters. Finally, I conclude
whether petitions were exhibited in the House debate and I explain the extent by which petitions,
and their defense by some House members, affected the political process.
Sample of Data: House Journal, Debate of Petitions
To gather the data, I searched online at loc.gov (Library of Congress) in 2014 for "Alien
and Sedition" and this resulted in a collection of twenty-six archival records, excluding indexes
(total of 33 records). From the twenty-six documents at the Library of Congress that specifically
referenced the Alien and Sedition laws, eight documents specifically originated from the House of
Representatives. These occurred during 1798 and 1799 and are located in, Annals of Congress,
House of Representatives, 5th Congress. 4 There were other archival records worth considering to
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confirm that a contestatory citizenry rose up to seek the repeal of the Alien and Sedition laws,
specifically through the process of crafting a Resolution of Instruction, such as official resolutions
that were signed and sent to Congress from Connecticut, New Hampshire, Virginia,
Massachusetts, and Kentucky. However, central to this chapter, I am particularly interested in the
people's direct petitions and especially how the members of the House treated these petitions in
support of direct popular control.
Retrieved online from the Library of Congress, specifically, A Century of Lawmaking for
a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates, 1774-1875;5 in, Annals of Congress,
House of Representatives, 5th Congress, 3rd Session, Alien and Sedition Laws, there are eight
separate entries covering the debate on the Alien and Sedition laws according to the Journal of the
House of Representatives on pages: 2429 through 2436, 2445 through 2454, 2797 through 2802,
2855 through 2856, 2883 through 2906, 2906 through 2907, 2957 through 2958, and 2985 through
3016. Due to my extensive use of quotations in this section in order to express the material as it
was recorded, I provide the reader the pages of reference at the beginning of each document, yet
do not cite the page of each quotation.
Overall, the debate is quite extensive since it covers about ninety pages of the House
record. Therefore, I extract the essential discussion from each page in the sample below
with respect to my hypotheses. For example, the final entry is roughly thirty-two pages; hence,
I focus on whether there was a defense for the people’s direct petitions and a repeal of the laws as
well as the hypotheses regarding authoritarianism. The data is a good fit for the research
question because the results will show who and how Representatives in the House took the
petitions seriously as well as who and how other Representatives possibly objected to them. My
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evidence will show that the petitioners were able to practice Instruction and influence proceedings
in the House of Representatives a dozen years after Ratification.
In the first record, pages 2429 through 2436, on a December day in 1798, the House began
the session when Mr. Harper, "called up the resolution which he yesterday laid upon the table" in
regards to publishing "an extra number of copies of the Alien and Sedition Acts, to be distributed
gratis throughout the United States." Mr. Nicholas had no objection to distributing official copies
of the Alien and Sedition Acts freely to the public, indeed, had not people written petitions
opposing the Acts because, "certain public meetings had acted upon false information, rough
draughts of bills, and other papers, which discovered the extremist ignorance," and publishing the
Acts would alleviate the public discontent arising from the ignorance of the laws?
Accordingly, at a public meeting in Virginia, Mr. Harper heard that, "resolutions of an
extraordinary and hostile complexion were passed upon the subject of these laws…" because of
a "draft of a bill which was reported in the Senate, which underwent a total alteration, and was in
the House further amended." Secondly, the resolutions passed by Kentucky against the Act were
created in response to a letter, "which contained what, perhaps, were not willful
misrepresentations; indeed, from the character of the gentleman, he must suppose them
unintentional misconceptions," because the letter contained "gross errors" as it explained a power
of "unjustifiable restraints on speech, which was not within the purview of the act." By my
reading, Mr. Harper was referencing Madison’s correspondence with Thomas Jefferson.
Then, Mr. Harper argued for the publishing and distribution of the Acts since, "in no
instance had he met with any individual, not himself actively employed in misrepresenting these
laws, or a moral zealous party man, who was not, upon hearing their contents simply stated,
convinced of their wisdom and propriety." The best way to stop more of "…the same inflammatory
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resolutions, and the same tumultuous assemblages of the people…" is to "give the people correct
information with respect to these laws," and discontents "would be removed by a simple
publication of them." To rebuff this, Mr. Nicholas responded that Mr. Harper is, "in the habit of
setting down all opposition to his own opinions to the account of ignorance," and, "since the
gentleman from South Carolina supposed them so grossly ignorant, he had no objection to their
receiving all the light he could throw upon the subject." Given this grand opening, contestation
appears to be alive and well, and maybe authoritarianism too.
The debate on publication continued after Mr. Dawson asked if it would be in order to
suspend the consideration of publication because, he was convinced, "the more the laws in question
are known, the more they will be reprobated by the citizens of the United States, and more
especially by friends of the Constitution." After this speech, he sought to quash the motion to print
the laws in order to vote on a new motion to repeal the laws, yet Dawson’s motion was denied by
a vote of 42 to 29 and debate to print the Alien and Sedition laws continued. A second and very
brief delay in the debate arose when Mr. Macon argued that U.S. laws were printed by a "special
law" and Mr. Harper retorted that the procedure he proposed, "was the same with that adopted last
session in the extra publication of the dispatches from our Commissioners in France…"
Next, Mr. Thatcher questioned if a simple printing was enough, and suggested that outreach
might be achieved if the laws were, "printed in all the newspapers of the United States once a week
for three or four weeks." Mr. Harper responded, "if one hundred thousand copies of these laws
were struck off, it would answer the purpose," because there are parts of the U.S. "where the
circulation of newspapers is extremely limited." Shortly thereafter, members voted down the
question to print 100,000 copies, voted down 50,000 copies, voted down 40,000 copies, and then
voted to print 20,000 copies. Debate continued following the vote as Mr. Gallatin picked apart Mr.
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Harper’s arguments and called the Acts impolitic and unconstitutional. Afterwards, Dawson,
Smith, and Macon concluded the debate with the possibility of adding amendments, a motion for
more discussion, and a call for civility in the House, respectively.
In the second House entry, pages 2445 through 2454, debate on Mr. Harper’s proposition
to print and distribute 20,000 free copies of the Alien and Sedition laws continued to be debated
in regards for stopping the discontent that was stemming from the people. First, Mr.
Dawson argued on the floor that the printing of the Acts should be accompanied by, "all the parts
of the Constitution which appeared to him to relate to the subject… to give the power to Congress,
as which prohibit the exercise thereof… it had ever been his wish to give the fullest information
to his constituents." After Mr. Dawson provided an amendment that cites various sections and
clauses of the Constitution to be printed with the two laws, Mr. Rutledge asked if, "there was any
portion of the citizens of the United States who had not read the Constitution…?" Then, Rutledge
answers himself, where "discontents had been manifested, and where resolutions had been entered
into censuring the alien and sedition laws, that discontents had been generated by
misrepresentations of these laws." Regarding certain gentlemen who had declared the Acts
"unconstitutional, and expressed their wish that the people would resist its execution… to rebel
against this law which invaded the Constitutional rights, was a duty they owed their country," was
a nothing more than a call for rebellion by high ranking officials! Rutledge "was surprised that our
citizens had discovered so much patience, wisdom, and good sense..." Indeed, both chambers of
Congress and the judges, "who had acted under them, had declared them to be perfectly
constitutional." Therefore, Rutledge explained, it is not necessary to appeal to the people to know
their sentiments on the Acts, especially since, "The Constitution… is in the hands of almost every
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citizen. He should blush for his constituents…" that they might need to be reminded of specific
passages.
Afterwards, the House falls into a set of procedural stumbles. The original resolution for
debate contained a proposal for a number of extra publications of the Acts to be published and
distributed for free, yet Mr. Eggleston moved for a postponement because he personally believed
that there was going to be a call to repeal the laws. However, according to an interrupting Speaker,
Mr. Eggleston was, "departing from order." Mr. Eggleston replied that he sought, "the propriety of
a postponement," whereby the Speaker replied that this was "wholly out of order…" and Mr.
Eggleston said he wished to comply and sat down. Then, Mr. Dawson withdrew his original motion
to add specific passages because he sought a motion to, "Add the Constitution of the United States
as now amended." Following, Mr. Claiborne agreed that the entire Constitution should be printed
with the Acts for distribution because in the Western country the amendments have, "not been so
generally circulated as he could have wished…" and "seeing the Constitution might allay the
present fermentation of the public mind with respect to these laws." Mr. Thatcher agreed
that, "people in the Western country are greatly misinformed," and explained that this is because
of "moral subjects," to which the Speaker interrupted, "no remark of this kind could possibly be in
order." Mr. Thatcher continued, "…it was not political information which these people were in
want of, but moral information, correct habits, and regular fixed characters," at which Mr. Nicholas
inquired if the gentleman was in order to which the Speaker replied, "very many of his remarks
were not in order." Then, Mr. Thatcher briefly restated his argument and sat down.
All the motions failed. First, Mr. Gallatin made clear that he believed, "the Constitution, as
amended, has never been published… he wished it now, for the first time, to be published."
Following, Mr. Craik said that no law of Congress should be published more than others and Mr.
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Hartley, "hoped neither the amendment nor the original proposition would be agreed to." In the
end, Mr. Hartley’s sentiments carried and the amendment to publish parts of the Constitution
allegedly in support of the Alien and Sedition laws failed 41 votes to 35 votes. Also, the original
proposition to print extra copies of the Alien and Sedition Acts failed 45 votes to 34 votes.
In the third House entry, pages 2797 through 2802, dated January 30, 1799, debate on the
Acts resumed as Mr. Eggleston presented a petition from the people of Amelia, Virginia, which
caused an uproar. In the petition, the people call the British Treaty an error because it follows
British policy, calls for the repeal of the law enabling the President to raise a provisional army,
and "particularly prays that the alien and sedition laws, which it terms impolitic, tyrannical, and
unconstitutional, may be obliterated from our statute book." Mr. Eggleston asked that this petition
be referred to the Committee of the Whole, and the Speaker laid it before the House and read an
address and remonstrance from Essex County, New Jersey, and said it would also go to the
Committee of the Whole. If sent, this meant that the entire House would be able to debate the
petitions to repeal the Alien and Sedition laws.
Then, Mr. Gordon called for "a division of the question" because the petition from
Amelia "contained a libel upon every measure of the Government since its first establishment… a
sort of threat, that unless the Congress shall proceed to repeal the two laws in question, the militia
of that county would not obey the orders of the General Government." He added that these petitions
in the House create a House, "considered as a place consecrated to abuse." Mr. Eggleston, familiar
with the petition signers, said he was, "sure they never entertained such a sentiment," and that parts
of the petition stated a will to oppose an invading enemy and to obey the will of the
majority. Further, this was the first petition from a group of people on the issue at-hand and he
hoped it would be referred. Next, Mr. Nicholas supported Mr. Eggleston, "the gentleman from
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New Hampshire certainly mistook the passage in the petition… gentlemen ought not to put the
most acrimonious meaning possible upon the words of petitions." After a few more comments, Mr.
Livingston arose to provide a stirring speech in favor of the right of the petitioners to participate
in national politics, echoing Hamilton’s sentiments on Instruction from the New York Convention
(in Chapter Four).
Mr. Livingston firmly expressed his disapproval of branding a petition as libel and turned
the conversation into a debate about the people’s right to directly petition in order to cause their
Representatives to change a federal policy. The petitioners did call for the repeal of the laws on
various grounds, yet they did not pose a threat that the militia will not perform its duty. And, "To
what would the gentleman reduce the right of petitioning? Have the people not a right… to say to
Congress, ‘You have done wrong. You have exceeded your powers.’ If they think so, who shall
stop their mouths, since the Constitution has guaranteed to them this right?" The people may
demonstrate "honest bluntness" which is not in any form a libel. If and when members of Congress
pass unconstitutional laws, then the people should tell us so or "the right of petitioning will be
reduced to narrow ground indeed."
In response, Mr. Parker stated that the people have a right to petition and, "this House has
a right to protect itself against abuse… The whole of this petition appeared more calculated to
insult the majority who passed this law" by labeling them a tyrannical Congress and a solicitous
Executive. Therefore, the petition should be referred to a Select Committee and not the Committee
of the Whole. Mr. Allen interjected that the House must be "content to hear a number of addresses
like this, which he supposed would get worse and worse," and then argued that once the petitions
become known to the public, "the honest part of the people would be induced to rise and throw off
these people as so many morbid excrescences on the body politic… the end of the business would
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be confusion to the subscribers of such petitions." At this, Mr. Claiborne snapped at the gentleman
from Massachusetts, demanding, who gave you "the right to stand on this floor, but the people?"
The conversation continued to be a defense of the right of the people to petition the House
and for the need of Representatives to respect and to act on the petitioners’ requests. Mr. Claiborne
continued, Virginians, "choose to express themselves in many and strong language, and are
unwilling to surrender any of their rights as Republicans… the order would be obeyed; but the
men who executed the order would be the first to say the law is unconstitutional." Mr. Livingston
asked Mr. Allen to, "explain what he meant, when he said ‘that the honest part of the people would
rise and throw off the description of persons who had signed the petition, as a morbid weight upon
the union,’" and Mr. Allen replied that he "did not say so." After being prodded by Livingston, he
admitted, "Mr. L. does me the honor to suppose some part of the spirit shown against the alien and
sedition laws had been excited in me," whereby Livingston concluded, "if anything he had said or
done had tended to awaken the people to a sense of their rights, he should think he had not lived
in vain." The idea is that the petitioners knew what they were doing and the House should adhere
to their leadership. In this way, James Madison may have been prophetic in his letter to Jefferson
in that the debate was becoming an eye opener or an eye sore for House members in regards to the
spirit of republicanism.
The debate regarding the role of petitions continued. Many Representatives from the
majority party openly urged that the House was a sacred place and beyond the reach of the people
because Representatives were not reliant on the petitioners or their petitions, and the House should
not be influenced by a libel from a few people. Yet, defenders of the right of the people to petition
as a foundation for governing in America was quickly well-defended. For example, Mr. Thatcher
sardonically supposed that members surrendered certain rights once they took their seats in order
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to be "insulted with impunity, though before they came, they would not have been liable to be so
insulted without redress." Enthusiastically, Mr. Smith responded that if the gentleman was
deprived of some rights because of his seat in the House, he has gained other rights by being able
to speak in the House. Afterwards, Mr. Gallatin arose and stated that he "scarcely believed"
the notion that a petition critical of a law could be called libel and argued, considering the libel
point of view:
…this doctrine goes a step farther, by saying, that if these opinions are expressed by way
of petition, it ought to be adjudged a libel, and not inquired into. And this is to be done…not
by a court or jury, but by ourselves, who passed the laws complained of, taking it for
granted we are right and the petitioners are wrong, and that whatever opinion differs from
ours is libelous, which was effectually to destroy the provision of the Constitution, which
guarantees the right of petitioning, and gives to the people the right, at any time, to oppose
their opinions to those of Congress… charging us with being deficient in wisdom or
something worse; and although gentlemen may not like this, it is so ordered, and cannot be
got over by charging a petition with being false or libelous.
After Mr. Gallatin defended the right of the people to directly petition the House of Representatives
as a catalyst of political change, Mr. Eggleston "calls for the yeas and nays." Immediately after the
call, Mr. Pinckney interjected, "indecency" was grounds for rejecting a petition, though he did not
think the current petition to be so exceptionable. Then, Mr. Rutledge ended the conversation and
argued, "petitions of this kind" should not go to the Committee of the Whole; rather, "to the
Committee of Defence [sic], with a view of showing them that their former measures were wrong,
or to a select committee, to report upon them to the House." At this, the yeas carried 73 votes to
30 votes.
In the fourth House entry, pages 2855 through 2856, dated February, 1799, Mr. Hartley
set down a petition from York county, "praying for a repeal of certain laws," and gave notice that
he would call upon them on Monday to which the Speaker said, "it would be necessary to make it
the order of the day," and Mr. Hartley made that motion and it carried.
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In the fifth House entry, pages 2883 to 2906, dated Tuesday, February 12, 1799, the debate
of placing petitions in a select committee and taking them off the House floor was settled. The
debate opened as Mr. Livingston brought forth, "a petition from a number of aliens, natives of
Ireland, resident within the United States, praying for a repeal of the alien law," and it was
motioned that the petition be referred to the Committee of the Whole, such as similar previous
petitions had been referred. However, Mr. Sewall objected and argued that this petition should go
to a select committee as well as the previous petitions through a discharge from the Committee of
the Whole because a select committee would show, "the nature of the complaints… from whom
they came… examine the merits of these petitions, and report their opinion thereon to the
House." Next, Mr. Nicholas hoped that Mr. Livingston would withdraw his motion in order for the
House to move on to Mr. Sewall’s call for a select committee because, "He did not want the
petitions of our citizens to be blended" with petitions from aliens. Mr. Livingston did not object to
withdraw his motion, noted that "objections to this petition are wholly without foundation," and
agreed not to "confound this petition with the petitions of the citizens of the United States." Then,
Mr. Sewall made a motion to discharge the "sundry memorials for the repeal of the alien and
sedition acts" from the Committee of the Whole and to send them to a select committee "to
consider and report their opinion thereon to the House."
Various arguments were made for and against the sending of petitions to a select committee
or to keep them in the Committee of the Whole. Following the record, Mr. Macon thought petitions
should stay in the Whole (on the House floor) because, "If a statement of the contents of these
memorials is to be made, there will be as much time spent in agreeing to it as in considering the
petitions themselves." Meanwhile, all the petitions seek the same end, the repeal of the Acts, so "it
is not necessary to employ a committee to give an opinion on the propriety of doing this." Mr.
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Macon added that the effect of Sewall’s motion was, "that these petitions would not be acted on at
all… probable that the select committee might not report till a few days of the close of the
session."
Next, the members debated whether aliens, or non-citizens, have the same petitioning rights
as citizens and if the petitions ought to be sent to a select committee. Mr. Nicholas returned to
Sewall’s remark to know who the petitioners were and asked, "Would the gentleman say, that he
should be ready to yield to the petition of one description of persons, and not to that of another
description?" Therefore, he hoped the petitions would remain in the Whole for all to debate
because in a select committee, "He conceived this course was intended to evade the question, and
to prevent that discussion…" regarding an official repeal. Mr. Hartley converted, he "had no doubt
the [select] committee would soon make their report" and once the report is given, "the same
opportunity will be afforded for debate that would be afforded in case the petitions were
immediately acted on." Mr. Williams also preferred to send the petitions to a select committee
because he wanted the petitions, "analyzed, as he found they were not only from our citizens, but
from aliens, and also found that even the ordinances of the Sabbath have been broken in upon to
obtain signatures to them." Coming full circle, Mr. Eggleston argued that the petitions should
remain in the Whole and, "after one of the petitions has been read, motions will be proposed for
repealing the two laws…" to which Mr. Sewall replied that petitions seeking a repeal of a law
should be analyzed, "to know from whence and from whom they come" because the petitions are
evidence "of the seditious feelings and seditious principles; as proofs that they have been deceived
by those in whom they have placed confidence." At this, the Speaker called the House to
order. Down came the gavel.
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After the call to order, Mr. Sewall stated that he thought, "he was treating these petitions
with respect," because the select committee would, "have a statement of their contents on the
Journals of the House," and the evidence of the committee’s review might satisfy and convince the
people at large that the petitioners have been considered while the law remains in effect. In
opposition, Mr. McDowell stated that sending the petitions to the select committee is an
opportunity for "casting an odium on the petitioners," to forge a case in favor of the laws, and
to "prevent any discussion upon the subject…" Then, Mr. Livingston explained, discussion on the
topic was always possible because any member may propose a resolution for repeal, yet the current
debate for petitions to go to the Whole or a select committee is important because, "so serious and
solemn a subject, that gentlemen would not shut their ears to the complaints of their constituents…
to a regard for the Constitution, and his sacred oath, in its support; all of which, in his opinion,
called for the repeal." He concluded, "every man who votes thus to hide the public complaints" by
sending petitions to a select committee is voting to continue the Acts. He called for the public to
have "full information on this subject" through a record of votes on the topic, and then he called
for the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were not taken because Mr. Harper stood to explain that he "was glad
the gentleman from New York had not again threatened the House with an insurrection of the
people and of the States, because gentlemen happened to differ in opinion from him; but he has
today come pretty near it." He added that it is not the duty of the legislator to surrender his opinion,
even when unpopular. And in his opinion, "The gentleman from New York may place in array
before the House all the petitions from the Northern Liberties to the streets of New York, and he
may threaten us with their force." Mr. Livingston interjected that he made no threats and Mr.
Harper said that he indeed expressed previously before the House a sentiment for the people and
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States to "rise and oppose" the Acts. Further, the select committee would organize all the
petitions to be, "better understood that it could be in its present state."
Following, House rules regarding the procedures for petitions was explained by Mr.
Gallatin. In response to Mr. Harper, Mr. Gallatin opened that the motion to send petitions to a
select committee was of a "novel nature" because he believed that it had been, "an uniform rule in
this House, that whenever petitions come which relate either to particular claims, or representing
the details of any law, or touching anything which requires a statement of facts, they are referred
to a select committee to report thereon" and it is also true that "petitions of a general and abstract
nature, praying for the repeal of a law in toto, and complaining of a measure in all its parts, all such
petitions are uniformly referred to a Committee of the Whole House" in order to answer the
petitioners’ petition of, "Should this thing be done or not?" Mr. Gallatin made clear that these
petitions to repeal the Alien and Sedition laws in total obviously belong in the Whole in order to
be addressed and voted on by everyone.
Public opinion mattered in various ways to House members. Mr. Gallatin argued that the
nature of the petitioners was not in question and it would be fairer to allow members of the
House, "who are in opinion with the petitioners, to produce our own arguments… If gentlemen are
not afraid of public opinion, if they are not afraid of meeting a discussion on the subject, why take
the course now proposed [to send these petitions to a select committee]—a course never before
pursued?" Furthermore, "the same gentlemen wish to take a course still more extraordinary, by
directing a committee to make an address to the people, in justification of these laws…10,000 or
20,000 copies distributed…" and he hoped this would not be adopted. More so, public opinion
should be attended to, and "threats ought to be despised." He continued, the Sedition law would be
repealed before the end of session, which is not unusual, considering other laws that had been at
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least partially repealed recently, such as a law to value houses and lands, and a
law, "enumerating the slaves in the United States, which relates to the measuring of
windows…" Thus, considering the motion to send petitions to a select committee, "…no good
could arise from pursuing this course… he should vote against this motion." Regular order
suggested that petitions from the people should cause a House vote regarding the repeal of the law
under consideration, or not, for the benefit of providing the people with a direct response to their
petitions.
Next, the debate turned upside down as Mr. Harper responded to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, who had spoken of threats, that, "He had no reference to them. He did not hear any
of them; if he had, he certainly should have opposed the reference of any such." Mr. Livingston,
"could not imagine which of his observations the gentleman from South Carolina alluded to when,
in the former part of the speech, he quoted him as having threatened the House." Then, it was
relayed that the threat came from Livingston’s call for "prudence" during the former session of
Congress, to which Mr. Livingston added that this is the first time, "a recommendation of virtue
had been construed into a breach of its precepts." Mr. Shepard said the gentlemen were afraid
because the petitions, "contain no solid reasons for repeal" and that "prudence" utilized earlier by
Livingston did "imply a threat" and he "wished the gentlemen could be more united." Mr.
Claiborne opened within order in that he is opposed to the motion for moving petitions to a select
committee, and then added, "It appears as if the gentlemen meant to denounce certain parts of the
country as seditious, and to declare that their petitions are unworthy of attention." At this, Mr.
Bayard sarcastically thanks Mr. Livingston, "for the prudence he had recommended to the House."
Mr. Bayard continued a great deal to conjecture on the meaning of the word prudence until
he says, "the gentleman, in his place, had publicly called upon the people, and upon the State
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Governments, to oppose the law, and prayed to his God that it would be opposed." Next, Mr.
Bayard expressed this prudence as an affront to the sanctity of the House, and Mr. Livingston
interrupted him and asked the Chair if it is in order to be debating a question in the House, "to
allude to arguments which took place at a former session?" If so, he continued, "are those
arguments to be correctly quoted?"
After Mr. Livingston pleaded his case for prudence, the Speaker said that the sentiment at
the last session and referred to now was, "that the States ought to resist the law, the people ought
to resist the law, and he hoped to God the people would resist the law." At this, Mr. Livingston
appealed to the Chair, "the Speaker had undertaken, to state from memory, the precise words which
it was said he uttered twelve months ago, without giving the arguments with which they were
connected, and because the statement itself was materially incorrect, if it were in order, to
show," and the Speaker called to order. Mr. Livingston lost and the point carried 57 to 29 in favor
of the Chair, and so Mr. Bayard continued.
Mr. Bayard, "conceived that it would really be prudent for the gentleman to attempt a
defense of his conduct on the subject" because, "so plain a commendation of insurrection could
never be forgiven by any honest man in the country…" The debate remained a harangue as Bayard
then connected the party seeking the repeal of the Acts with the French whom engaged in a "torrent
of revolutionary opinion threatened to prostrate every mound of Government and social order. In
this moment of delirium, they willingly enough connected themselves with the French interest." He
went on a while regarding the French / American connection—the one which Madison
ubiquitously denounced in his May 20th letter to Jefferson—and concluded that signals were given
from party leaders to the people. So, "When the gentleman from Virginia, early in this session,
gave notice of his design to move for the repeal of these laws, he must have known that he was
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scattering firebrands through the United States." Certainly, alluding to James Madison’s Virginia
Resolves, they were, "designed to put in activity every restless and disconnected spirit in the
country—to overwhelm us with petitions and remonstrances." At this, the Speaker halted the
speech and said that it was, "not in order to speak of the motives of a member’s conduct."
Next, Mr. Bayard argued that a motion to repeal the Acts was an attempt to increase the
rage and virulence of a party spirit, and he had reason to believe, "there were many intriguers
among us, employed not only to debauch the minds of the people, but acting as spies upon the
country." Since the laws were set to expire in a short time and no one had been coerced through
the alien law and with one instance of use by the sedition law, "what great national mischief could
be contemplated?" The petitions should go to a select committee because, "very improper means
had been employed in obtaining signers." And, it was his belief, "many people had been imposed
on in procuring their signatures; that the petitions were represented to them as being of a different
nature from their actual import… If such frauds had been practiced, they ought to be known." If
so, these petitions, "could not be entitled to any weight." For example, "we have seen the sanctity
of a church violated—the holy services of religion interrupted—the devotion of a whole
congregation disturbed, by a daring and insolent attempt to procure signatures." Bayard then
suggested a solution for these transgressions was, "extending and invigorating the criminal
code." Consequently, a select committee was "alone competent to the inquiry, and he should, of
consequence, vote for such a committee."
A great part of the remainder of the debate was a rebuttal to Mr. Bayard by Mr. McDowell,
Claiborne, Eggleston, and Gallatin with a defense by Thatcher and Bayard in regards to sending
petitions concerning the Alien and Sedition laws to the Committee of the Whole or a Select
Committee. Mr. McDowell admonished the idea that the people should seek a repeal of the laws
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in order to spread firebrands and added that a select committee would bring to the House a
document to, "convince the petitioners of their errors, and that these laws are good and proper." To
achieve this result, he predicted that the House members friendly to the petitions would not be on
the committee for review, "so that this course might effectually prevent a discussion of the
subject."
Opposing the motion to send the petitions to a select committee, Mr. Claiborne
lamented, "Are we to be told that gentlemen who express their disapprobation of the alien and
sedition laws, that the petitioners for their repeal, do not wish to obtain the repeal, but merely to
spread firebrands through the Union, in order to excite disquiet and discontent…?" And, "…they
do this from an attachment to the French nation? Such charges, such illiberality, such untruths,
were reserved for the gentleman from Delaware." After this, Mr. Claiborne defended the petitions
to repeal the laws because those laws were the cause for the public discontent. In this way, sending
petitions to a select committee will aggravate and exacerbate the discontent. As for the Sabbath
having been violated to procure signatures, he claims that this charge was unfair because this
charge was made in general to all petitions, yet there was only one instance of this happening, to
which Mr. Bayard said he "spoke only of one," whereby Mr. Claiborne said that his petitions,
among others, lie on the table and have not been referred, further, "no charge of irregularity could
be brought against any of the others…" Apparently, petitions were piling up on the table.
The debate turned into a determination regarding the weight that petitions should be given
considering various viewpoints, especially in light of those who favor the sanctity of the House
versus representatives who favor a sanctity of the people to be able to petition their representatives
for a repeal of a federal law. Mr. Eggleston viewed the petitions as a way for the legislators to rely
on the people. He asked for a fair discussion on the question and was concerned because, "he had
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heard it said that [House] favors might be so roughly conferred as to take away all sense and
obligation [to the people]…" So far, petitioners had been treated with decency and respect
and, "With respect to threats, he had heard none in any of the petitions; but if someone
had contained anything of this kind, it ought not to affect those which were unexceptionable in
their language." Mr. Eggleston concluded that a full debate in the Whole would allow a call for
repeal, and if a majority was against the repeal, then the House would air the reasons for continuing
the law and denying the petitioners’ call for repeal, "and the public will judge who are right."
At this, Mr. Thatcher reasoned that continuing debate is a waste of time because, "he did
not suppose a single mind would be changed." For example, the gentleman from New York is so
convinced for the need to repeal the law that "nothing short of a miracle would convince him to
the contrary… the gentleman from Pennsylvania is so firmly fixed as to be even beyond the power
of a miracle." Thus, "why should this discussion take place, when every gentleman has made up
his mind upon the subject, and determined he will not alter it?"
The debate circled back to public opinion. Mr. Thatcher explicated that incoming petitions
did not represent public opinion because, "public opinion is in favor of, and generally satisfied
with the laws, and against any unnecessary discussion." He continued, "Gentlemen commit a great
mistake, when they say that petitions are from ‘the people’ of the United States. They are not in
proportion of one to one thousand; they are like a drop compared to the ocean." Finally, "if the
State Legislatures are consulted, they will be found in favor of these laws, though two or three
States have expressed their opinions against them. Therefore, as it could not be said to be the wish
of the people that this subject should again be discussed…" It followed that the petitions do not
represent the general will of the people and the people expect the House to move on to another
topic since the legislators are fixed in their opinions, have expressed them on the floor, and will
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not change their opinion. Mr. Thatcher concluded that the motion to move petitions to the select
committee will provide the "go-by."
Next, Mr. Gallatin vehemently defended the right of the people to petition on republican
grounds. He began with a good laugh at the gentleman from Massachusetts, because he did provide
great candor to tell "the House the true ground of this motion, which, he says, is to give the subject
the go-by." In addition, "he adduced his argument to show that these petitions are the work of
demagogues… whenever a man jumps up to deliver his sentiments, he calls himself ‘the people’…
a Jacobin, because he declares all the people of his opinion." He adds, pointedly, who is the Jacobin
and demagogue is for the people to decide. Moving on, Gallatin surmised that connecting the
people who seek repeal with the French Republic was, "by political imposture," trying to assume
public opinion on their side, "which are calculated to eradicate from our minds the principles of
our Revolution, and to concentrate power in the Executive." He continued, this "will prove
obnoxious to the people of America." Also, the laws were set to expire in a year, so why not repeal
one of the laws which "has not proved a dead letter?"
The Alien law had no victims, so why keep it on the books when the people through
petitions were calling for its repeal? On the other hand, the sedition law in effect, "has been leveled
against the free press in several parts of the country; in Massachusetts, New York, and he believed,
in New Jersey, prosecutions had been commenced against the printers of newspapers, on account
of some offensive paragraphs…" Meanwhile, the Alien law had not been enforced on anyone.
Hence, it was reasonable that gentlemen would seek to repeal the Alien law because "these laws
were opposed on the ground of their unconstitutionality." Then, he enunciated that the
unconstitutionality of the laws were the cause for division between the people and their
government, since the people currently, "render the administration of the Government unpopular."
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Considering the strong sentiments of the people, Gallatin concluded that if the gentlemen will vote
to repeal of the Acts, then they may enjoy, "as little discussion as they please."
Some comments suggested that there was common support for authoritarian public policy.
As a response to Gallatin, Mr. Thatcher began, "…it was a matter of joy" that there had been more
than one prosecution under the sedition law and he wished to keep and expand the law
permanently. With greater force, seditious men in public and in the House will be punished,
because, "‘the tongue is an unruly member;’ and there is no difference between the tongue and the
press, except that every press ought to be considered as a million tongues, and ought to be guarded
with a million of guards." In response to Thatcher, Mr. Hartley disapproved of the "go-by" as a
reference for sending something to a select committee. "If that gentleman had any such wish, he
trusted he stood alone."
Next, Mr. Bayard held the floor awhile until the vote on the motion to send petitions to a
select committee was taken. He began by declaring McDowell and Claiborne to be, "extremely
liberal in their charges of illiberality against him," and he did not question their privilege to make
such charges considering their "distinguished urbanity and uncommon good breeding..." Bayard
claimed it would be a, "great reproach if he were justly liable to the charge of illiberality," and that
he never reflected on a specific individual or character. Indeed, the culprit was the political
party. His party was accused through insinuation to be, "more friendly to monarchy than to
republicanism." However, "Has it not been the constant practice, for years, of gentlemen on the
other side, to criminate the views, and vilify the measures of the administration, and of those who
supported the operations of the Government?" It was true that he opposed an amendment to the
sedition law giving a jury the right to decide the outcome, but that was because, "he considered the
provision as nugatory and useless," since he assumed a jury would do so without the provision.
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On more level ground, the laws were explained as harmless to the people, and protective
of the people. As the Sedition Law existed, Bayard stated, "no man could be convicted but for
publishing a malicious falsehood. He was not liable to be punished for his malice, unless it was
false; nor, for his falsehood, unless it was malicious." The Sedition Law was good policy because,
the "true pride of a country" is known when laws punish crimes, "with severity, with few or no
instances of persons suffering under them." But then the trail towards authoritarianism resumed as
Mr. Bayard continued, "a gentleman from Pennsylvania had complained bitterly of its operation
upon a member of the House, whose constituents, in consequence of his punishment," were not
represented for the remainder of the session. Further, "the member should be instantly expelled, if
he should again take his seat." At this, the Speaker observed that the gentleman was departing from
the question, and Mr. Bayard finished that gentlemen were "impatient at the late hour for the
question, and he would trespass no longer on their patience."
The vote to move the petitions to a select committee carried 51 votes in favor to 48 votes
against. Representatives Messrs, Goodrich, Pickney, Nicholas, Craik, and Hartley were named to
the select committee to report on the petitions to the House.
In the sixth House entry, pages 2906 to 2907, dated Wednesday, February 13, 1799, there
were a number of petitions introduced with a defense of the character regarding the petition
signers. First, Mr. Gregg, "presented a remonstrance against the alien and sedition laws, signed by
two hundred and seventy" people from Mifflin County. Considering "some insinuations" leveled
"against the characters of the signers of these petitions," he "thought it a duty incumbent on him to
state" that the signers of the petitions were "drawn up by a committee of the signers themselves, in
consequence of and agreeable to certain resolutions" adopted at a previous meeting of freeholders
and reputable inhabitants of the district, "specially convened for that purpose." Many of the signers
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had been, "actively and usefully engaged in the service of their country during the Revolutionary
war; and ever since that period have conducted themselves as good citizens and friends to the
Government…" They feel they are "irresistibly impelled" to object to the Alien and Sedition laws
due to the reasons stated in the remonstrances. Indeed, this is their first time "troubling
Government with their complaints…"
Then, Mr. Gregg added, "two petitions and remonstrances on the same subject, signed by
320 people," from Cumberland, which "had been formed by deputies from different parts of the
county, and were signed by the yeomanry of the places from which they came; a yeomanry highly
respectable, not only for their number, but also in point of affluence, respectability, and
patriotism." He hoped the petitions would be referred and, "they were referred to the select
committee yesterday appointed." Lastly, Mr. Havens presented a memorial from Queens County,
New York, "praying for a repeal of the alien and sedition laws" and they were referred to the same
select committee.
In the seventh House entry, pages 2957 to 2959, dated Friday, February 22, 1799, more
petitions were presented along with a motion to strike out words in a specific petition, which was
followed by a defense for the people’s constitutional right to directly petition the House of
Representatives. First, Mr. Bard, "presented several petitions and remonstrances from 1,487
inhabitants of the county of Franklin, Pennsylvania, praying for the repeal of the alien and sedition
laws, which having been read," were asked to be referred to the select committee. Interjecting, Mr.
Harper, "inquired whether it would be in order to strike out a part of this petition," to which the
Speaker answered in the negative. Mr. Harper continued, he "could not help protesting against an
atrocious libel contained in these petitions in that ‘the sedition law had, in its execution, been used
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as a means of private vengeance, personal enmity, and party resentment.’ A charge so unjustifiable,
and so untrue…" that he felt compelled to protest the petition.
At this, Mr. Gallatin objected to calling a part of the petition a libel, that Mr. Harper is
alleging a part of the petition is untrue, "but he does not want to have the allegation examined, in
order to discover whether it be true or not;" rather, "to dismiss the subject at once; to tell the people,
‘You shall not be permitted to lay your petitions before us, if you dare to say that laws are carried
into operation to gratify party spirit or private revenge… if they contain such allegations, we will
reject your petitions."
Mr. Harper replied that party malice and party revenge, "will cut both ways." He asked if
it would be in order to, "refer this part of the memorial to a select committee" to inquire into the
subject matter? The Speaker replied that such a motion is out of order. Next, Mr. Nicholas
explained that Mr. Harper indeed answered himself in that the petition is going to a select
committee for review and added, "hereafter, no petition would be received that complained of the
maladministration of any department of government." The reference, "carried, there being 55 votes
for it." Finally, Mr. Gallatin presented petitions from six hundred and seventy-eight people from
Chester County, "praying for the repeal of the alien and sedition laws," and it is not noted, but
extremely likely, that these petitions were sent to the select committee in charge of reviewing
petitions on this subject.
In the eighth and final House entry, pages 2985 to 3016, dated Monday, February 25, 1799,
there was a record of the select committee’s report, a defense for the petitioners’ petitions and the
right of self-government, and a vote on two resolutions that derived from the select committee’s
report. First, on motion of Mr. Goodrich, the select committee brought in their full report on the
petitions to the House floor via the Committee of the Whole. The Chairman read the report in its
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entirety, pages 2985 to 2993, which was essentially a defense of the Alien and Sedition laws due
to a major threat from France regarding, an "organized system of conduct towards foreign nations;
to bring them within their sphere and under the dominion of her influence and control." Therefore,
the Alien and Sedition laws were, "an essential part in these precautionary and protective measures,
adopted for our security," and the "innocent misconceptions of the American people will, however,
yield to reflection and argument, and from them no danger is to be apprehended." Additionally,
the Constitution was made for citizens, not aliens, and aliens may be removed and have no rights
under the Constitution. As for the Sedition Act,
…the liberty of the press consists not in a license for every man to publish what he pleases
without being liable to punishment, if he should abuse this license to the injury of others…
a law to restrain its licentiousness, in publishing false, scandalous, and malicious libels
against the Government, cannot be considered as ‘an abridgement’ of its ‘liberty.’
According to these and other similar arguments to say the Acts are constitutional and necessary in
the report, "the committee beg leave to report the following resolutions:"
Resolved, That it is inexpedient to repeal the act passed in the last session, entitled, ‘An act
concerning aliens.’
Resolved, That it is inexpedient to repeal the act passed in the last session, entitled, ‘An act
in addition to the act, entitled, ‘An act for the punishment of certain crimes against the
United States.’
After the Speaker began to inquire about voting on the first resolution, Mr. Gallatin rose to reply
to the report at about an equal length of time as the report in favor of the right of the petitioners to
call for a repeal the laws and for them to be able to therefore cause a vote in order to directly be
provided an answer to their petitions.
Gallatin argued that the people have a fundamental right to directly petition and receive an
answer. He cited a total of 18,000 signatures from his state and explained that these petitions urged
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that the laws be purged because they are, "destructive of the first principles of Republican
Government." The laws appear to be, "the instrument of most unjust oppression, and to restrain
that free communication of honest opinion which is the Soul of the Government. But when you
come to inquire further… the advocates of the law, the authority which they claim… extends to
absolute and unlimited control." Yet in a Republic, "the powers of the Federal Government were
intended to be limited, is universally admitted, in the abstract; is proved by every clause of the
Constitution, and positively declared" by the 10th Amendment. Indeed, "The most important and
necessary information for the people to receive is, of the misconduct by the Government…"
Finally, the American Revolution and the Conventions happened:
for the right of self-government against one of the most powerful nations in the world, was
to establish what? Not the inviolability of the Governor of the State, nor of the majority of
either House of the Legislature, but to punish men who should promote resistance to the
right of the people to govern themselves, to the principles of the Constitution, to the
republican principle.
Therefore, Gallatin asserted, the States retain the right, and the people, to enforce laws against
libel, and "… no power is given by the Constitution to control the press, and that such laws are
expressly prohibited by the [first] amendment" was the cause to which Congress must yield.
After the lengthy report by the committee and the response by Mr. Gallatin, there was a
short exchange between those for and against continuing the debate the following day in order to
postpone the vote in the House in regards for the select committee’s resolutions. Mr. McDowell
arose and hoped the committee would rise because, "…he thought an hour or two of tomorrow
might be employed in the discussion of this subject—a subject which had been brought to the
House by the people, and ought, therefore, to receive a full discussion." Mr. Bayard hoped the
committee would not rise and argued that debates and essays had been "exhausted" in this
and other legislatures and the question of the resolutions by the committee should be taken. Mr.
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Livingston observed that the petitions are "loaded" on the table because this subject, "alarmed and
agitated the public mind." Therefore, debate should continue so that the people, "have received due
consideration." Mr. Dayton, the Speaker, said he "lamented" that McDowell and Livingston
thought more debate was necessary, considering, "that the gentleman had last year exhausted all
his threats and all his bitterness." If the debate continued, the gentleman "will eat his dinner as
well, and sleep as quietly, as if the question was determined in a different way."
At this, Mr. Livingston replied to the Speaker, "The gentleman from New Jersey is
mistaken. If the resolution be decided, as he thinks it will, I will not sleep in quiet. The country
will not be quiet… If gentlemen wish to put the present discontent to sleep, they ought to suffer
a more full discussion…" Then, Mr. Claiborne agreed to, "participate in the disquiet which his
friend from New York declared he should feel; because he thought so hasty a decision on so
important a question would be an insult offered to the majesty of the people." He argued that more
discussion was necessary because the people have petitioned at length to ask whether, "we, the
Representatives of the people, have violated the Constitution, which we have sworn to maintain."
Debate closed and the votes were taken on the resolutions given by the select committee to
continue enforcing the Alien and Sedition laws—not to repeal them. Debate ended as, "the
question on rising" was raised on the Floor and "negatived—55 to 42." This meant that the vote on
the select committee’s resolutions would be taken, and the after the Speaker declared Mr.
Livingston’s interrupting remarks to be, "unconnected with the question before the House," Mr.
Livingston sat down and the first resolution was decided, "by the yeas and nays, and stood—52 to
48." The House of Representatives cast the exact same vote on the second resolution after
Mr. McDowell’s move for adjournment was "negatived—55 to 38" votes. The Alien and Sedition
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Acts were not repealed in response to petitions by the people calling for a repeal of the Acts by
members of the House of Representatives.
Results
Qualitatively, the House record supports all four hypotheses.
The “Republican” hypotheses are supported because members of the House minority, such
as Mr. Gallatin, argued vehemently that the petitioners and their thousands of petitions were a
responsible effort to protect the Republic through self-government on republican grounds. A
review of the House records demonstrates that a lot of petitions by ordinary people were signed
and delivered which condemned the Alien and Sedition laws (Hypothesis 1). There was a defense
of the petitioners and the petitions by the Representatives in order to protect self-government
(Hypothesis 2). House members presented and defended petitions from their constituents on the
House floor as part of their effort to repeal the Alien and Sedition laws, and these petitions were
sent to a committee, and the committee reported upon the petitions to the Chamber for a vote with
a set of new resolutions. Examples of evidence in support of the republican hypotheses include:
•

Mr. Eggleston: Presents a petition from the people of Amelia, Virginia. (Entry #3).

•

Mr. Livingston: "To what would the gentleman reduce the right of petitioning? Have the

people not a right…to say to Congress, ‘You have done wrong. You have exceeded your powers.’
If they think so, who shall stop their mouths, since the Constitution has guaranteed to them this
right?" (Entry #3).
•

Mr. Claiborne: Who gave you "the right to stand on this floor, but the people?" (Entry #3).

•

Mr. Claiborne: Virginians "choose to express themselves in many and strong language,

and are unwilling to surrender any of their rights as Republicans… the order would be obeyed; but
the men who executed the order would be the first to say the law is unconstitutional." (Entry #3).
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•

Mr. Hartley: Set down a petition from York county, "praying for a repeal of certain

laws." (Entry #4).
•

Mr. Livingston: "presented a petition from a number of aliens, natives of Ireland, resident

within the United States, praying for a repeal of the alien law." (Entry #5).
•

Mr. Livingston: "so serious and solemn a subject, that gentlemen would not shut their ears

to the complaints of their constituents… to a regard for the Constitution, and his sacred oath, in its
support; all of which, in his opinion, called for the repeal." (Entry #5).
•

Mr. Eggleston: A full debate would allow a call for repeal, and if a majority is against the

repeal, the House will hear the reasons for continuing the law "and the public will judge who are
right." (Entry #5).
•

Mr. Gallatin: It is reasonable that gentlemen would seek to repeal a law because "these

laws were opposed on the ground of their unconstitutionality" and this causes to divide the people
against the Government when they "render the administration of the Government unpopular."
(Entry #5).
•

Mr. Gregg: "presented a remonstrance against the alien and sedition laws, signed by two

hundred and seventy" people from Mifflin County. (Entry #6).
•

Many of the signers had been "actively and usefully engaged in the service of their country

during the Revolutionary war; and ever since that period have conducted themselves as good
citizens and friends to the Government…" and they feel they are "irresistibly impelled" to object
to the Acts due to the reasons stated in the remonstrances. (Entry #6).
•

Mr. Gregg: Added "two petitions and remonstrances on the same subject, signed by 320

people" from Cumberland, which "had been formed by deputies from different parts of the county,
and were signed by the yeomanry of the places from which they came; a yeomanry highly
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respectable, not only for their number, but also in point of affluence, respectability, and
patriotism." (Entry #6).
•

Mr. Bard: "presented several petitions and remonstrances from 1,487 inhabitants of the

county of Franklin, Pennsylvania, praying for the repeal of the alien and sedition laws, which
having been read..." (Entry #7).
•

Mr. Gallatin: Presented petitions from six hundred and seventy-eight people from Chester

County, "praying for the repeal of the alien and sedition laws." (Entry #7).
•

Mr. Gallatin: Cited a total of 18,000 total signatures from his state, and these petitions

urged the laws to be purged because they are "destructive of the first principles of Republican
Government." (Entry #8).
•

Mr. Gallatin: The Revolution and the Conventions happened "for the right of self-

government against one of the most powerful nations in the world, was to establish what? Not the
inviolability of the Governor of the State, nor of the majority of either House of the Legislature,
but to punish men who should promote resistance to the right of the people to govern themselves,
to the principles of the Constitution, to the republican principle." (Entry #8).
•

Mr. Claiborne: More discussion is necessary because the people have petitioned at length

to ask whether, "we, the Representatives of the people, have violated the Constitution, which we
have sworn to maintain." (Entry #8).
The "Authoritarian" hypotheses are supported. First, members of the House majority, such
as Mr. Harper, argued that the petitioners and their petitions were an affront to the Representatives
and their Chamber should not be allowed to be presented in the House because their petitions were
a source of a libel against the House, therefore, the House through paternalism would protect the
people from themselves (Hypothesis 3). And, members of the majority argued that the petitions
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were illegitimate because they were passed because of misinformation or disinformation
(Hypothesis 4). Examples include:
•

Mr. Nicholas: Had not people written petitions opposing the Acts because "certain public

meetings had acted upon false information, rough draughts of bills, and other papers, which
discovered the extremist ignorance" and publishing the Acts would alleviate the public discontent
arising from ignorance of the laws? (Entry #1).
•

Mr. Gordon: The petition from Amelia, "contained a libel upon every measure of the

Government since its first establishment…a sort of threat, that unless the Congress shall proceed
to repeal the two laws in question, the militia of that county would not obey the orders of the
General Government." Allowing these petitions in the House creates a House to "be considered as
a place consecrated to abuse." (Entry #3).
•

Mr. Thatcher: "it was a matter of joy" that there had been more than one prosecution under

the sedition law and he wished to keep and expand the law permanently. With this greater force,
seditious men in public and in the House will be punished, because "‘the tongue us an unruly
member;’ and there is no difference between the tongue and the press, except that every press
ought to be considered as a million of tongues, and ought to be guarded with a million of
guards." (Entry #5).
•

Mr. Bayard: The party seeking the repeal of the Acts is connected with the French whom

engaged in a "torrent of revolutionary opinion threatened to prostrate every mound of Government
and social order. In this of moment delirium, they willingly enough connected themselves with the
French interest…" (Entry #5).
•

Mr. Bayard: Signals are given from party leaders to the people, so, "When the gentleman

from Virginia, early in this session, gave notice of his design to move for the repeal of these laws,
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he must have known that he was scattering firebrands through the United States. … designed to
put in activity every restless and disconnected spirit in the country—to overwhelm us with
petitions and remonstrances." (Entry #5).
•

Mr. Bayard: We have reason to believe, "there were many intriguers among us, employed

not only to debauch the minds of the people, but acting as spies upon the country." (Entry #5).
•

Mr. Harper: "inquired whether it would be in order to strike out a part of this petition" to

which the Speaker answered in the negative and Mr. Harper continued that he "could not help
protesting against an atrocious libel contained in these petitions in that ‘the sedition law had, in its
execution, been used as a means of private vengeance, personal enmity, and party resentment.’ A
charge so unjustifiable, and so untrue…" that he felt compelled to protest the petition. (Entry #7).
•

Mr. Gallatin: Objected to petitions to be a libel, and that Mr. Harper, "does not want to

have the allegation examined, in order to discover whether it be true or not;" rather, "to dismiss the
subject at once; to tell the people, ‘You shall not be permitted to lay your petitions before us, if
you dare to say that laws are carried into operation to gratify party spirit or private revenge… if
they contain such allegations, we will reject your petitions." (Entry #7).
•

Mr. Gallatin: The majority party argues that the people see the laws as, "the instrument of

most unjust oppression, and to restrain that free communication of honest opinion which is the
Soul of the Government. But when you come to inquire further… the advocates of the law [the
majority party], the authority which they claim… extends to absolute and unlimited control" of the
people (Entry #8).
Discussion
Petitions provided lawmakers an opportunity to allow Americans "equal access to
influence" the federal government regarding republican norms (Pettit, 2012), but this access to
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government was stifled by the majority party on authoritarian grounds. Even though aliens and
Sabbath breakers were thought to be less than an equal citizen by some House members (as
indicative of authoritarianism), the people were provided a voting record on the yeas and nays in
response to their petitions. There were repeated calls by some members of the House to call for
the yeas and nays in order to confirm a record of support for and opposition to the Alien and
Sedition laws as a public answer to the petitioners as an access point to government. Meanwhile,
House members in the majority were loyal to President Adams and these Representatives almost
always treated the petitioners and petitions with scorn. In fact, the final committee report is
questionably a note of authoritarianism because it appears to have been based on misinformation
and disinformation, if we rely on James Madison who had argued vehemently that there was no
French connection with American republicanism. The majority party clearly found in the select
committee report a need for the laws to continue because of a belief in paternalism.
Considering republicanism, the results confirm that the American people practiced
republican values openly, and their representatives also openly supported republican values in the
House of Representatives as a core value. The archival records regarding the evidence for petitions
about the Alien and Sedition laws relates that petitioning happened because of a republican
moment to exercise direct popular control over the federal government that was designed to
influence federal politicians into repealing what was seen as anti-republican laws—monsters that
must forever disgrace their parents. Representatives, like Gallatin and Livingston, were openly
supportive of republican values and practices of self-government during the debates. Two
supporting measures are the gross number of pages in the Journal dedicated to the debate as well
as the contextual evidence by Gallatin and others to vehemently defend republican values on the
House floor.
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The petitions from people at the local level resulted in a great deal of intense debate on
the House floor. Representatives, such as Eggleston, Gregg, Livingston, and Gallatin, framed the
petitions as a routine call for self-government to authorize republican documents whereas the
petitions under regular order must be given an up or down vote by the whole House. This supports
the idea that broad-based participation was tied to meaningful practices to peripheralize the federal
government regarding the Alien and Sedition laws under standard House procedure. Therefore,
the majority party's deliberate move to send the petitions regarding the repeal of the Alien and
Sedition laws to a select committee (to 'go-bye') was a point of departure from the republican
tradition. This point of departure helps to explain why so many Americans would defend the
principles of the Revolution by choosing "Republicans" in what became known as the Revolution
of 1800.
Republican norms of transparency, contestability, and impartiality (Pettit, 2012) were
evident through the record of debate in the House regarding the Alien and Sedition laws to a limited
degree. The petitions provided transparency by showing the people's understanding of the laws
and their sentiments for further action to be administered on their behalf. Even though some House
members said that the people were grossly misinformed, the debates were of public record and
calls for "yeas and nays" to demonstrate House action per the laws provided the people with a
transparent House regarding the Representatives' vote concerning the call for repeal by the
petitioners. Contestability was evident as House members challenged overtures for and against the
peoples’ direct petitions regarding a Senate bill that predated the Acts, as well as in regards for a
stream of petitions that arrived after the laws had been passed. The House of Representatives was,
reasonably, an impartial forum in which challengers and supporters of the petitions could expect
an impartial assessment, considering that both the majority and minority were "out of order" at
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times, and both were given almost equal length to speak on the House floor. Yet, the majority
maintained a disproportionate amount of control because the select committee's report on the
petitions did not reflect the sentiments of the petitioners and appears to have been completely onesided and concentrated on misinformation / disinformation. In the eyes of the petitioners, arguably,
republicanism lost to the authoritarian desires of the House majority, otherwise the House should
have voted up or down on the question of repeal openly, instead of the select committee's
resolutions to sustain the laws.
Thus, Americans as nonelected individual participants enjoined and signed petitions for
the federal representatives to respond to what they perceived to be impolitic and unconstitutional
laws, and the petitioners' representatives empowered their constituents by openly defending the
petitions in the House of Representatives. However, I did not find that the peripheralizing function
caused meaningful changes to transpire against the Alien and Sedition laws because the petitions
were expelled to a select committee and that committee essentially explained that the petitioners
were perverse. Hence, to members of the House majority, republicanism on the issue of the Alien
and Sedition laws was perverse. I find that the House majority supported authoritarianism while
the people and the House minority openly supported republicanism.
Conclusion
Considering the evidence, I find support for all the hypotheses. House members presented
and defended copious amounts of petitions from their constituents on the House floor in order to
repeal the Alien and Sedition laws because of a shared belief in republicanism. However, after
extended debate, the minority party who supported the petitioners lost once the petitions were sent
to a select committee, since the committee reported on the petitions to the Chamber for a vote
regarding two new resolutions that explicitly supported the laws, which, qualitatively, invalidated
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the petitioners' petitions calling for the repeal of the two laws. The select committee report was
based on authoritarianism considering misinformation, disinformation, and paternalism.
My main claim that Americans relied on republicanism as a means to express their
republican values after Ratification is partially supported because the petitioners were moderately
able to affect the federal government through the actions of Gallatin and others who consumed a
great deal of time and energy on the House floor to introduce and defend their constituents'
petitions to repeal the Alien and Sedition laws. However, the majority party controlled the
discussion and decided to defend the laws over the people and their right to petition and
peripheralize the House of Representatives. In fact, the members of the majority aligned
themselves much more closely with values of authoritarianism than republicanism according to
the archival records. Still, Gallatin and others vehemently defended republican values and called
for the sole practice of republicanism to maintain inviolate the Constitution and the values of the
Revolution. For that reason, I conclude that the political exhibitions of authoritarianism and
republicanism in the House debate regarding the Alien and Sedition laws produced a study of
multiple traditions.
Gallatin's portrayal of the petitioners and their beliefs provides support for why historians
have named the election of 1800 and Thomas Jefferson's success as the Revolution of 1800. When
"republicans" lost the ability to peripheralize the federal government in order to repeal two laws
that they deemed impolitic and unconstitutional according to thousands of petitions, the people
likely felt that they had lost control of the federal government and sought to regain control through
the election of 1800. What remains to be seen in this dissertation is whether Instruction continued
during the decades after Ratification by means of Resolutions of Instruction insofar as Senators
did, or did not, support the peripheralizing function stemming from the republican tradition when
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given an ROI from their state legislature. If ROI were as ineffective as the petitions to repeal the
Alien and Sedition laws, then support for Riker's determination that state legislatures lost the
ability to peripheralize the federal government because of the Constitution will be borne out.
However, if republicanism was a shared value-system across the nation as historians contend, then
the archival record regarding ROI according to the Senate Journal will establish that the state
legislatures continued to peripheralize the Senate during the decades after Ratification.
In the next chapter, if Resolutions of Instruction sent from state legislatures to the United
States Senate from 1789 through 1819 are found to be ineffectual, then more weight may be given
to the political scientists' general argument that, after Ratification, republicanism was pretty much
dead. On the other hand, if ROI is found to be an excellent example of the peripheralizing function
being exhibited in the Senate because of the state legislatures, then political scientists must
reevaluate their understanding of American republicanism and concern themselves with
republicanism though additional studies, potentially with a focus to reconsider Multiple Traditions.
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CHAPTER 6: U.S. SENATE TREATMENT OF RESOLUTIONS OF INSTRUCTION,
1789-1819
Introduction
During the Founding, there was a gritty debate by supporters of the republican tradition
regarding the subject of Instruction and whether the legitimate power state legislatures possessed
would allow them to instruct U.S. Senators to follow a binding or non-binding Resolution of
Instruction (ROI). Although James Madison and others tenaciously kept the practice of Instruction
excluded from the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights so that it was not constitutionally binding
(Chapter Four), he also embraced the practice as a legitimate pathway to openly oppose the Alien
and Sedition laws a dozen years after Ratification (Chapter Five). As we shall see in this chapter,
James Madison as President of the United States indeed presented the Senate with ROI! The more
we follow James Madison and others during the Founders' generation, the more we tend to find
support for the idea that instructions were a familiar means to participate in politics, and that
republican values continue to influence American politics after Ratification.
Republicanism is fundamentally a practice of self-government on the people’s terms
(Smith 1993, 1997; Pettit, 2012). Perhaps the most common form of self-government in early
American politics came through the practice of Instruction during the Founders' generation
(Chapter Four). This was a process of peripheralizing the federal government (Riker, 1955)
because power stemmed from the local / state governments and affected the federal government.
After Ratification, state legislatures would pass an ROI, which might have originated at the local
level, such as a county convention (Chapter Three), and then pass on the ROI to their U.S. Senators
who would, sometimes, introduce the ROI on the floor of the Senate. This seems to be a
continuation of the practice of Instruction prior to Ratification.
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I purport that Instruction was a customary republican practice that continued long after
Ratification because the people and their representatives expressed republicanism openly
throughout the Founding period and the republican practice of Instruction was a reflection of their
core values. The Constitution of 1787 gave state governments two functions that many in the
Founders' generation believed to be necessary for the proper functioning of the General
Government. They were expected to 1) articulate their states’ interests in Congress and 2) defend
the liberties of their citizens from usurpations by the General Government. The purpose was to
keep power in the hands of the people so that the people could contest and foster change in the
laws as necessary over time in order to help facilitate and maintain a common good based on
popular sovereignty.
Instruction was important to the constitutional understanding of federal-state relations on
republican grounds. ROI were an institutional bulwark of republicanism which, to the Founders'
generation, meant a shared commitment to individual liberty, just procedures, and broad-based
political participation (Greenberg, 1977; Bailyn, 1992; Wood, 2011). First, to their way of
thinking, a "good republican" does not just have a right to petition the government, but a moral
obligation to act. Even though one might expect a singular individual to be ignored by the federal
government, the representatives at the national level have a duty to provide an answer for the
people who are continually contesting the same laws, and the legislatures provide transparency in
a spirit of impartiality, transparency, and contestability (Pettit, 2012). By sending an ROI, which I
assume was important enough to have been passed by a majority of a state legislature, it must also
have been meaningful at the national level because of the vast increase of ROI after President
Jackson (Table 3.1). Therefore, ROI were sent to senators as a means by which state legislatures,
hamstrung by challenges presented by timing and distance, ensured that their petitions were placed
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before Congress (Girdwood & Grynaviski, 2014). As Congress acted, if ROI were treated quite
seriously by the Senate, then it should be possible to examine archival records in order to ascertain
whether ROI performed a peripheralizing function that caused action by the federal government
due to activities from state legislatures.
Second, during the first decades of the new republic's existence, the civil list at virtually all
levels of government was vanishingly small and the opportunities for the kinds of communications
between federal and state agencies that are common today to coordinate inter-governmental
relationships was, for all practical purposes, non-existent (Girdwood & Grynaviski, 2014).
Furthermore, Congress was in session only infrequently, most state legislatures were in session
even less often and not necessarily at the same time as Congress, and the actors in those legislative
bodies were often the ones making the kinds of decisions made by government agencies today.
That was problematic because there were both matters of particular local concern that required
federal action (e.g., addressing an overseas tariff on an important state export) and of national
concern that required local input (e.g., the location of a federal post road) that demanded intergovernmental coordination. Thus, Americans were "republicans" as a means for attending to their
political business in their Republic (Girdwood & Grynaviski, 2014).
Many scholars make claims that republicanism was unimportant after Ratification.
Documentation that state legislatures remained a powerful part of the republican tradition after
Ratification is desperately needed. I believe that a key problem has been in our understanding for
how instructions were exhibitions of customary institutional practices that Americans utilized as
expressions of republican values. This engagement could therefore be a cause of significant change
regarding the federal government's policy choices after Ratification, qualitatively and
quantitatively. Instruction could show these exhibitions of the peripheralization of the federal
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government, but without such available evidence, in the words of Gordon Wood, "by 1787,
Lockean liberalism [came to] overshadow republican sentiment" (Dunn, 2004, p. 158). Going a
step further, John Diggins in, "Republicanism and Progressivism," asserts, "republicanism never
took hold in America even though it had a persistent allure as an unexercised and probably
unexercisable option well into the twentieth century," citing Theodore Roosevelt, Croly, Wilson,
Beard, and Dewey (Appleby 1985, p. 472). Indeed, political scientists have echoed this assertion,
for example, Kalyvas and Katznelson unambiguously state (2008, pp. 4-5):
…liberalism as we know it was born from the spirit of republicanism, from attempts to
adopt republicanism to the political, economic, and social revolutions of the eighteenth
century and the first decades of the nineteenth… Republican discourse, concepts, and
motivations were adopted… the core of which was surprisingly liberal… The amendments
and synergies produced constitutional liberalism…political liberalism burst from the shell
of a republican chrysalis. The more republicanism sought to retrofit itself for modern
conditions, the more liberal it became…. As a freestanding model, republicanism
disappeared.
However, taken with an open mind, it is hard to square the former claims that republicanism
disappeared after Ratification because we have evidence that ROI from state legislatures were
increasingly prevalent, at the very least, during the antebellum era (Girdwood & Grynaviski,
2014).
The purpose of this chapter is to substantiate whether senators sincerely participated in the
Instruction practice with respect to the ROI being sent to them from their state legislature. If the
ROI were sentimental artifacts that meant little as a matter of policy action at the federal level,
then political scientists need lose little sleep about a dreamy mountaintop and a worn-out soldier
atop a heap of useless trash. But, bearing in mind the historians' and legal scholars' observations
about republicanism during the antebellum era and beyond, I believe that Instruction through the
exhibitions of ROI exhibited an important aspect of the republican element of the culture. ROI
were legislated political documents regarding an incoming of Senate business. If senators
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increasingly introduced ROI during the decades after Ratification, that runs counter to the claim
that republicanism had outlived its utility as a value system.
To verify that ROI from state legislatures were substantively important to American
politics as a practice of self-government, I hypothesize:
1. Instructions increased quantitatively over three decades after Ratification.
2. Instructions were increasingly sent to committee and passed over three decades after
Ratification.
3. The presenter of the instruction changed over time, on average, from the president to
senators. This happened because senators found messages from state legislatures to be
more important over time.
4. The nature of the communication by resolutions changed over time from a description of
what states were doing in territories and in need of lighthouses to much more serious
actions being required of Senators in that they were instructed to amend the Constitution.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I provide a narrative of ROI to illuminate
the record of Instruction from 1789 through 1819. Because there were numerous ROI, I separate
them into three time-periods according to decade: 1789-1799, 1800-1809, and 1810-1819.
Afterwards, I provide an analysis of the results regarding the actions the Senate took on each ROI
in order to test the hypotheses. To help explain if senators treated a ROI seriously or with scorn, I
focus on the actions the Senate took with respect to each ROI (i.e., read, lie for consideration, sent
to committee, passed). I also evaluate when ROI were most to least common per year over a period
of thirty years. Then, I discuss whether ROI from state legislatures were important or unimportant
to American politics at the federal level during the Founders' generation. Finally, I conclude the
chapter.

163
Sample of Data: Senate Journal, Resolutions of Instruction
I provide a sample of the archival records regarding the ROI submitted by state legislatures
to the Senate from 1789 to 1819 that were recorded in the Senate Journal. I collected the data by
visiting online links provided to me by my Chair, Jeff Grynaviski. I retrieved each entry online
from the Library of Congress and copied the information into Excel, including the treatment of
each ROI. I separate the archival records into three time-periods in order to ascertain if there are
qualitative differences of ROI between the decades of: 1789-1799, 1800-1809, 1810-1819. I
denote how the Senate treated each resolution in order to observe whether the Senate increasingly
treated ROI with sincerity or scorn. Separating the records by decade should clarify whether ROI
was increasingly important as a practice of self-government. I am interested in how the Senate
treated ROI to ascertain whether political scientists are correct to assert that republicanism mostly
died with the passage of the Constitution, or if the historians' findings of a permeating and
dominating republicanism through the antebellum era (Chapter Three) is a more accurate depiction
of America's past political experience as a nation.
I relate the treatment of the ROIs as recorded by the Senate Journal. At the time, lie on the
table was translatable to having been brought into the Chamber for review and available for a
Senator to call on for debate. Lie for consideration means that the debate on the ROI was open or
could soon open. Referred means that a committee or department received the ROI for review and
the receivers could provide a recommendation to the whole Senate at a later time. Passed,
approved, or printed for the use of the Senate means that the Chamber passed / incorporated the
ROI. During instances where nothing was noted, I assume that the ROI was read since it was
recorded in the Journal. The exhibitions of treatment instances will test these assumptions.
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Decade One, 1789-1799
A majority of resolutions during this period were ordered to lie for consideration or to lie
on the table (63 percent). First, on September 21, 1789, Mr. Morris presented a ROI on behalf of
the Senators from Pennsylvania to relay a resolve by the General Assembly from March 5 th to
make "a respectful offer to Congress of the use of any or all the public buildings in Philadelphia"
in case Congress "should, at any time, incline to make choice of that city for the temporary
residence of the federal government," which was read and ordered to lie for consideration. Next,
on February 1, 1790, Mr. Johnston and Mr. Hawkins laid before the Senate an act of the legislature
of North Carolina, entitled, "An act for the purpose of ceding to the United States of America,
certain western lands thereto described" which was read and ordered to lie for consideration. Then,
on January 13, 1791, several resolutions and a memorial from the Legislature of the
Commonwealth of Virginia called on Congress to create "An act making provision for the debt of
the United States," communicated to the Senate by Mr. Monroe, which was read and ordered to lie
on the table. Following, on January 17, 1791, two resolutions from the Legislature of Virginia and
a petition of sundry officers and assignees of officers and soldiers from Virginia in regards to
bounty lands allotted to them on the northwest side of the Ohio, as well as an act by the Legislature
of Maryland to empower the wardens of the Port of Baltimore to levy and collect duty was offered.
They were ordered to lie for consideration.
Other ROI in the 1790s were recorded as having been submitted by President George
Washington and these were often ordered in the Senate to lie for consideration. On October 25,
1791, the President of the United States, "lay before you copies of the following acts, which have
been transmitted to me during the recess of Congress," including an act passed by the New
Hampshire Legislature "for ceding to the United States the fort and light-house belonging to the

165
said state; An act of the Legislature of Pennsylvania, ratifying, on behalf of said state, the first
article of amendment to the constitution of the United States, as proposed by Congress; and, An
act of the Legislature of North Carolina, granting the use of the jails within that state to the United
States." Following, on October 26, 1791, President Washington relayed a message authorizing the
United States the right and jurisdiction over an acre of land on Occacok Island and ten acres on
the Cape Island "for the purpose of erecting light-houses…. shall be built before the first day of
January, 1801, and that on the Cape Island, before the eighth day of October, 1800. And I have
caused these several papers to be deposited in the office of the Secretary of State. A statement of
the returns of the enumeration of the inhabitants of the United States, which have been received,
will at this time be laid before you." Regarding this last instance, the President seems to be
including Congress in a manner to suggest that the light-houses was finished business.
Next, on January 23, 1792, President Washington stated that he received from the Governor
of Virginia a letter, enclosing a resolution of the General Assembly of that state, and a report of a
committee of the House of Delegates, "respecting certain lands located by the officers and soldiers
of the Virginia line, under the laws of that state, and since ceded to the Chickasaw Indians, I lay
copies of the same before you, together with a report of the Secretary of State on this subject." The
message, and papers therein referred to, were read and ordered to lie for consideration. This is one
of many examples herein regarding the use of Instruction for implementing westward expansion.
President George Washington continued to bring in resolutions from State legislatures and
governors to Congress during his second term, and the Senate continues to order that they lie on
the table or for consideration. On February 26, 1793, he did lay an act of the legislature of New
York, "ceding to the United States the Jurisdiction of certain Incas on Montuk Point," which was
ordered to lie on the table. On May 11, 1794, he provided a letter from the Governor of Rhode
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Island, "enclosing an act of the legislature of that state, impowering [sic] the United States to hold
lands within the same for the purpose of erecting fortifications, and certain papers concerning
patents for the donation lands to the ancient settlers of Vincennes upon the Wabash," which was
ordered to lie for consideration. On February 16, 1795, he provided a letter from the North Carolina
Governor and of an act of the legislature thereof, ceding, "to the United States certain lands, upon
the conditions therein mentioned," and no action by the Senate is mentioned. Finally, on February
16, 1795, President Washington provided two acts of the legislature of Georgia:
one passed on the 28th day of December, and the other on the 7th day of January last, for
appropriating and selling the Indian lands within the territorial limits claimed by that state.
These copies, though not officially certified, have been transmitted to me in such a manner
as to leave no room to doubt their authenticity. These acts embrace an object of such
magnitude, and in their consequences may so deeply affect the peace and welfare of the
United States, that I have thought it necessary now to lay them before Congress. In
confidence, I also forward copies of several documents and papers received from the
governor of the southwestern territory. By these, it seems that hostilities with the Cherokees
have ceased, and that there is a pleasing prospect of a permanent peace with that nation.
But, from all the communications of the governor, it appears that the Creeks, in small
parties, continue their depredations, and it is uncertain to what they may finally lead. The
several papers now communicated deserve the immediate attention of Congress, who will
consider how far the subjects of them may require their co-operation.
President Washington’s messages "were severally read. Ordered, That they lie for consideration."
Of the twenty-two entries between 1789 and 1799, six entries did not lie on the table or for
consideration as they were either sent to a committee or passed / incorporated. First, on February
09, 1791, there were "authentic documents" from the Legislatures of New York and of the territory
of Vermont and others individuals calling on Congress to admit a territory of New York as the
State of Vermont. The bill was read a third time, resolved, and then the bill did pass. Second, on
March 26, 1792, Mr. Cabot presented a resolution from the Massachusetts Legislature on "the
petition of Charles Knowles and others, late regimental paymasters and agents of that state's quota
of the continental army," which "was read. Ordered, That it be referred to the Secretary of War, to
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consider and report thereon to the Senate." Third, on March 09, 1794, the Vice President laid
before the Senate a letter from his Excellency Josiah Bartlett, Governor of New Hampshire,
enclosing the remonstrance of the legislature against the determination of the circuit court, which
were read and, on motion, "Ordered, That they be committed to Messrs. Livermore, King, and
Langdon, to consider and report thereon to the Senate." Fourth, on February 26, 1795, Mr. Jackson
provided two acts from Georgia in regards to "appropriating a part of the unlocated [sic] territory
of the state for payment of the late state troops" which declared, "the right of the state to the
unappropriated territory thereof for the protection and support of the frontiers of the state" and the
two acts were, "Resolved, That this bill pass with the amendments." Fifth, on February 12, 1797,
Mr. Cocke laid before the Senate the address and remonstrance of the Tennessee Legislature,
"requesting the interposition of Congress for the extinguishment of the Indian titles to certain
lands," which was "read. Ordered, That it be referred to the committee appointed the 31st of
January last, on the letter and inclosures [sic] from the Governor of North Carolina, to consider
and report thereon to the Senate." Finally, on January 30, 1798, the Vice President laid before the
Senate a resolution from the Delaware Legislature to say they, "appointed the Honorable Joshua
Clayton a Senator of the United States, in the place of the Honorable John Vining, resigned" and
the resolution was "read. Ordered, That it lie on file."
Decade Two: 1800-1809
During this time period, the most common reaction to a resolution in the Senate Journal
was for it to be read (in eight of twenty-five entries). Examples of these resolutions include, "an
address and remonstrance of the legislature of the state of Georgia, stating certain grievances
resulting from the operations of the law" (December 30, 1800); "Congress to use their utmost
exertions to obtain an amendment to the constitution of the United States to prevent the further
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importation of slaves" (April 6, 1806); "requesting their Senators and Representatives in Congress
to use their exertions to obtain a grant of land between the Sciota and the Little Miami… for the
use of schools, within the Virginia military district…", "to procure the passage of a law prohibiting
the importation of slaves into the United States, or any of the territories thereof, so soon as the
constitution will admit of the same" (January 14, 1807); and, there were sundry resolutions of the
Legislative Council and House of Representatives of the Mississippi territory, stating that they
respect the Constitution, "and have the utmost confidence in the wisdom and virtue of the chief
magistrate: and that every project of the ambitious and enterprising to dissever the Union, and to
usurp the prerogative of government, will always excite their honest indignation" (February 23,
1807). These cases relay the sentiments of the people, in general, including a need to call for a
constitutional amendment to end the importation of slaves.
There were four instances of resolutions laid on the table. There was a letter communicated
by the Vice President to the Senate from Governor St. Clair of the Northwest Territory, "instructing
William H. Harrison, their delegate in Congress, to apply for an act of Congress to authorize the
President of the United States to grant to the said legislature, in trust, certain lots reserved for
public use in the grant to John C. Symmes…" and others (January 19, 1800). There was a letter
from the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mr. Logan, from Pennsylvania, "enclosing a
resolution of that House, on the subject of an uniform standard of weights and measures" (February
27, 1804). There was a resolution that Senators in Congress are instructed to obtain an amendment
to the Constitution of the United States respecting the judiciary (January 21, 1806). And, Mr. Reed
communicated a resolution from Maryland’s legislature that disapproved of the alteration proposed
to the Constitution of the United States by Virginians, "to render the Senators in Congress of the
United States removable from office by the vote of a majority of the whole number of the members
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of the respective State legislatures by which the said Senators have been or may be appointed"
(January 03, 1809). These cases seem to ask for immense action that Senators might find very
difficult to accomplish on the spot, such as the amending of the Constitution or a provision for the
State to be able to remove a Senator.
There were four entries of resolutions laid for consideration. In one entry, there were two
resolutions by the legislature of Virginia (January 15, 1807). In another, the President
communicated certain resolutions from the legislative council and house of representatives for the
Indiana territory concerning the suspension of the sixth article of compact between the United
States and the Northwest Territory, passed the 13th July, 1787 (January 20, 1807). The President
communicated a resolution and memorial from the House of Representatives of the Mississippi
Territory, "praying an extension of the time for payment of the first installment for the purchase
of lands" due January, 1809, and, "praying that a bill under consideration in the House of
Representatives at their last session, for establishing a federal court in that district, should not pass
into a law" (November 6, 1808). Finally, the President communicated resolutions from the
legislative council of the Indiana Territory, "respecting the mode of electing the legislative council,
and the time of their continuance in office" (November 20, 1808). It is unclear, but likely, that
these resolutions were presented to the Senate by the President of the United States, Thomas
Jefferson, since in the last decade the resolutions for consideration were presented by President
Washington and his name is in all caps at the end of the resolution, while no name is given in the
Senate Journal regarding who is the President in these resolutions. Either the President of the
Senate, who is also the Vice President of the United States, or the President of the United States
would have presented these ROI. Either way, ROI was a practice to formally advance
intergovernmental coordination.
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There were two occurrences of ROI ordered to lie on file during the second decade. First,
on November 9, 1803, Mr. Bradley stated that the Vermont Legislature had passed a "resolution
that it is highly important that an alteration should take place in the second article of the
constitution of the United States which prescribes the mode of choosing a President and Vice
President." Second, on Nov 10, 1803, Mr. Worthington stated that Ohio had passed a "resolution
that the Senators and Representative of that state in Congress be requested and instructed to
endeavor to obtain an amendment to the first section of the second article of the constitution of the
United States which shall authorize the electors of each state to designate on their ballots the person
voted for as President, and the person voted for as Vice President of the United States."
There were two instances that the resolutions were ordered that they be printed for the use
of the Senate. On January 16, 1804, Mr. Franklin presented a petition from Thomas Dillon,
addressed to the North Carolina legislature, with a resolution from that legislature, stating that Mr.
Dillon is the holder of a grant for lands in Tennessee, "guaranteed by the United States, but that he
is prevented by the laws of the United States from obtaining possession of those lands, as being
within the present acknowledged Indian territories, and praying the state of North Carolina to
interpose for his relief." And, on December 29, 1808, Mr. Turner presented the ROI from the North
Carolina Legislature, "expressing their sentiments on the present situation of our foreign relations,
and approbatory of the measures of government."
There were three clear instances of resolutions being referred to a committee in order for a
report to be made by the committee to the Senate during 1808 and 1809. On November 14, 1808,
the President communicated ROI passed by the House of Representatives from the Indiana
territory which stated, "the discontents prevailing among the people west of the Wabash, in
consequence of their connection with the people eastward of the said river, and requesting a
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separation as the only means of restoring harmony and terminating those discontents so essential
to their general prosperity," and it is referred to Messrs. Pope, Tiffin, and Bradley, to consider and
report thereon. On December 29, 1808, it is clearly noted that President Thomas Jefferson
presented a letter from Governor Claiborne regarding a small tribe of Alabama Indians, on the
western side of the Mississippi, consisting of about a dozen families and:
Like other erratic tribes in that country, it is understood that they have hitherto moved from
place to place, according to their convenience, without appropriating to themselves
exclusively any particular territory. But having now become habituated to some of the
occupations of civilized life, they wish for a fixed residence. I suppose it will be the interest
of the United States to encourage the wandering tribes of that country to reduce themselves
to fixed habitations whenever they are so disposed. The establishment of towns and
growing attachments to them, will furnish, in some degree, pledges of their peaceable and
friendly conduct. The case of this particular tribe is now submitted to the consideration of
Congress.
The former resolution was referred to Messrs, Mitchill, Milledge, and Crawford, to consider and
report thereon. Finally, on May 25, 1809, Mr. Pope presented a resolution from the General
Assembly of Kentucky, "expressive of their opinion that strong garrisons at Michilimackinac, St.
Louis, and near the mouth of the Ohio, would be of great public utility, and particularly aid in the
protection of the frontiers… on so much of the message of the President of the United States…" a
need to defend "our seaport towns and harbors." The committee members who received the ROI
were not expressly noted.
There were two instances of ROI that are complex and given great attention. First, on
November 24, 1808, Mr. Pickering stated that he and Mr. Lloyd had received ROI from the
Massachusetts Legislature, "to use their most strenuous exertions to procure an immediate repeal
of the various laws imposing an embargo on the ships and vessels of the United States" and it was
asked, on motion, if the Senate should receive and read these instructions and it passed in the
affirmative. A motion was made, by Mr. Anderson, to reconsider the question. On motion by Mr.
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Giles, it was "agreed that the motion for reconsideration be postponed to Monday next." This ROI
example was dynamic on the Senate floor.
Second, on May 6, 1809, "The President laid before the Senate a communication from
Governor Huntingdon, enclosing a ROI passed by the General Assembly of the state of Ohio,
approving the measures of the general government" which was read. Then, "after the consideration
of the Executive business," on motion, it was ordered that Messrs, Bayard, and Reed to be a
committee, "to wait upon the President of the United States, and notify him that, unless he may
have any further communications to make to them, the Senate are ready to adjourn." If followed
that, "Mr. Bayard reported, from the committee, that they had waited upon the President of the
United States, who informed them that he had no further communications to make to them.
Whereupon, The Senate adjourned without delay." Thus, more than intergovernmental
coordination, this example suggests that Instruction was a political process for governing.
Decade Three: 1810-1819
The number of recorded ROI almost tripled during this decade compared to the last, with
sixty-nine entries being recorded in the Senate Journal. Of these, thirty-eight were simply read,
sixteen were sent to a committee for a report, three were printed for the use of the Senate, two were
postponed, two were recorded to lie on the table, one was ordered to lie for consideration, and one
was sent to the House for concurrence. I produce the content of the former examples, and for
practical purposes, I chronologically account for the read resolutions by a sample of every 5 th entry
(5, 10…35). In regards to the committee observances, I sample every 3 rd ROI (3, 6…15). Finally,
I complete this section by relating two specific resolutions from February 6, 1817, and March 3,
1818 which, like the Huntingdon ROI at the end of the last section, provides evidence that
Instruction through ROI was peripheralizing the federal government.
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The ROI that were read only, in general, declare sentiments that cannot be made into a law,
instances that require intergovernmental coordination, or express opinions about a constitutional
amendment which requires a great deal of collaboration in the lawmaking process. This is exactly
the types of ROI that were only read during the first decade, too. First, dated December 9, 1810,
Mr. Leib presented ROI from the Pennsylvania Legislature, "approving the measures pursued by
the administration of the United States, on our foreign relations." Second, on December 30, 1811,
Mr. Franklin presented the ROI from the North Carolina General Assembly approving the
sentiments in a message by the President of the United States to Congress at the opening of the
present session and, "resolving, unanimously, that they will cheerfully co-operate with the general
government in the prompt and effectual execution of such measures as may be deemed best
calculated to promote the interest and secure the union, liberty, and independence, of the United
States." Third, on March 2, 1812, Mr. Pope communicated a ROI from the Kentucky Legislature,
"recommending an improvement of the militia system of the United States; also, a resolution
requesting their Senators and Representatives in Congress to endeavor to procure the establishment
of certain roads or highways therein mentioned, under the authority of the general government."
Fourth, on February 13, 1814, President James Madison communicated a protest from the Indiana
territory Legislative Council, "against the power which the present governor has assumed to divide
the territory into council district, without being thereto authorized by law." Fifth, on March 1,
1815, Mr. Varnum submitted for consideration, "a resolution of the Legislature of the
commonwealth of Massachusetts, containing the same request, and embracing the same objects,
of the resolution of the Legislature of the State of Connecticut, submitted on the 28th ultimo."
Sixth, on February 26, 1816, Mr. Varnum laid before the Senate instructions from the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts to their Senators in Congress, "to endeavour [sic] to obtain an

174
amendment to the Constitution of the United States" that would create "a number of districts equal
to the number of Representatives to which such State may be entitled" (and within the resolution
recording it is mentioned that a related Senate bill did pass a second reading). Finally, on January
2, 1817, Mr. Varnum communicated ROI from the Massachusetts Legislature for, "the
appointment of agents to present the claims of that commonwealth against the United States for
allowance, with instructions to their Senators to afford the said agents all the aid in their power for
the accomplishments of the object of their appointment…" This final entry is particularly
interesting in that Massachusetts seeks to make a point that they are able to present claims against
the United States.
The ROI sent to committee during this decade usually dealt with land issues or rights,
including a Right of Nobility. Someone obviously did associate with aristocracy! Examples
include: The President communicated a letter from the Governor of Ohio and a resolution of that
legislature the approbation for an, "amendment to the constitution of the United States respecting
titles of nobility," which was sent to the Secretary for the Department of State (February 10, 1811).
Mr. Fromentin presented resolutions from the Louisiana Legislature, "instructing their Senators in
Congress on the subject of indemnification for the disbursements of certain individuals in taking
possession of a part of that state in the year 1810," which was referred to a select committee of Mr.
Messrs, Mr. Fromentin, Mr. Bledsoe, and Mr. Brown to consider and report thereon by bill or
otherwise (March 3, 1814). Mr. Lacock communicated a resolution from the Pennsylvania
Legislature instructing the Senators, "to use their endeavours [sic] to procure the passage of a law,
dividing the State of Pennsylvania into two districts, and establishing a district and circuit court of
the United States, at Pittsburg, in the county of Alleghany," which was ordered to go to a select
committee consisting of Mr. Lacock, Mr. Roberts, and Mr. Chace. The President communicated a
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memorial of the legislature from the Mississippi territory, "praying for the appointment of an
additional judge east of Pearl river," which was referred to the committee on the Judiciary to
consider and report thereon by bill or otherwise (January 19, 1817). And, Mr. Williams, from
Mississippi, offered ROI by the Mississippi Legislature, "on the subject of the eastern limits of
that state," which were "referred to the committee to whom was referred on the 16th of December,
1817, the memorial of the Mississippi Convention, on the same subject, to consider and report
thereon, by bill or otherwise" (February 11, 1818).
There were three ROI printed for the use of the Senate and each entailed a message
regarding the War of 1812. Mr. Smith, of New York, presented the memorial of Samuel Adams
and other merchants from the city of New York, "deprecating the calamities of war, preferring the
continuance of the embargo and restrictive system, to that greatest of all evils" (June 8, 1812). Mr.
Lloyd presented a resolution from the Massachusetts he House of Representatives stating, "that an
offensive war against Great Britain, under the present circumstances of this country, would be, in
the highest degree, impolitic, unnecessary, and ruinous" (June 11, 1812). And, the President
communicated a resolution from the Mississippi Territory, "tendering to the general government
their undivided support in repelling the aggressions and unjust demands of the enemy, and
preferring a sacrifice of their lives and fortunes, to the surrender of our rights or national dignity"
(June 20, 1815).
There were instances to suggest that ROI initiated and caused the process of constitutional
change. First, on December 22, 1817, Mr. Dickerson expressed an "obedience to instructions
received from the legislature of New Jersey" and proposed, "an amendment to the constitution of
the United States, as it respects the election of representatives in Congress, and the appointment
of electors of President and Vice President of the United States," and the resolution was read and
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did, "pass to the second reading." On November 24, 1818, Mr. Storer offered ROI from the New
Hampshire Legislature stating a bill for how "each state shall, by its legislature, be divided into a
number of districts equal to the number of representatives to which such state may be entitled," as
well as the requirements for appointing electors for the President and Vice President of the United
States, which was "sent down for concurrence." And, on December 6, 1818, the full bill came
through as Mr. Daggett communicated resolutions from the Connecticut Legislature in regards to,
"choosing representatives in the Congress of the United States," in that, "each state shall, by its
legislature, be divided into a number of districts equal to the number of representatives to which
such state may be entitled." In effect, the resolutions were a back and forth between the Senate and
the state legislatures and the House of Representatives in order to cause constitutional change.
Qualitatively, this example supports the idea that the practice of Instruction through ROI
influenced the Senate.
Analysis
I assess whether archival records from the Senate Journal regarding ROI from state
legislatures exhibited a form of self-government on republican grounds in the U.S. Senate.
Qualitatively, ROI were observed increasingly as a practice after Ratification because senators and
presidents, including James Madison, introduced ROI on the floor of the Senate. In general, the
content of ROI explains, in part, how local matters were resolved by the federal government as
well as how the state legislatures addressed national issues, including the passage of the 12th
Amendment of the Constitution. Quantitatively, the evidence supports my claim that the Founders’
generation openly relied on "republican" values supportive of self-government because the
doctrine of Instruction increasingly materialized as a practice after Ratification. Further, ROI
appear to be at least partially responsible for the need to create a Committee System during the
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1810s. State legislatures increasingly passed ROI for the federal representatives who, statistically,
increasingly introduced them on the Senate floor. Since the Senate increasingly sent ROI to a
committee or passed them from 1810 through 1819 comparatively with the previous two decades,
this highly suggests that Instruction through ROI allowed the state legislatures during the
Founders’ generation to influence the U.S. Senate.
Qualitatively, I separated the archival data into three time-periods, by decade, in order to
consider if there were breakdowns or breakthroughs regarding republicanism as an open practice
and core value. I find that the ways by which ROI were simply read, to lie, sent to committee, and
passed were increasingly to simply read them or to cause the Senate to send them to committee or
to pass them from 1789 through 1819. Presidents and senators successfully engaged in the practice
of Instruction by honoring all but one ROI from state legislatures through the introduction of them
into the U.S. Senate. The exhibitions of ROI therefore support the idea that republicanism was an
influential political practice at the national level and not treated with scorn.
The closest thing to a smoking gun in support of the inference that there was an emerging
norm for senators to believe that ROI were important enough to present them on the Senate floor
is the apparent rejection by that chamber near the close of the 14th Congress of a motion by Senator
Wilson of New Jersey that read, "Resolved, That the Senate deem it inexpedient that instructions
from a State legislature to the Senators from such State, should be received and filed in the Senate."
Mr. Wilson very likely made the motion due to a ROI from Ohio that asserted a right of the State
Legislature to be able to dictate the salary of the senators, regardless, the resolution to control
salaries in the U.S. Senate was circumvented when, on motion by Mr. Daggett, and ordered, "That
the committee appointed to inquire into the expediency of repealing or modifying the law entitled,
‘An act to change the mode of compensation to the members of the Senate and House of
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Representatives, and delegates from Territories,’ be discharged from further consideration." It is
only conjecture that there may be a connection, but the 14 th Congress also happens to have made
big steps toward the institutionalization of the committee system by adopting the Senate’s first
standing committees in December, 1816 (Girdwood & Grynaviski, 2014). The fact that only one
resolution of one hundred and sixteen was discharged and that all other ROI were increasingly sent
to a committee or passed after that particular ROI was discharged provides evidence to support the
hypothesis that Instruction was increasingly taken seriously by the senators.
Even though one might be tempted to claim that there is an ordered preference of outcomes,
whereas an ROI that becomes a bill and passed by the Senate is "better" than a bill sent to
committee, and a bill sent to committee is better than a bill open for debate, and a bill open for
debate is better than one simply read; however, the sample of evidence suggests that such an
ordering of the former preferences might not always ring true because sometimes a ROI simply
"read" appears to have been valid on the spot. For example, a ROI presented by presidents George
Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison were mostly read or ordered to lie for
consideration. The treatment of their ROI as well as their continuance across presidential terms,
suggests that ROI were read as a formality to integrate the ROI by the Senate into their business.
None of those resolutions moved beyond that stage according to the Journal, yet the practice
increases over time and the presidents keep coming back, so why would the practice increase if
the ROI weren’t meaningful to the presidents? The closest thing to a smoking gun to prove this
theory happened when the Senate waited on the President before adjourning in order to potentially
receive additional ROI from the President to, by my reading, read it. Therefore, ROI may have
been "active on arrival" once read in the Senate for certain ROI as part of a federal agenda that
abided by the “republican” tradition of self-government. This means that Instruction through the
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passage of ROI was quite likely a profound peripheralization of the U.S. Senate, rather than the
conventional wisdom in that only accounting for ROI (or Bills) being “passed” by the Senate could
be an exhibition of an influential ROI regarding the peripheralizing function.
Quantitatively, I use standard scientific methods to assess the sample of ROI data (n. 116).
In order to test whether resolutions increased over time, which would support the idea that ROI
from state legislatures influenced the federal representatives, I analyze the amount of ROI per year
from 1789 through 1819. To remove statistical bias regarding the data, given the increase of states
over the years that were added to the Union and able to pass a ROI (which would skew a simple
test in favor of the later years), I divide the number of resolutions passed per year by the number
of states in the union during the same year (Table 6.1). The results suggest that ROI increased over
time after Ratification as a practice in the Senate. This is important because an increase of ROI to
the Senate during the first thirty years of governance supports my claims that Americans practiced
republicanism openly and took it as a core value. As these claims are supported, there becomes
reason to avow that republicanism continued as a political value system after Ratification (Chapter
Three). Accordingly, the "top five" years of ROI impact, according to the Senate Journal, occurred
during the third decade. There were no recorded entries for 1799, 1801, 1802, and 1805.
Table 6.1 supports the hypothesis that instructions increasingly appeared in the Journal
over the decades. To simplify the results, Table 6.2 organizes, by decade, the high number of
entries (11 entries), middle number of entries (10 entries), and low number of entries (10 entries)
from Table 6.1. The results show that the third decade by far outnumbered the previous two
decades regarding the high number of instances of ROI being introduced in the Senate. The second
decade outnumbered the other decades regarding the middle number of ROI entries being
introduced in the Senate. The first decade outnumbered the other decades regarding the low
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number of ROI being introduced in the Senate (Table 6.2). These two tables support the hypothesis
that, according to simple statistics, ROI became increasingly important over three decades.
Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 demonstrates that ROI became more important over the years,
which begs the question, how did the Senate deal with this increase of ROI? In the Senate Journal,
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the most common attention to give each resolution was to read it, and sometimes, afterwards, there
was a remark to specifically order the ROI to: Lie on the table, lie for consideration, lie on file,
committed / referred to a select number of senators to consider and report thereon to the Senate,
referred to the Judiciary Committee, transmitted to the office of the Secretary for the Department
of State, be printed for the use of the Senate, resolved that the bill pass with amendments, pass on
a second reading, and sent down for concurrence. Overall, these actions taken by the Senate
regarding ROI highly suggests that ROI influenced senators and their agenda.
To understand how the Senate positively treated ROI, I collapse the Senate’s treatment of
ROI into four categories: (1) Read, (2) Open for Debate, (3) Sent to Committee, or (4) Pass. I
coded all ROI (1) as “Read” if “read” was noted in the Journal without any other treatment being
noted, or there was no treatment whatsoever (not even read) because it was noted in the Journal
and therefore read (though not noted). I coded all ROI (2) as “Open for Debate” if the Journal
noted that the ROI was to lie on the table or lie for consideration. Each of the former orders
provided senators with an opportunity to begin to discuss the ROI as it lie. I coded all ROI (3) as
“Sent to Committee” if the Journal noted that the ROI was to be sent to a Committee. I coded all
ROI (4) as “Pass” if the Journal noted that the ROI was printed to the use of the Senate, sent to
the House for concurrence, passed on a reading, or passed with amendments.
I tracked the amount of treatments as noted in the Journal by decade. The results indicate
that there was a substantial increase of ROI being sent to a committee or passed from 1810 through
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1819 (Pie Chart 6.1, Pie Chart 6.2, Pie Chart 6.3). Clearly, many more bills were being read, sent
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to committee, or passed in the Senate during the third decade considering the previous two decades
of activity. This supports the idea that ROI became more important during the decades after
Ratification, not less, and also supports the idea that the Committee System was standardized to
support ROI.
The results of the treatments of ROI from the pie charts shows that there was a sizeable
increase during the third decade regarding ROI being passed or sent to committee as well as a
plunging number of ROI that were open for debate. Qualitatively, the sample suggests that this
was because of the choice to pass a constitutional amendment and additional states were
advocating a ROI response in order to pass the amendment. This process resulted in ROI being
sent to a committee and then passed. This evidence highly suggests that Americans did share
republican values because they relied on ROI sent from state legislatures to influence the U.S.
Senate and change the Constitution. The charts provide support for the idea that the peripheralizing
function continued, increasingly, during three decades (at least) after Ratification.
Of particular interest, the amount of instructions "read" increased rapidly from fourteen
percent of the Senate’s treatment of ROI to an outright majority during the third decade. Also
apparent, there is a jump of eleven percentage points to send instructions to committee during the
third decade over the first decade. Part of the explanation is in the plummet of instructions ordered
to lie on the table or for consideration (Open for Debate), going from sixty-three percent during
the first decade to thirty-six percent in the second, and then falling rapidly to just nine percent
during the third decade. To simplify these statistics, I compile the pie charts into Table 6.3 and
Table 6.4.
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The quantitative results above regarding the Senate treatments of ROI from state legislatures from
1789 through 1819 suggests that this practice was important because fewer ROI were open for
debate as more were sent to committee and passed. However, as stated earlier, qualitatively, the
sample regarding the first decade highly suggests that simply reading a ROI or having it lie for
consideration was a noteworthy practice when the ROI was offered by the President. Given the
fact that many of the ROI offered sentiments of praise or a policy recommendation, the Senate
may have simply completed the application of the ROI by openly recognizing the sentiments and
possibly integrating the intergovernmental coordination requests into other bills, such as a ROI
pertaining to westward expansion that was an ongoing operation. In this way, the results suggest
that ROI reflected a flourishing republicanism in the United States.
To test the hypothesis that ROI did matter to the senators as something to increasingly
introduce during the later decades, I track the amount of ROI introduced by the senators and by
the president. My hypothesis is that the senators increasingly introduced ROI over time, at least
on average, because senators found messages from state legislatures to be more important to their
electorate who were "republican" and would consider their Senator's vote decision regarding the
ROI as an important political decision. This happened because everyone shared republican values

185
after Ratification, such as the historians’ findings from Chapter Three. Accordingly, Line Graph
6.1 provides evidence to support the hypothesis that senators increasingly introduced ROI from
their state legislatures over time. Also, I find that presidents George Washington, Thomas
Jefferson, and James Madison also introduced ROI in the Senate on several occasions. These
results suggest that ROI did matter to senators and presidents over time. Line Graph 6.1 provides
support for my prime hypothesis that republicanism was practiced openly after Ratification
because everyone supported republican values during the Founders' generation.
Given their increase of importance to the senators over time, I test the hypothesis that the
context of the ROI changed over time from a description of what states need locally, such as the
building of a lighthouse, to more national political challenges, such as the passage of a
constitutional amendment. In order to test this hypothesis, I coded the resolutions as "1" if they
were in regards to a local concern, "2" if they reflected a state concern, "3" if the resolution sought
to influence a national concern, and "4" if the resolution specifically mentioned the need to pass
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or not pass an amendment to the Constitution. The results in Line Graph 6.2 demonstrate that there
is an increase in observances of resolutions that specially address national issues as well as
constitutional change during the third decade. This supports the hypothesis that ROI were
increasingly of national concern. Overall, most resolutions during this time period focus on
concerns to be solved by the national government. Within the "3" category, there are numerous
resolutions that detail the way in which the national government, states, and people worked
together to usurp territory from Native Americans, which may lend support of an alternative
hypothesis that ROI were utilized to support authoritarianism with consideration for Multiple
Traditions (Smith, 1993; Hero, 2003).

The evidence in this chapter supports four key claims. First, ROI increased quantitatively
over the years (Table 6.1 and Table 6.2). Second, ROI were increasingly sent to committee and
passed while they were decreasingly open for debate (Pie Chart 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, Table 6.3, & Table
6.4). Third, the presenter of the ROI changed over time from the president to senators on average
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as senators found messages from state legislatures to be more important over time (Line Graph
6.1). Finally, the nature of the communication by resolutions changed over time from a description
of local matters, such as the location of a lighthouse, to national and constitutional issues (Line
Graph 6.2). This happened because Americans were directing self-government through their state
legislatures and ROI provided an established and routine practice to coordinate inter-governmental
relationships at a time when the Senate infrequently met.
Since all four hypotheses are supported by the evidence, the idea that republicanism was
prevalent is established. Senators took Instruction more seriously over time. The amount of
Instruction increased over three decades after Ratification. ROI were increasingly sent to
committee and passed by the Senate, especially during the third decade. Finally, ROI concerning
national and constitutional issues increased during the third decade as opposed to an ROI that was
reflective of a local matter or the sentiments of the local population during the first decade. These
results suggest that the peripheralizing function continued long after Ratification in support of the
historians' and not the political scientists' perspective regarding American republicanism at the
federal level after Ratification.
Discussion
The Constitution of 1787 gave state governments the ability to perform a political role to
protect popular sovereignty that most Americans from the Founders' generation believed to be
necessary for the proper functioning of the new Republic. State legislatures remained important to
the constitutional understanding of federal-state relations on republican grounds because ROI were
an institutional bulwark of exhibitions regarding a shared commitment to individual liberty, just
procedures, and broad-based political participation. ROI to senators were a means by which state
legislatures, hamstrung by challenges presented by timing and distance, ensured that their petitions
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were placed before Congress (Girdwood & Grynaviski, 2014). What is surprising is the degree by
which almost all ROI were taken quite seriously, even those simply read for the record. Today, if
something is ordered to lie for consideration or sent to a committee in the U.S. Senate, political
scientists generally assume that passage is quite unlikely and, by extension, the introduction of
such a bill is meaningless regarding the official business of the Senate. However, the ROI brought
in by presidents George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison appear to have been
"good on arrival." Only a "republican" and not a "liberal" value system can explain this qualitative
observation, though more research is necessary in order to substantiate this qualitative observation.
Resolutions were matters of particular local concern that required federal action (e.g.,
Native Americans’ land) and of national concern that required local input (e.g., the location of a
federal post road or lighthouse). Both demanded inter-governmental coordination. Senators
performed an important agency function for their states merely by presenting their legislatures’
wishes to the lawmakers in the capitol who could use that information to coordinate
intergovernmental activities. ROI to U.S. Senators and similar petitions appear to have been an
especially useful vehicle for these kinds of communication because they so clearly established the
wishes of the state as opposed to the whims of the individual representatives in Congress. The ROI
practice therefore encouraged transparency, impartiality, and contestability regarding the
republican element of the culture. And, when we consider Instruction in the decades before the
Constitution (Chapter Four), we observe from this dissertation almost fifty years of Instruction as
a continuous practice to peripheralize the national Congress.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I provide the context and treatment of a sample of one hundred and sixteen
Resolutions of Instruction that were recorded in the Senate Journal from 1789 through 1819. I find
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that the use of ROI to express a local sentiment as well as to pass a constitutional amendment
strongly implies that each resolution carries its own weight according to its purpose. Thus, my
findings support the historians’ depiction of the role of Instruction from Chapter Three as a
pathway to exhibit self-government instead of the current disposition by political scientists which
contends that republicanism was pretty much dead after Ratification as an influential element of
the culture considering the choices and actions of federal representatives. Further, even though a
singular ROI was discharged as a nuisance from an independent Senate, this action is better
understood as a dramatic show of restraint because the Constitution allowed the senators to entirely
ignore ROI at a whim, nevertheless, senators increasingly utilized the practice of Instruction after
Ratification. This happened because Americans and their representatives shared an adherence to
core republican values.
State legislatures played an important role as a broker of power between the people and the
federal representatives in regards for the maintenance of a Republic. From light-houses to
westward expansion and constitutional change, Instructions demonstrate that, to some degree, the
state legislatures were organized to peripheralize the U.S. Senate in order to administer selfgovernment. However, there were clearly torrents of authoritarianism (race supremacy) embedded
into the decision-making process of ROI in regards for westward expansion. In brief, the
republican practice of Instruction through state legislatures mattered during the Founders'
generation as a means for being a republican, but republican values were at times sequestrated by
the representatives to provision other elements of the American culture, such as authoritarianism.
Much more research is needed.
Keeping Instruction from the Constitution was a point of departure regarding the
republican tradition under the Articles of Confederation considering the implementation of self-
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government; meanwhile, the practice of Instruction proliferated to the new states and territories
after Ratification and, according to the evidence, is partly responsible for the need to develop the
Committee System. The states could not constitutionally recall senators or force them to resign by
sending in and ROI, but the state legislatures did make their wishes known to federal government
regarding purposive action for the development of the Republic and these instances of ROI enabled
the peripheralizing function to grow, not eviscerate, during the decades after Ratification in the
U.S. Senate.
In conclusion, ROI were increasingly introduced and delegated to a number of senators
who would serve on the special committee to determine how to incorporate ROI. The qualitative
analysis highly suggests that this incorporation of ROI by the Senate was a processing of the
peripheralizing function. Thus, republicanism grew during the decades after Ratification regarding
the federal government, contrary to contemporary assertions from political scientists that
republicanism was basically dead after Ratification in Congress, and I find support for the
historians’ long-held conclusion that republicanism dominated America politics during the
Founding and early Antebellum Era.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION OF DISSERTATION
Overview
Once working on Dr. Grynaviski’s collection of Resolutions of Instruction (ROI) during
2013, I began to notice a breach in the academic literature between historians and political
scientists in regards for the role of Instruction as a practice of the republican element of the culture
that did, or did not, allow Americans a means to participate in self-government. On the one hand,
historians witnessed exhibitions of self-government as a consummate experience of bottom-up
politics everywhere in that the people ultimately exerted power over their government through
local conventions, barbeques, pledges, petitions, the ballot, and ROI, among other pathways, for
governing themselves before and after Ratification until at least the Civil War. On the other hand,
Riker (1955) led a discussion to reveal that the local and state governments did not have the power
to peripheralize—to cause the national body to act due to local / state actions—after Ratification.
Thus, for historians the republican element of the culture was manifest, permeating, and often a
significant explanation for political issues and events before the Civil War regarding American
politics, but for political scientists, republicanism became moot once Instruction was purposefully
withheld from the Constitution.
The purpose of this dissertation is to bridge the breach between historians and political
scientists regarding the continuation of republicanism after Ratification as meaningful practices
within the federal government. By crafting an original contribution to show that the people used
the republican element of the culture as a means to influence the federal government after
Ratification through ROI and petitions, I close this breach with the recommendation that
republicanism should be considered to have been a functioning value system long after Ratification
because the people exercised the means to influence politics within the national Congress in a
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manner consistent with republican core values. Therefore, this dissertation should allow for many
research lines to open in order for political scientists to inquire regarding the republican element
of the American culture, but how might someone begin to study republicanism?
An original contribution of this dissertation is to provide a “baseline” of American
republicanism for future studies of republicanism regarding political practices, institutions,
structures, behavioral, and norms based on political values. To accomplish this, I review two
literatures and provide three empirical examples pertaining to republicanism as an element of a
complex political culture. As an overview, Chapter Two, published by the Journal of Behavioral
and Social Sciences (Girdwood, 2016), supports the idea that scientists are interested in studying
the multiple elements of the American culture. Chapter Three offers a detailed review regarding
the role of Instruction and explores why historians broadly argue that republicanism was the
significant element of the culture, par excellence, during the antebellum era. Meanwhile, Riker
(1955) was persuasive in that the state legislatures didn’t peripheralize the federal government
often enough after Ratification to suggest that republicanism was an operational self-government
through the practice of sending an ROI from a state legislature to the federal government after
Ratification.
My research with Dr. Grynaviski (2014) compels a reevaluation of Riker’s finding because
Riker (1955) grossly underestimated the actual amount of Resolutions of Instruction from state
legislatures after Ratification. Therefore, visiting this breach between historians and political
scientists should be worthwhile because Riker, if given the information of over 2,000 ROIs during
the antebellum era, would likely have argued that there was, given any year during the antebellum
era, having more than one instance of an ROI being operationalized through the Senate, a minimum
of support regarding exhibitions of republicanism. In short, republicanism was at times
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operationalized to peripheralize the federal government during any given year throughout the
antebellum era.
An original contribution of Chapters Five and Six is that the evidence supports the claim
that petitions from the people and ROI from state legislatures were peripheralizing the House and
Senate for years after Ratification, respectively. I find that republicanism was very much alive
after Ratification within the federal government because of a shared belief in republicanism across
the American nation. The people did practice their republican values openly and their
representatives did respond appropriately to them on their terms.
Another original contribution of this dissertation is that I provide a study of Multiple
Traditions because I also find evidence of authoritarianism in the House debate regarding the Alien
and Sedition laws as well as ROI concerning the lands of Native Americans and westward
expansion, complementing the literature related to Rogers Smith (1993, 1997).
Recommendations
Keeping Instruction from the Constitution was a point of departure regarding the
republican tradition under the Articles of Confederation with respect for the implementation of
self-government; meanwhile, the practice of Instruction grew after Ratification and, according to
the evidence, is partly responsible for the need to develop the Committee System. The states could
not constitutionally recall senators or force them to resign by sending in and ROI, but the state
legislatures did make their wishes known to federal government regarding purposive action for the
development of the Republic and the examples of ROI display the peripheralizing function in
action to develop, not eviscerate, the Republic during the decades after Ratification in the U.S.
Senate. Of special interest, James Madison, Father of the Constitution, openly supported the
practice of Instruction as a means to be a republican after Ratification through the Virginia
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Resolves and while President of the United States he introduced ROI from state legislatures to the
Senate.
Therefore, I recommend that political scientists reassess republicanism as an influential
element of the American political culture. Such studies would likely best serve the public interest
when designed to inquire into republicanism from a Multiple Traditions approach. Important
points from this dissertation to consider additional studies of republicanism include:
•

Keeping Instruction withheld from the Constitution was a point of departure from the
republican tradition, yet;

•

State legislatures increasingly practiced Instruction after Ratification

•

U.S. Senators increasingly peripheralized the Senate with ROI during the decades after
Ratification

•

Presidents after Ratification supported the practice of Instruction openly on the Senate floor

•

U.S. Representatives introduced into the House many petitions to repeal two national laws
and these Representatives defended the right of the people through self-government to
cause a House vote to publicly respond to the public request

•

The Founders' generation deeply structured their actions to the republican practices of selfgovernment considering Instruction from 1775 until Ratification, and long afterwards,
notably including James Madison and Thomas Jefferson.
A Multiple Traditions research agenda is now capable of generating research that will be

able to systematically document the multiple elements of the culture because I have provided a
"baseline" of republicanism through this dissertation. The other elements of the culture should be
explored as early as possible by scholars of those value systems, considering Multiple Traditions.
Meanwhile, the examples of authoritarianism through the republican tradition to expand westward
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(Chapter Six) likely provides a good place to look for Native American Thought, Biblical Thought,
Authoritarianism, Liberalism, and conservativism. And, the authoritarianism noted in the House
in regards for vitriolic opposition to the petitioners calling for a repeal of a national law might be
a starting point for scholarly inquiry regarding institutions, behavior, and structure practitioners.
A central contribution of the dissertation is to open new research lines to support the
Multiple Traditions research agenda (pick another topic or the same topic during a different time
frame). Is it possible to imagine that we could embark on the creation of a Multiple Traditions
Repository, maybe to point out when, where, why, and how the major elements of the culture are
at cross purposes regarding the same issue or event. Subsequently, a positive effect of a Multiple
Traditions study using my baseline of republicanism may be that scientists are able to explore and
reduce scientific biases in political agendas as well as to evaluate their own beliefs regarding
liberalism, authoritarianism, republicanism, or another element of the culture. For instance,
behaviorialists may study attitudes towards the elements on various issues, topics, or events.
Or, structuralists may attempt to replicate the elements as structures given the scarcity of resources
concerning the needs of each specific element to function effectively. Finally, institutionalists may
look into how preferences towards each element correlate with policy preferences. Do people who
score high for "liberal" values truly stifle republican and authoritarian policy preferences, and viceversa?
Future Work
Where do we begin to study republicanism during the early 21 st century?
Given the nature of republicanism seemingly everywhere before the Civil War, I took a
chance to research whether Resolutions of Instruction were passed against the Patriot Act of 2001
because it appeared to mimic the Alien and Sedition laws. The results are breathtaking. In response
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to the Patriot Act, there is indeed literature to support the idea that republicanism is an active
element within the culture. Vasi and Strang (2009) account for Bill of Rights (BOR) Resolutions
in, "Civil Liberty in America: The Diffusion of Municipal Bill of Rights Resolutions after the
Passage of the USA PATRIOT Act." They find that over 400 resolutions of instruction were passed
at the local and state levels to, essentially, repeal the Patriot Act! This is, statistically, a great
increase of local / state ROI to oppose a prominent national law!
Of particular interest, according to the study, local participatory associations showcased a
variety of coalitions to pass or to abstain from participating in the passage of the BOR resolutions.
Undeniably, the community associations best suited to join the BOR campaign were those with a
mission to "protect collective goals" (Vasi & Strang, 2009, p. 1748). The top three sponsors of Bill
of Rights resolutions in Dallas, New York, and Columbia are: (1) Peace, Social and Justice
associations, (2) Women, Gay and Lesbian Associations, (3) Racial and Human Rights
associations; respectively. At the far end of the spectrum, and statistically the least likely to
promote the BOR resolutions were: (1) Right Parties, (2) Labor, and (3) Business;
respectfully. Prima facie, the most active associations represented are known to express support
for republican values, and the least likely associations promote the BOR resolutions are known to
express support for liberal and authoritarian values. In light of the literature review from Chapters
Two and Three, this suggests that the resolutions of instruction were passed by citizens who value
"republican" and not "liberal" values during the early 21 st century!
The grassroots organization promoting equality on republican grounds is the Bill of Rights
Defense Committee (BORDC). By August, 2005, 396 municipal, county, and state resolutions had
successfully passed to cover over 80 million American citizens from the Patriot Act. The campaign
by BORDC is activated through a "decentralized structure" and acted as an "informational
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clearinghouse rather than a command and control center" (Vasi & Strang, 2009, p. 1753). The
resolutions on the website provide the material for citizens to act on, and municipalities did craft
a resolution that spoke specifically to the municipality’s constituency. The mode was to "promote
heterogeneity by permitting groups within each city to mobilize autonomously and in their own
way" (Vasi & Strang, p. 1753). This event of ROI in opposition to the Patriot Act wholly supports
Pettit’s expectations for what a republican democracy acts like (2012)!
The Bill of Rights (BOR) resolutions may have altered the implementation of the public
policy because BORs made it illicit to allow the Patriot Act to violate the basic civil liberties
regarding the people of the Republic. Some of the BOR resolutions mandated transparency with
local officials, and the local officials had the right to say "no" to compliance with the Patriot Act.
To be sure, eight of the ordinances verbatim instructed city officials to refuse to comply with
aspects of the Patriot Act deemed unconstitutional as stated by the BOR resolution (Vasi & Strang,
2009, p. 1753). According to BORDC.org (2012), eight State legislatures and four hundred and
six county and local governments did pass, "Resolutions and Ordinances Critical of the USA
Patriot Act" from 2002 through December 4, 2007. Thus, the republican element of the culture is
"online" with respect for the Multiple Traditions research agenda during the early 21st century!
This begs the question: To what degree do individuals belong to associations, community
organizations, and local governments which value freedom, virtue, and equality and are these
values part of a republican value system that is truly maintained and expanded by the people across
America? And, considering the field of political science, to what degree are Urban Studies
examples of the republican, liberal, or authoritarian elements of the culture? Are studies of
federalism and intergovernmental coordination additional examples of the peripheralizing
function? Much more research is needed!
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Conclusion
In this dissertation, I provide examples of historical boundaries of republican practices and
beliefs in practice from 1775 through 1819 in American politics at the national level. This
dissertation should help to establish verifiable boundaries of republicanism that will enable
researchers to search for and observe the element of republicanism during the early 21 st century,
hopefully using new and invigorating methods to advance a Multiple Traditions research agenda.
I find that Americans enjoyed individualized, unconditioned, and efficacious control over their
government from 1775 through 1819 (Pettit 2012), albeit in rudimentary ways. The evidence
suggests that Americans did peripheralize the General Government after Ratification because of a
belief in the republican values of freedom, virtue, and equality.
In conclusion, to show that republicanism was important before and after the ratification
of the Constitution, I systematically documented two practices of direct popular control, ROI and
direct petition, by which the people and their representatives enjoined and sustained a formative
republican political experience. On the other hand, republicanism cannot explain the experiences
of authoritarianism or its inability to foster a common good of equality, virtue, and freedom with,
considering this dissertation, Native Americans. Nonetheless, republicanism was a customary
political practice that continued long after Ratification because Americans openly practiced
republican values as a means for supporting their values regarding self-government. And, this
happened at the federal level because republican values were the core values of the representatives
too, shared across the nation.
The end.
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AFTERWARDS
Ronald Formisano’s article (2001), “The Concept of Political Culture” as published in The
Journal of Interdisciplinary History explores the descriptions and definitions of political culture
between historians [holistic and evolutionary] and political scientists [is political culture causal
and is there a behavioral component?] (p. 396). As culture studies originated with Herder, de
Tocqueville, and Montesquieu, the modern genesis began in political science with Almond’s
article (1956) “Comparative Political Systems” (p. 396). Almond’s central definition of political
culture is: Every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political
action (p. 396). In 1963, Almond and Verba’s The Civic Culture accomplished a cross-national
study “offering a theory of political stability and democracy that implicitly celebrated AngloAmerican representative government—which became a major work of the political culture
approach” (pp. 396-397). The “most popular spin-off from the concept’s international origins was
the comparison of state political cultures” by Elazar (1966) and many empirical studies generally
confirmed Elazar’s typology, which I shall return to shortly.
By the 1970s, critics gained a foothold and political scientists became disinterested in the
concept of political culture (Formisano, 2001). Pye (1972) argued that the definitions for political
culture were elusive and that it was used to explain “anything that cannot be explained by more
precise and concrete factors” (p. 399). Further, political culture studies seemed to obscure
scientific analysis to the fallacy that macro systems are simply extrapolations of micro systems,
“thus failing to establish the connection between the richly complex thoughts and actions of
individuals and the collective polity” (p. 400). Other critics include Pateman (1971) and Dittmer
(1977) regarding assumptions of patterns of participation and ambiguity of central definitions,
respectively. By 1979, Elkins and Simeon called political culture “popular and seductive” as well
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as “controversial and confused” because the dependent variable was often not specified but as a
mind-set or disposition (p. 403). Further criticisms continued through the 1980s and in 1988,
Chilton addressed the downward spiral of political culture in that it “remains a suggestive rather
than a scientific concept” (p. 404). Laitin (1995) concluded that thirty years of political culture
illuminated a “degenerative research program” fraught with unproductive, unclear, and
tautological findings (pp. 168-169).
On the other hand, Formisano (2001) contends, there are defenders of political culture who
agree that culture studies provide explanations for politics, such as Almond (1990), Merelman
(1989, 1991), Gibbins (1989), Wildavsky, Ellis, and Thompson (1990), Lane (1992), NesbittLarkin (1992), Welch (1993). During the 1987 presidential address to the American Political
Science Association, Wildavsky stated that there is a “cultural rationality.” Political culture is
capable of demonstrating causal efficacy, noting Eckstein (1988) and Inglehart (1988). Even
though Laitin and others completely disagreed with these assessments, political culture broke new
ground in 1993 considering the seminal work by Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work. Yet
these advances were knocked back down by detractors, such as Jackman and Miller (1996) who
argued that these works substantially overstated how cultural accounts affect political life.
Concomitantly, Formisano (2001) relates that historians by and large accept political culture as a
meaningful set of attitudes, beliefs, orientations, and values to affect politics (pp. 425-426).
David Lowery and Lee Sigelman’s article (1982), “Political Culture and State Public
Policy: The Missing Link,” published in The Western Political Quarterly, focuses on testing
Elazar’s tripartipe classification of political cultures considering moralistic, individualistic, and
traditionalistic cultures. These cultures exhibit a unique understanding regarding the purpose of
political action and governmental policy, with special attention paid to “the legitimacy of mass
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political participation and the acceptable scope of government policy making” (p. 376). The
moralistic culture highly supports mass participation as a means to direct public policy. The
individualistic culture welcomes mass participation to affect public policy, however, the heavylifting is done by the professionals and the people are isolated from policy making. The
traditionalistic culture displays a restrictive orientation towards popular participation, “reflecting
a highly elitist view in which mass activity is seen as disruptive or even dangerous” (p. 376).
Altogether, political culture impacts public policy as a matrix of the three major cultures (p. 377).
At first glance, republicanism, liberalism, and authoritarianism “match” Elazar’s tripartipe
classification of political cultures considering moralistic, individualistic, and traditionalistic
cultures, respectively.
In ascertaining whether Elazar’s three distinctive attitudes towards mass participation and
the scope of government “holds sway among members of the three cultures,” Lowery and
Sigelman (1982) gather data from the 1978 American National Election Study survey and execute
three measures of attitudes concerning mass participation (pp. 377-379). They are external
efficacy, governmental responsiveness, and sense of citizen duty, each with a scale of attitudes per
item and a composite measure. And, the authors use dummy variable approach in order to
circumvent conceptual problems of in regards for the treatments of political cultures regarding a
regression analysis. The traditionalistic dummy variables were excluded from the equation since
“the traditionalistic culture serves as the reference category in interpreting the coefficients for
respondents identified with moralistic or individualistic cultures” (p. 379).
The regression results demonstrate a “modicum of empirical support for Elazar’s
formulation, but their net effect is to undermine rather than bolster confidence in the empirical
validity of that formulation” (p. 380). Regarding the coefficients for the dummy variables, four of
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the six tests for moralistic culture were significantly different from zero. Further, all current
residence were significant, meaning, controlling for all other variables, residents or people
subscribing to the moralistic culture “are more politically efficacious, view government as being
more responsive, and express a more highly developed sense of citizen duty than do residents of
traditionalistic cultures” (p. 381).
However, the differences do not attain statistical significance (p. 381). Similar results in
support of Elazar’s formulation occur for the individualistic and traditionalistic cultures, with 7 of
12 predictions borne out. Thus, “the performance of the political culture variables as predictors of
attitudes related to political participation and the desired scope of government activity is modest
at best” (p. 382). “The argument that there are sharp contemporary attitudinal differences between
cultural groups simply remains unproven” (p. 382). In the end, explanations considering other
relevant studies of political culture may be due to “elite cultures” that greatly influence public
policy making, or the matter of a “culture lag” whereby the present political institutions reflect the
works implemented by previous eras (p. 383). This is therefore an opportunity for me to
accomplish a new culture approach in order to attempt to attain statistical significance.
Therefore, at the time of defending this dissertation in 2018, political culture remains a
controversial research topic. Regarding this dissertation, I believe that I have begun to solve many
of the problems political scientists studying political culture have faced concerning an ambiguity
of findings / conclusions as well as the independent / dependent variable problems because, in
short, I clarify how republicanism was a freestanding political value system from 1775 through
1819. The elements of republicanism, liberalism, authoritarianism, and biblical thought comprise
the collective polity of the American political culture (Tocqueville, 1835 | 1988). Political
scientists have long argued that liberalism is an independent element of the American culture and
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authoritarianism has been surfacing rapidly considering President Trump and his supporters. What
has been a thorny puzzle is whether republicanism continued to affect American politics at the
national level through the peripheralizing function after Ratification (Riker, 1955).
Thus, I believe that this dissertation will lead to many new research lines concerning the
research topic of American political culture. Technically, I provide an empirical study of
republican practices before and after Ratification to craft a baseline of strictly republican values
and practices from 1775 through 1819. I show that Riker (1955) was misguided because of his
lack of data and the data shows that republican practices actually increased nationwide after
Ratification. Practically, political scientists researching political culture should consider the
conceptualization and application of republican values as noted in this work to explain
observations for the republican pattern of orientations to political action. In this way, I hope to
replace Elazar’s moralistic culture with the firmly established republican element of the American
political culture.
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APPENDIX: CLAIMS AND HYPOTHESES
“The principal claim of this dissertation is that republicanism continued to influence American
politics at the federal level after Ratification.”
Chapter Three
CLAIM 1: the American people and their representatives practiced their republican values openly
before and long after Ratification.
CLAIM 2: Their exhibitions of Instruction based on core republican values were widespread
and prevalent across the nation.
If both claims are true, I think that it is reasonable to conclude that republicanism was a
freestanding political value system, at the very least, from inception through the antebellum era.
Chapter Four, 1775 - 1789
HYPOTHESIS 1: The people and their representatives (Delegates) practiced Instruction as an
expression of their "republican" values to cause significant action in changing national policy.
HYPOTHESIS 2: There is no difference between the exertion of political change that Instruction
had in American politics before and after the Battle of Yorktown.
Chapter Five, 1798-1799
My primary hypothesize is that Americans sent petitions directly to their Representatives in order
to cause action at the federal level regarding the need to repeal the Alien and Sedition laws of 1798
and 1799 a dozen years after Ratification. And, the members of the House who received the
petitions defended them and performed their role as agent of the people in a way that exhibited the
role of Instruction as a ritualized practice of self-government.
Republican Hypotheses
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HYPOTHESIS 1: House records should demonstrate that a lot of petitions by ordinary people
were signed and delivered which condemned the Alien and Sedition laws.
HYPOTHESIS 2: There was a defense of the petitioners and the petitions by the Representatives
in order to protect self-government.
Authoritarian Hypotheses
HYPOTHESIS 3: In the House debate, if some members exhibited authoritarianism, there would
have been expressed as an argument against the people’s right to exercise an ability to
legitimately oppose and repeal a federal law because the petitions were argued to be an affront to
a body of Representatives who hold an inherent power to care for the people (e.g., paternalism).
HYPOTHESIS 4: The petitions were argued to be illegitimate on various grounds, such as being
passed by the people based on misinformation or disinformation.
Chapter Six, 1789-1819
My primary hypothesize is that ROI from state legislatures were substantively important to
American politics as a practice of self-government.
HYPOTHESIS 1: Instructions increased quantitatively over three decades after Ratification. I
provide a table to support this hypothesis or not.
HYPOTHESIS 2: Instructions were increasingly sent to committee and passed over three decades
after Ratification. I provide pie charts to support the hypothesis or not.
HYPOTHESIS 3: The presenter of the instruction changed over time from the president to senators
on average. This happens because senators found messages from state legislatures to be more
important over time. I provide a line graph to support the hypothesis or not.
HYPOTHESIS 4: The nature of the communication by resolutions changed over time from a
description of what states were doing in territories and in need of lighthouses to much more serious
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actions being required of Senators in that they were instructed to amend the Constitution. I provide
a line graph to support the hypothesis or not.
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In my three empirical chapters, I provide documentation for my claims that (1) the people
did petition the General Government, such as through petitions and resolutions of
instruction and, (2) the national representatives did acknowledge and respectively act on
the people’s political documents, with attention paid to the defense of republican self-government,
during the decades before and after Ratification. The evidence suggests that Americans did
peripheralize the General Government before and after Ratification because of a belief in the
republican values of freedom, virtue, and equality.
Practically, political scientists researching political culture should consider the
conceptualization and application of republican values as noted in this work to explain
observations for the republican pattern of orientations to political action. In this way, I hope to
replace Elazar’s moralistic culture (1966) with the firmly established republican element of the
American political culture because I provide evidence to support that republicanism was a viable
political value system in America from 1775 through 1819.
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AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT
Political things are very interesting to me. I majored in Political Theory and Constitutional
Democracy at James Madison College inside of Michigan State University and graduated during
1999. In 2004, I began to write a political novel regarding the Iraq War and American foreign
policy, N. Awakening, The Origin of the Nobill Revolution, that I would self-publish a few months
before entering the Ph.D. Political Science program at Wayne State University during 2009.
There, I began to research republicanism during 2010 and I plan to continue to research
republicanism in America for the remainder of my career because I think republicanism provides
the “political solutions” that all Americans would find optimal to the status quo. This is because
republicanism is what the Framers of the Constitution indeed ritualized into institutional norms
and procedures with respect to the values and practices of the administration of self-government
in regards to the functioning of the federal government (by the people, of the people, and for the
people—said by the first president, Abraham Lincoln, of the newly established Republican Party!).
Thus, I have come to believe that Americans today fundamentally seek to renew a
government of American republicanism, and because of their political culture, they will succeed.
It’s my job to document and analyze it—and maybe even one day to be able to predict it.

